


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


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
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Section 2



DREW'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN SOUL.



AN ESSAY

ON THE

IMMATERIALITY AND IMMORTALITY

OF THE

HUMAN SOUL:

FOUNDED SOLELY ON PHYSICAL AND RATIONAL PRINCIPLES.

BY SAMUEL DREW, A.M.

WITH NOTES AND A MEMOIR,


BY J. R. MILES,

Author of "Scripture Geography," "Life of Watts," &c.

MANCHESTER:

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

THOMAS JOHNSON, LIVESEY STREET.



TO THE
RIGHT REV. JOHN BIRD SUMNER, D. D., &c.,
BISHOP OF CHESTER.

MY LORD,

Had it not been for the recent death of a much esteemed friend and highly valued instructor*, it is more than probable that I might have passed through this life without my name ever coming under your Lordship's eye. I had long since determined, if I ever entered on the paths of purely philosophic inquiry, that my first efforts in that field, however humble and unworthy of general notice, should be addressed to the gentleman, already referred to, as a mark of sincere respect and long cherished esteem for the valuable lessons I had derived from him; and the high example of general propriety of conduct which through life adorned his lengthened career.

The only motives for addressing your Lordship, on the present occasion, arise from admiration of your conduct as a minister of Christ, and your talents as a Theologian and a Philosopher. In the capacity of a teacher of religion your

* The Rev. James Mylne, A. M. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

general conduct has been marked by a constant attention to the pastoral duties of your diocese; whilst others have been spending the period allotted to them, by a gracious Providence for fulfilling the purposes of his will and performing the functions of the sacred calling, in party strife, and in enkindling and perpetuating prejudice, your Lordship's voice has not been raised for the purpose of distinguishing yourself as a political partisan; nor has your pen been prostituted for the purpose of vilifying those who might differ with you in their political deductions. As a theological writer your name is extensively known and your labours highly appreciated; and there can be but one opinion as to the value of your labours in this department of Literature.

Had the motives now referred to been wanting, one still remained which would have entitled your Lordship to the distinction of having the following pages addressed to you had no other ground of distinction or preference existed; namely, that of having been one of the successful competitors against the author of the "Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the Human Soul" for the Burnet Prize "On the Being and Attributes of the Deity." In conclusion; I may with strict propriety and truth borrow the language of Mr. Drew, when addressing the Reverend Rector of Ruan-Lanyhorne, "that the modes of address and the arts of pleasing are a species of learning which I have never yet acquired;" but silence in the present case would not have been justifiable considering your Lordship's position, character, and literary relation to the author of the following work. Having thus done what I conceive to be an act of justice

to your Lordship, I have only to say, that I sincerely hope you may be long preserved in strength of body and soundness of mind by the great Head of the Church for the performance of those important duties which your elevated position presents, whether in affording a practical illustration of true godliness to all around and beneath you ; or, in still further adding to the literature of our father-land.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's

Humble and Obedient Servant,

JOHN REID MILES.



TO THE
REV. JOHN WHITAKER,
RECTOR of RUAN-LANYHORNE,
Cornwall.

REV. SIR,

WHEN this Dedication meets your eye, it will be unnecessary for me to say,—that the modes of address, and the arts of pleasing, are a species of learning which I have never yet acquired ; but silence is not justifiable when gratitude urges an acknowledgment. It is a full conviction of your favors, which has prompted me to a Dedication ; and I intend nothing more in this Address, than to tell the world how much I am indebted, and to express the warm effusions of a grateful heart.

When, without patron or friend, I abandoned my first publication to its fate, you saw it floating on the stream of time toward the caves of oblivion, and, kindly extending the hand of unsolicited friendship, you rescued it from the shade.

Under the forms of common civility, you have treated me with a degree of politeness to which my deserts can bear no proportion ; while the condescension of your manners, has taught me to surmount that distance, which station and circumstance had made between us.

Superior to those local prejudices which might have influenced a mind devoid of magnanimity, you have more than called yourself my friend ; while, stimulated by your encouragement, I have prosecuted with vigour the present work, which, abstracted from this circumstance, would, in all probability, never have seen completion.

Destitute of literary reputation in myself, and treated with the icy hand of indifference by several of those whom custom had taught me to call my friends,—the link which united *completion to publication*, originated also with you.

Distinguished as an Historian and Philologist, in the literary world, the name of Mr. WHITAKER has been my passport to many of my subscribers, to whom, without it, even presumption itself would have led me to despair of all access.

It is under the sanction of your approbation of my Work, that I have addressed myself to the Ladies and Gentlemen of Cornwall; and, beyond my most sanguine expectation, their generosity has crowned my application with success.

Under these circumstances gratitude becomes a duty; and I should reproach myself with that ingratitude, to which I hope my bosom will long remain a stranger, were I to omit the acknowledgment of favors, where I cannot cancel obligations.

The uniform attachment of Mr. WHITAKER to the cause of Christianity, and his abilities to defend her out-posts against all opposers, have been sufficiently appreciated both by friends and foes;—the present Work, therefore, approaches you by a kind of natural right. But to proceed further in detailing those facts, which are necessary to make good its claim, would look like adulation;—In proceeding, I must hurt your feelings; and in desisting, I must stifle my own; and as I wish to be grateful, I must be silent.

To the Nobility, the Gentry, and other respectable inhabitants of Cornwall, I acknowledge myself to be particularly indebted for their patronage and support. There are many among them, who have interested themselves in the issue of my present publication, whose names it would gratify my feelings to publish; but it is a liberty which I dare not take.—To notice all the marks of attention which I have received, would be to violate the bounds of prudence; and to make selections, would be invidious and unjust.

To them, and to you, the Work is now presented, and the fate which awaits it cannot be remote. Under the sanction

of your approbation, I shall feel tranquillity amidst the shafts of critical malevolence ; and this reflection will afford me consolation in obscurity, though forgetfulness should stamp her *insignia* on my Work. But should a different fate await it—should it rise into some degree of reputation, this paper will bear testimony to whom I am indebted.

That they, and you, in the regions of immortality, may inherit that Glory which God has reserved in a future state of Being for them that love and fear him, is among the genuine wishes of my heart. The influence of discordant motives, no doubt, produces changes in the human mind, which baffle all calculation ; but, judging from those feelings which have been long the inhabitants of my breast, gratitude and life must forsake together the bosom of

REV. SIR,

Their and Your

Much obliged,

And very humble Servant,

SAMUEL DREW.

ST. AUSTELL, *November 5th*, 1802.



PREFACE.

AMONG that infinite variety of abstract truths which the God of Heaven has placed within the reach of human investigation, there are but few more pleasing to a contemplative mind than the *natural Immortality of the Human Soul*. To the gratification which results from such a contemplation, the Author of our being has been pleased to unite our most important interests; and has placed the *immortality of the human soul* among those truths which it is at once our duty and privilege to explore in our present state of being; a our felicity to enjoy through all eternity.

A subject which thus becomes interesting from its own importance, must be applicable to mankind in all ages of the world, and can only lose its energy when we lose our being. If, however, from the chequered state of human life, any one period can advance a claim in preference to another, it must be in an age, when infidelity, under the apparent sanction of philosophy, attempts to impose itself upon the credulous and the unthinking. It is in this age that we live.

When principles appeal to our passions, under the auspices of Reason, and yet leave the understanding uninfluenced by their efficacy, they carry with them a presumptive evidence, that error lies concealed behind the mask. The principles of French philosophy answer this description, and therefore justify this conclusion. They fascinate with a specious appearance, and by gratifying the corrupted passions to which they appeal, they conceal their delusive tendencies under the visor which they wear.* Error chiefly becomes formidable

* We may here use the language of Locke, and say that nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a bias to all their actions. It

from its concealment, and a detection of falsehood generally dispels its charm.* And were infidelity to disclose its horrors, it would cease to operate upon the minds of men. Defeated in its native form, it approaches us in habiliments which are less questionable; and enters, unperceived, the unguarded avenues of the heart. In this strange delirium of the mind, we become captivated with the novelty of new ideas, and mistake a paroxysm of soul for an intellectual acquisition.

The progress of French philosophy, has, perhaps, been more destructive than her arms.† By appealing to the more

is quite possible for principles to be brought before the mind erroneous in themselves, as regards other individuals, or their interests, and still afford not the slightest evidence that error lurks beneath the conclusions deduced from them, as far as regards the minds of the parties upon whom such principles have been superinduced, from the simple fact that they do not, nor can they view them under the same aspect, as other parties may do. The whole history of mankind, viewed either religiously or philosophically, establishes this great truth. Archelaus, for example, taught that the distinction between right and wrong is not founded in nature, but in arbitrary law. His disciples might believe in such a conclusion, and still not perceive that error lay concealed behind the mask. Every individual who implicitly credits any principle from which disorder may afterwards arise, and not at the time when the principle is inculcated, is evidently an illustration reversing the conclusion intended to be drawn by our Author. The conclusion which he draws from the philosophical systems of the French was not warranted by the premises.

* So long as error is unperceived, from its non-application, its effects are unfelt and consequently cannot be said to be formidable in any degree. A man may write a treatise on moral science as false as that of Archelaus, and may conceal it in his chamber; it produces no effect. The same system can only become dangerous by its publication and the practical application of its conclusions to the previously pure standard of moral virtue.

† Our author's mind appears to have been deeply imbued with the prejudices created against the French, arising out of the circumstances of the period when he wrote. By opposing truth to the falsity of their philosophy, we might have prevented the inroads of error, either in religion or the laws of reasoning; but we now feel and that bitterly too the effects of her arms, arising from the unjust and impolitic opposition offered to that people, by those who had no desire for the promotion of truth, but whose sole object was the suppression of liberty and the subjugation of mankind.

vulnerable parts of human nature, we suffer our principles to be undermined by imperceptible degrees, till we * barter truth for error ; and, by adopting sentiments which originate a few shades beneath the surfaces of things ; a superficial mind is tempted to place the reasoning by which it has been seduced among the recondite depths of science.

The principles of *Rousseau* on education, if indiscriminately adopted, † will prepare the youthful mind for that ridicule which marks the pages of *Voltaire* ; ‡ and the mind which can cherish the ridicule of the latter without remorse, is sufficiently prepared for the false philosophy of *Marat* and *Volney*, and bids fair for the adoption of the bare-faced impudence of *Thomas Paine*.

It is thus the principles of posterity become poisoned at the fountain-head. And while under the sanction of a *Bolingbroke* or a *Shaftesbury*, the insidious volumes of similar writers have been calling into question those truths which we have been taught to revere as sacred and incontrovertible ; it is to be lamented that men of erudition and splendid talents, who profess themselves christians, have lent their pens—"to point a moral, or adorn a tale !" This stricture may seem severe. § I should gratify my feelings in softening its rigour, but the fact is self-evident, and I draw the comparison with the deepest regret.

* Our author evidently designed this application in the third person. The change of person is needful to give his meaning that force, which he intended it to convey.

† A contingency upon which but little stress requires to be laid ; as no sane mind would adopt in practice the principles of *Rousseau*. Such an attempt would carry with it, its own defeat.

‡ The name of this great bad man but seldom passes through my mind, without bringing with it that laconic but pointed character given of him by Mr. Cowper. His character of 'M. de Voltaire' is, that he—

"Liv'd long, wrote much, laughed heartily, and died !" DREW.

§ The writer's design is by no means obvious. Unless it was intended as a covert hit at the Socinians of his own time. If we may thus conclude, the text becomes intelligible ; and quite applicable to that party at the present moment.

In all ages of the world a general belief has prevailed, that man must survive the grave. This sentiment is inculcated so early as the days of Homer, in—

“ That wrath which hurl’d to Pluto’s gloomy reign
“ The SOULS of mighty chiefs, untimely slain ;
“ Whose limbs, unburied, on the naked shore,
“ Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore.”

On the presumption of this general truth, the idea of future consciousness is founded, and consequently of rewards and punishments in another life. From this source, those systems of morality have been drawn by those venerable sages of antiquity, whose writings have illuminated the Pagan world.* And while arguments and authority have both conspired to establish this general truth, and define the boundaries of human action ; a full conviction of its being true, has afforded us that immoveable basis on which we rest our hopes and fears.

It is indeed to be lamented, that while these truths have obtained the general suffrage, the world has not been without exceptions to universal belief. Whether the insufficiency of evidence, or some unaccountable deformity in the human intellect ; whether the novelty of being singular, a determined resolution to resist those restraints which a conviction of these truths would impose ; or a lazy apathy which freezes the mental powers, may claim the primary station in the black catalogue of causes ; are points of speculation which it might be useful to explore. Whatever the cause or causes are, certain it is, that an apparent fatality extends its influence to a certain description of men, who seem to place their defence in the blandishments of wit, and derive their security from the sorceries of applause.

In proportion as science has enlightened the human mind, an attack on these truths has naturally been succeeded by an examination of first principles ; opposition has produced

* We are somewhat persuaded that Mr. Drew’s acquaintance with the moral systems of the ancients was extremely limited ; and we may not be far from the truth in concluding, that his information on this head was only such as he had derived orally from some of his clerical friends.

defence, and life and immortality have been brought to light by the gospel. The day of general controversy has long been past, and peace has been the happy result of demonstration.

In this state of tranquillity, when the ground of infidelity was no longer tenable, and opposition became too feeble to keep alive debate, the *rational* methods of defence were lost, with many, in the blaze of demonstration; and the arguments which proved the soul to be immortal, were forgotten in the full conviction of its being true. An Atheist, like a solitary meteor, might have wandered through a century, and excited the mixed emotions of astonishment and contempt.*

The concluding years of the eighteenth century, have, however, presented us with a different aspect. The revolution in France has extended itself to the departments of literature, and moral philosophy has undergone a considerable change. The contagion has been communicated across the water. In England we have been told that the human soul "is nothing but *matter*;" and in France we are informed, that "*death is an eternal sleep*." A *Godwin* has told us, that "*duty is the bugbear of the ignorant*;" and a *Marat* has assured us, that "*pity is not a native of the human breast*." The doubts which have been started by *Hume* and *Hobbes*, have been improved by *Priestley* and *Barlow*, and diffused through every order of society, by emissaries of the present day. Infidelity is a pernicious evil. The different branches into which it shoots, are but distinct parts of one great whole. And whether infidelity approach us in the stern philosophy of a *Priestley*, or in the scepticism of a *Rousseau*; in the polite ignorance of a *Volney*, or the naked blasphemy of *Thomas Paine*, the identity of its nature is not thereby changed. The streams may be different, but they all originate in one common fountain, and all terminate in one general issue.

To sit as idle spectators on the issue of these commotions, is no longer a matter of indifference; but to be active in the

* A strong illustration of the force of prejudice. We do not treat a man with contempt on account of his opinions: we view the errors of judgment into which he has fallen with pity. It is his misfortune, not his fault.

cause of truth, is a duty which every man owes to his God, and to his country, to himself, and to posterity; and that man must be deficient in the discharge of his duty, who, to the utmost of his power, will not exert himself to check the progress of so destructive an evil.

Under the influence of this principle, I have been led from traditionary belief, to an investigation of first principles, and the result of my inquiries is,—a full conviction that rational principles must support the fact. The arguments which have produced that conviction, I have committed to writing, and am now about to commit them to the world. The modes of reasoning, therefore, which I have adopted, founded upon no preconceived hypothesis; and the arguments, as well as manner, are equally new to me.

On a subject so awful, I am well assured that the ground on which I tread, is, if possible, more than sacred; but whatever be the issue, I shall have this consolation,—that I have done my best, and meant it well. To pretend to be without all emotion on the issue of this Essay, I should betray my vanity in professing. I have sensations on the occasion which I feel it difficult to describe; and I place the internal conflict of my bosom, among those indescribables, which may naturally be conceived on such an occasion, to occupy the mind of man.

My feelings revolt at the idea of publishing an Essay on such a subject while I am writing this Preface; yet the importance of the subject suggests these ideas;—if I succeed in my main propositions, I shall feel myself amply recompensed for my present perturbations; if not, the *occasion* itself will soften the mortification of disgrace.

It is not, however, to my own feelings, but to the public judgment that I appeal.

A subject so abstruse in its nature, and whose consequences extend to a future state of being, must necessarily impress some obscurities on the manner of its pursuit: I have avoided all in my power, and yet many, perhaps, remain. It must however, be remembered,—that our inability to comprehend a fact, is no argument against the fact itself. The ploughshare of reason may be driven through the rocks of error, although every reader may not be able to discern the furrow which it makes.

Far be it from me to insinuate, that I have said all that might be said, or anticipated every objection which may be started; but truths can never oppose each other; and if the arguments which I have adduced to establish my main propositions be conclusive, every objection, however possible, must lose its force. On such a subject, new arguments are continually starting to a contemplative mind; and whether the *importance* or *extension* of this subject be the greatest, it is, perhaps, hard to say; but in favour of an important subject, he that advances any thing new, adds to the general stock of argument; and he that adds to the general stock of argument, adds to the general benefit of mankind.

Let it not be thought because I have declined all appeal to the Sacred Volume, that I have therefore drawn over the book of God the most distant shade of disrespect. The mind that can harbour such an idea, must form but a very partial conception of my undertaking. The Bible I consider as the great repository of sacred knowledge; and moral philosophy can be no longer right, than while it acts in concert with revelation. I consider moral truth, as an elevated mountain, the summit of which, Revelation unveils to the eye of faith, without involving us in the tedious drudgery of painful speculations. To some of these views philosophy will direct us, through a labyrinth of intricacies; and after the human understanding has put forth all her efforts, it is “by toil and art the steep ascent we gain.” If, however, in any given momentous instance, tardy movements of philosophy will lead us to the same conclusions which the Bible has already formed, it affords us no contemptible evidence of its authenticity; and Revelation challenges our belief in those instances where we can trace no relation.

The ground on which I have assumed the present question, is simply this—Have we, or have we not, any rational evidence of the soul's immortality, admitting that no revelation had ever been given us from God? If we have, infidelity loses one of its strongest fortresses; if not, all rational proof of the immortality of the soul is at once done away.

Whether the present Work, like those bubbles on the passing stream, which float along and then expire, will engross the attention of mankind only for a moment, and then disappear; or pass onward to ages which its author can never

reach, are points which events can alone decide. I have not vanity enough to presume, that infallibility has impressed her footsteps upon every sentence which I have written ; the arguments, however, are such as have produced conviction in my own mind, from a persuasion that they arise from the fixed relations of things. I have attempted to erect this fabric on such facts and propositions as are incontrovertible, and have traced the intermediate ideas which appeared to have stood in contact with one another, to that conclusion which I had in view.

To those who are skilled in the critical accuracies of grammar, my language may sound harsh and unharmonious and some solecisms may appear ; but the *real* critic, and the candid of every description, I am persuaded will readily make allowances for these imperfections, when they consider my situation in life, and the disadvantages under which I have written.

I have no apology to offer ; I publish with diffidence, but I publish with deliberation ; I solicit no favour which justice and candour will not entitle me to claim, and which I have been more than once convinced the public are ready to bestow.

Should what I have written be made instrumental in reclaiming but *one* from the fangs of infidelity, or in preventing another from becoming its victim ; it will afford me a consolation which will accompany me through life, and, I hope, be remembered with gratitude through all eternity.

PREFACE

TO THE

SECOND EDITION

As a second edition of this work is about to enter the world so close upon the first, I think it a duty which I owe to the public and myself, to state a few particulars relative to both.

When proposals for printing the first edition of this Work, were presented to the inhabitants of *Cornwall*, I had no conception that a patronage so liberal awaited it; I had, therefore, no further design in soliciting subscriptions, than to obtain a partial reimbursement of those expences which attended the publication, the risk of which my circumstances would not permit me to bear. And though almost unknown in the departments of literature, and destitute of those acquirements which might justify the public expectation, the Work has come forward under the sanction of the most respectable list of subscribers, that *Cornwall* on any similar occasion has, perhaps, ever afforded.

Anxious to know its fate, and solicitous for the issue, I waited the event with a mind fluctuating in suspense, and labouring under sensations, which it would be useless to publish, and difficult to describe. The ordeal of local criticism, however, is now past; and the numerous testimonies of approbation, which I have received from the enlightened and judicious, are such as have exceeded my most sanguine expectations. And, I hope, I may state without the imputation of vanity, that it has been highly gratifying to me to learn, that I have given no occasion to the enlightened and liberal minded, to reflect on their patronage with regret.

The claims of an infant family, obliging me to attend on the common avocations of life, have rendered the present Work, during the whole progress of its composition, the produce of my leisure hours; it has, therefore, been written under different impressions. On a second review, I have found some paragraphs which required elucidation, and in

this new edition, the whole is analyzed, and arranged in a more methodical order, which will render the arguments more distinct, and place their energy in a more decisive point of view.

In the present edition, the Work has undergone a considerable alteration. It is now divided into *Parts*, and *Chapters*; and these chapters subdivided into *Sections*. The various arguments are now arranged under proper heads, and placed in a more conspicuous light. Several of the former arguments are constructed anew, and rescued from that brevity, which, to readers who are unacquainted with the nature of metaphysical argument, must sometimes have rendered the conclusions apparently confused and indistinct. To such as are acquainted with the nature of metaphysical disquisition, these changes must tend very much to relieve the mind from the severity of close argument; and to such as are unacquainted with it, these *Chapters* and *Sections* will give a general view of that theory, which is here submitted to the public consideration.

The favourable light in which this work has been received by the enlightened inhabitants of *Cornwall*, has also led me to venture on some arguments which are entirely new, and which are now occasionally interspersed through the different sections, and so interwoven with the whole, as to become *additional*, or *explanatory*, as circumstances seemed to require.

Two sources of argument are now ventured on, which were untouched in the former edition; and two entire sections are added, which are founded entirely on arguments drawn from the Omnipotency and Omnipresency of God. These new sections, together with those additional arguments which are occasionally interspersed through the Work, will form an addition of nearly forty pages, and I flatter myself, will add more to the argumentative part of the book, than to the number of its leaves.

These new Sections, these new Arguments, these Elucidations, together with a Table of Contents, which will direct the reader to the different departments of the Work, where he may consult distinctly the various arguments by which the theory of the whole is supported, will, I hope, be con-

siderable acquisitions, and render the Work still more worthy of public notice.

The confidence which I feel in the enlightened liberality of the respectable inhabitants of *Cornwall*, precludes the necessity of all apology for these alterations and corrections. Those among them who comprehend the subject, have more liberality than to conceive themselves slighted by the improvement of a Work which owes to them its primary existence; their minds must therefore be superior to such prejudices: and those who are incompetent to judge of its merit, or demerit, will feel no interest in the change. It is to those subscribers whose names fill the original list, that I feel myself primarily indebted. I hope I shall ever retain a just sense of their kindnesses toward me, and shall take pleasure in acknowledging the obligations which I owe them, while gratitude is capable of warming my heart.

My primary motive in writing this Essay, and in all the improvements which I have since made, has been to attempt the establishment of the *Immortality of the Human soul*; a truth which scepticism and infidelity would teach us to disbelieve. If that end be accomplished, my design will be fully answered; if not, my motive in writing will afford me a source of consolation; and I shall reflect with satisfaction, that I have done my best, and meant it well.

ST. AUSTELL, *Feb.* 2, 1803.

"THIS Essay is introduced to the world, under the auspices of the Rev. JOHN WHITAKER, the great and good Rector of RUAN LANY-HORNE; to whom it is dedicated in a very handsome manner. The address, indeed, is well conceived, and well expressed. The Preface is elegant and appropriate.

In the first part of the Essay, Mr. DREW has successfully proved, that "there is an IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE in man." In the second part, therefore, his inquiry is; "Can this IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE possibly EXPIRE?"

[After giving a pretty copious Extract from the work, the Reviewers conclude with the following remarks:]

"An attempt to decide on the future life of Brutes," says our Author, "in a few straggling propositions, would be both immodest and indiscreet."

With respect to "the future life" of the Essay before us, we would use the same language. We cannot pretend to decide, absolutely, on the degree of merit which it possesses; or the rank which it will hereafter hold in the metaphysical world. We have discovered, we think, a few errors in the reasoning: but we have found much to applaud—much to admire. Of his subject, in general, the Author is a master. Whilst we are struck with a chain of argumentation, strong and beautiful, we are assured, that this is the production of no common writer. And in thus connecting the Author with his Work, we cannot but recollect with wonder, that he is the untutored child of nature; deriving no advantage from education; indebted only and immediately to Heaven for a reach of thought astonishingly great!—for a MIND to which all the matter of the Universe seems but an atom; and in himself, exhibiting a splendid proof, that the soul of man is IMMORTAL!"

ANTI-JACOBIN REVIEW, for February 1803.

MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR.

SAMUEL DREW, A. M., the second son of Joseph Drew, was born near St. Austell, in Cornwall, March 3, 1765, and baptized in the parish church on the 24th. of the same month. His father followed the double occupation of husbandman, and what in Cornwall and Devonshire, is termed, "streaming for tin."

Before entering on the life, character, and literary labours of Samuel Drew, it will not be deemed out of place to mention a few circumstances connected with the religious character of his parents. His father appears to have arrived at nearly the age of manhood without having been the subject of religious impressions, even in the most limited sense. In the ardent desire for the spiritual improvement of his species the Rev. George Whitefield did not overlook the religious destitution of the people of Cornwall, who, as in other parts of the country, flocked in crowds to the out-door preaching of that distinguished servant of Christ. On one of these occasions Joseph Drew, along with several of his companions, went, as a matter of amusement, and probably with the determination of annoying the preacher, who exhibiting the truths of the Gospel of Christ and their adaptation to the conditions of perishing sinners with an eloquence wholly unequalled since the days of the apostle Paul, so won on the mind and feelings of Joseph Drew, as to render him a correct illustration of that forcible, though oft quoted line from Goldsmith :—

"And fools who came to scoff, remain'd to pray."

He returned, from his intended scene of frolic and amusement, a changed man ; seeking opportunities for secret pray-

er ; and was marked for his regular attendance on the ministry of Whitefield and Wesley, to whom England owes so much of its high character in religion and morals, and but for whose labours, the country must have been, long ere this time, a moral desert.

Joseph Drew, in consequence of his firm adherence to a religious life, become the subject of persecution on the part of his own family ; and from his father he experienced the most unrelenting severity, verifying the prediction of Christ, that "a man's enemies shall be they of his own household." He was offered the sad alternative of quitting the paternal abode, or returning to his previous state of religious indifference and separating himself from the people of God : He choose, in the language of the apostle, "Rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season."

Thomasin Osborn, his second wife, the mother of the subject of this memoir, was also a member of the Methodist society, and appears to have been a woman of a strong understanding, and "of courage and zeal in the cause of God, which nothing could damp ; and ready to brave every hardship that the discharge of duty might render necessary." From her parents she received literally no education, and when nearly arrived at womanhood, she applied herself to the arduous task of self-instruction, in which she appears to have made great proficiency. She died of consumption before her son Samuel had reached his tenth year.

Mr. Drew's parents, in the early part of his life, were at no time beyond the chilling influence and effects of very limited means, if not the subjects of positive poverty. Notwithstanding which, they used every exertion to confer on their children such education as the district afforded ; and for this object Samuel and his brother Jabez were sent daily to a school at St Austell ; the latter not only took great

pleasure in learning but made considerable progress in the simpler elements of knowledge; the subject of our memoir, however, had no relish for the drudgery of school business, preferring rather to absent himself, as frequently as opportunity favoured. His conduct frequently presented instances of considerable shrewdness and resolution, which conjoined with his exuberant animal spirits and vivacious disposition unfitted him for acquiring knowledge or receiving instruction through the usual channels. His mother became his instructress, and by her devotedness he was enabled to read, and with occasional assistance from his brother, he partially acquired the art of writing. This invaluable woman however, regarded all other kinds of knowledge but of small moment when compared with that knowledge which unfolds to the mind the duty we owe to God and man. With what success her labours were attended, at an after period, will best appear from the language of Mr. Drew, a few weeks before his death.

“I well remember in my early days, when my mother was alive, that she invariably took my brother and me by the hand, and led us to the house of prayer. Her kind advice and instruction were unremitting; and even when death had closed her eyes in darkness, the impression remained long upon my mind, and I sighed for a companion to accompany me thither. On one occasion, I well recollect, we were returning from the chapel, at St. Austell, on a bright and beautiful star light night, when my mother pointed out the stars as the work of an Almighty Parent, to whom we were indebted for every blessing. Struck with the representation, I felt a degree of gratitude and adoration which no language could express, and through nearly all the night enjoyed ineffable rapture.”

“Though of a rude and reckless disposition,” the death of his affectionate mother appears to have produced in his mind, feelings of bitter anguish, and even minute circumstances

attending this bereavement seem never to have been forgotten by him; in one of his earliest poetical compositions he thus gives vent to his pent up feelings:—

“These eyes have seen a tender mother torn
From three small babes she left behind to mourn.
One infant son retired from life before;
Next followed she whose loss I now deplore.
This throbbing breast has heaved the heart-felt sigh
And breathed afflictions where her ashes lie.
Relentless death! to rob my younger years
Of soft indulgence and a mother’s cares;
First brought to life, then left without a guide,
To wade through time and grapple with the tide!”

Several years afterwards, in writing to a gentleman, who desired to know his early history, he says, “On visiting my mother’s grave, with one of my children, I wrote the following. The first couplet is supposed to be spoken by the child:—

“‘Why looks my father on that lettered stone,
And seems to sigh with sorrows not his own.’
‘That stone my dear conceals from human eyes
The peaceful mansion where my mother lies.
Beneath this stone (my infant, do not weep.)
The shrivelled muscles of my mother sleep;
And soon my babe, the awful hour must be
When thy sad soul will heave a sigh for me,
And say, with grief, amidst thy sisters cries,
BENEATH THIS STONE OUR LIFELESS PARENT LIES.
Shouldst thou, my dear, survive thy father’s doom,
And wander pensive near his silent tomb,
Think **THY** survivors will perform for thee,
What I do now, and **THOU** wilt **THEN**, for **ME.**’”

By the time Mr. Drew was eight years old he commenced working as a *buddle-boy*, at the rate of three-half-pence a day, along with others, from whose evil example and immoral language he seems to have suffered considerably. “It may be asked,” observes Mr. Drew, in a short sketch of his early life, which he dictated to one of his children just before his last illness, “as my father was a serious man, why did he not step forth, on my mother’s death, to supply her place:

The reason is obvious though by no means satisfactory. Being employed as a local preacher among the Methodists, every Sunday he had to fulfil his appointments, while the moral and religious culture of his children was comparatively neglected. This system of employing persons to preach on the Sabbath, who have very little time to instruct their families during the week I consider to be a serious evil, and one that needs especial correction. Such being my father's case, it may naturally be supposed, that any serious impressions resulting from my mother's instructions soon vanished. I had no one to take me by the hand; and with precept and example I was now, in a great measure, unacquainted." It does really seem that Mr. Drew attributed to this peculiarity in the system, a large portion of that laxity of moral principle which was manifest in his general conduct. To such a system and such individual cases the apostle's injunction is not inapplicable, "If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." *

In the year 1776, and before he had finished his eleventh year, Samuel Drew was apprenticed to a shoemaker resident about three miles from St. Austell. His master's house was delightfully situated, but too secluded, as a place of business. About this period his father's family removed from Parr, in

* Mr. Drew's father does not seem to have been at all successful in the most important part of a parent's duty or conduct; that of governing by, and securing their affections through kindness. His was the authority and government of power, not that of tenderness and feeling. He seems not to have understood or discovered the first elements of parental influence over the minds of the young. Perhaps, his father's conduct towards himself may have insensibly intruded itself as a model of paternal rule. The effect bears a similarity, and is proportionable, to the cause producing it. The boy was wayward, sarcastic, and sullen; only anxious for opportunities to exercise the mischievous inclinations of his mind, and fit subjects to expend his ill-nature on.

St. Blazey to the tenement of Polpea, in Tywardreath Samuel thus felt the loneliness of his situation increased, from the greater distance from the paternal home.

His condition and feelings at this period will be best explained in his own words. "My new abode," he says, "at St. Blazey, and new engagements, were far from being pleasing. To any of the comforts and conveniences of life I was an entire stranger, and by every member of the family was viewed as an underling, come thither to subserve their wishes, or obey their mandates. To his trade of shoemaker my master added that of farmer. He had a few acres of ground under his care, and was a sober, industrious man : but, unfortunately for me, nearly one half of my time was taken up in agricultural pursuits. On this account, I made no proficiency in my business, and felt no solicitude to rise above the farmer's boys with whom I daily associated. While in this place, I suffered many hardships. When, after having been in the fields all day, I came home with cold feet, and damp and dirty stockings, if the oven had been heated during the day, I was permitted to throw my stockings into it, that they might be dry against the following morning ; but frequently have I had to put them on in precisely the same state in which I had left them the preceeding evening. To mend my stockings, I had no one ; and frequently have I wept at the holes which I could not conceal ; though, when fortunate enough to procure a stocking-needle and some worsted, I have drawn the outlines of the hole together, and made what I thought a tolerable job.

"During my apprenticeship, many bickerings and unpleasant occurrences took place. Some of these preyed with so much severity on my mind, that several times I had determined to run away, and either enlist on board of a privateer, or a man of war. A kind and gracious Providence, however, invariably defeated my purposes, and threw unex-

pected obstacles in the way, at the moment when my schemes were apparently on the eve of accomplishment.

* In some part of my servitude, a few numbers of the Weekly Entertainer were brought to my master's house. This little publication, which was then extensively circulated in the West of England, contained many tales and anecdotes which greatly interested me. Into the narratives of adventures connected with the then American war, I entered with all the zeal of a partisan on the side of the Americans. The history of Paul Jones, the Serapis, and the Bon Homme Richard, by frequent reading, and daily dwelling upon them in the almost solitary chamber of my thoughts, grew up into a lively image in my fancy; and I felt a strong desire to join myself to a pirate ship; but as I had no money, and scarcely any clothes, the idea and scheme were vain. Besides these Entertainers, the only book which I remember to have seen in the house, was an odd number of the History of England about the time of the Commonwealth. With the reading of this I was at first much pleased, but when, by frequent perusal, I had nearly learned it by heart, it became monotonous, and was shortly afterwards thrown aside. With this I lost not only a *disposition* for reading, but almost an *ability* to read. The clamour of my companions and others engrossed nearly the whole of my attention, and, so far as my slender means would allow, carried me onward towards the vortex of dissipation.

"One circumstance I must not omit to notice, during this period of my life, as it strikingly marks the superintending providence of God. I was sent one day to a neighbouring common, bordering on the sea-shore, to see that my master's sheep were safe, and together. Having discharged this duty, I looked towards the sea, which, I presume, could not be less than two hundred feet below me. I saw the sea-birds busily employed, providing for their

young, flying about midway between the sea and the elevation on which I stood, when I was seized with a strange resolution to descend the cliff, and make my way to the place where they had built their nests. It was a desperate and dangerous attempt; but I determined to persevere. My danger increased at every step; and at length I found that a projecting rock prohibited my further progress. I then attempted to retreat; but found the task more difficult and hazardous than that I had already encountered. I was now perched on a narrow ledge of a rock, about a hundred feet below the edge of the cliff, and nearly the same height above the ocean. To turn myself round, I found to be impossible: there was no hand to help, no eye to pity no voice to soothe. My spirits began to fail. I saw nothing before me but inevitable destruction, and dreaded the moment when I should be dashed in pieces upon the rocks below. At length, by creeping backwards about one-eighth of an inch at a step, I reached a nook where I was able to turn, and happily succeeded in escaping the destruction which I had dreaded."

The subject of this memoir was largely endowed with shrewdness and cunning, which were frequently called into exercise from his love of adventure, and the dissatisfaction he felt from the menial drudgery to which he was subjected by his mistress, during the time he remained in her husband's service. As a consequence of the position in which he was thus placed, and for which he was, in no small degree, indebted to his father's want of foresight, he became associated with companions, in all likelihood, much worse than himself; which tended to increase that moral debasement to which he appears to have been prone from the peculiar constitution of his mind, and to the superinduction of those pernicious habits which were the constant occupation of those with whom he mingled.

During Mr. Drew's apprenticeship smuggling was a fre-

quent occupation of the Cornish men ; and one well suited to his spirit of enterprise and the course of reading in which he had indulged under his master's roof. Samuel Drew frequently joined in the illegal expeditions, in which his companions had long practice, without the knowledge or consent of his master. Several of these adventures he related to his son, who subsequently became his biographer, and to one of which we shall have occasion hereafter to refer.

To those who have had much to do in the management and moral training of youth, it is almost unnecessary to remark that affection and kindness are, of all other means attempted, the most successful in softening the emperiousness, and restraining the impetuosity, of youth. The adoption of other modes of governing where these are absent and unfelt tend only "to add fuel to the fire;" and are apt to beget in the minds of the young a principle of resistance, which nothing but Divine Grace can subsequently overcome. Many masters and parents thus become, from want of consideration and the absence of family religion, the causes of the moral deterioration of those, whom circumstances have placed under their control, and we fear, in too many instances the impelling cause of their eternal ruin. That this was the case with Samuel Drew no one can for a moment doubt. In his circumstances there was a total absence of moral guardianship and religious culture: and what tended to aggravate his feelings, still further, was the indifference of his master to that careful instruction in his trade, which ought, at least, to have held a prominent place, and to which was conjoined the marked determination of his mistress to hold him in a continued state of menial degradation.

The remark of one of his early associates is deserving of notice: "I believe Sam was a difficult boy to manage; but he was made worse by the treatment he received. I was once in the shop, when, for a very small offence, his master

struck him violently with a last, and maimed him for a time. Such usage only made him sturdy, and caused him to dislike his master and his work." This filled up the measure of his dissatisfaction, and when about seventeen, he absconded. When he determined on this step his means were only sixteen pence half-penny.

We should here remark, that on leaving his master's service he called at his father's, requesting a small supply of money, which his mother-in-law did not feel herself warranted in giving in the then absence of his father. "My brother's adventure," his sister stated, after leaving our house, I have heard him thus describe.

"When I came to Polpea, to ask for money, I had not fully determined whither to go. I thought of travelling to Plymouth, to seek a berth on board a king's ship. Instead of taking the short road, where I feared my father might fall in with me, I went on towards Liskeard, through the night, and, feeling fatigued, went into a hay-field and slept. My luggage was no encumbrance, as the whole of my property, besides the clothes I wore, was contained in a small handkerchief. Not knowing how long I should have to depend upon my slender stock of cash, I found it necessary to use the most rigid economy. Having to pay a half-penny for passing either a ferry or toll-bridge, feeling my present situation, and knowing nothing of my future prospects, this small call upon my funds distressed me; I wept as I went on my way; and, even to the present time, I feel a pang when I recollect the circumstance. The exertion of walking and the fresh morning air, gave me a keener appetite than I thought it prudent to indulge. I, however, bought a penny loaf at the first place I passed where bread was sold, and, with a halfpenny-worth of milk, in a farmer's house, ate half of my loaf for breakfast. In passing through Liskeard, my attention was attracted by a shoemaker's shop, in the door of

which a respectable looking man, whom I supposed to be the master, was standing. Without any intention of seeking employment in this place, I asked him if he could give me work; and he, taking compassion, I suppose, on my sorry appearance, promised to employ me the next morning. Before I could go to work, tools were necessary; and I was obliged to lay out a shilling on these. Dinner, under such circumstances, was out of the question: for supper I bought another halfpenny-worth of milk, ate the remainder of my loaf, and for my lodging again had recourse to the fields. In the morning I purchased another penny loaf, and commenced my labour. My employer soon found that I was a miserable tool, yet he treated me kindly; and his son took me beside him in the shop, and gave me instruction. I had now but one penny left; and this I wished to husband till my labour brought a supply: so, for dinner, I tied my apron-string tighter, and went on with my work. My abstinence subjected me to the jeers of my shopmates; thus rendering the pangs of hunger doubly bitter. One of them, I remember, said to another, 'Where does our shopmate dine?' and the response was, 'Oh! he always dines at the sign of the mouth.' Half of the penny loaf which I took with me in the morning, I had allotted for my supper; but, before night came, I had pinched it nearly all away in mouthfuls, through mere hunger. Very reluctantly, I laid out my last penny, and, with no enviable feelings, sought my former lodging in the open air. With no other breakfast than the fragments of my last loaf, I again sat down to work. At dinner-time, looking, no doubt, very much famished, my master kindly said, 'If you wish, I will let you have a little money, on account;'—an offer which I very joyfully accepted. This was, however, my last day's employment here. Discovering that I was a runaway apprentice, my new master dismissed me, with a recommen-

dation to return to the old one; and while he was talking, my brother came to the door, with a horse, to take me home."

Mr Drew returned home with his brother only on the condition that he should not be obliged to return to his master, with whom arrangements having been made, his indenture was cancelled. Having remained a few months under the paternal roof, he went to work at Millbrook with a person named Williams to whose especial care his father recommended him. This neighbourhood was remarkable for its stir and bustle, owing to its being a naval station of some importance, and altogether a place adapted to gratify the disposition for enterprise and love of adventure previously manifested by our hero. The inducements to apply himself diligently to his trade were more numerous, and of a more cheering kind, than the abode from which he had absconded presented. The business was conducted upon a more extensive scale—the workmen were numerous, compared with his SOLITARY SELF,—and the work produced was neater in its execution than any he had before witnessed; while, to use his own expressive language, he was "a wretched tool at the trade." Here, for some time, his wages averaged not more than eight shillings weekly; being distant from his family and cast wholly upon his own resources, he required not only to be diligent but also to exercise economy; and he used in after years to say, that Liskeard was not the only place where he *had tied his apron-string tighter for a dinner.*

It was about this period that he began to afford manifestations of his future intellectual greatness. Having had but little practice in his business, the awkwardness he exhibited conjoined to his want of that polish, always derivable from intercourse with the more sensible portion of the operative population, he became the butt of his fellow-workmen—the powers of his mind were called into exertion in self-defence,

and with such success, that few, if any felt inclined to risk the effects of his wit and ridicule. "I very well remember," says a person who was then an apprentice in the same shop, "that in our disputes, those who could get Sam Drew on their side, always made sure of victory; and he had so much good humour and drollery, that we all liked him, and were very sorry when he went away." He remained here about a year, and left for a neighbouring town in consequence of employment becoming scarce, where he signalized himself in cudgel playing.

We have already referred to his connexion with smuggling parties, during his brief apprenticeship: and there is sufficient ground for inferring that he had not ceased, during the intervening period, from occasionally joining in such expeditions, not only as matter of gratification from his love of adventure, but also upon the more solid ground of remuneration. One of these adventures is thus narrated by his Son.

"Notice was given throughout Craithole, one evening, about the month of December, 1784, that a vessel, laden with contraband goods, was on the coast, and would be ready that night to discharge her cargo. At nightfall, Samuel Drew, with the rest of the male population, made towards the port. One party remained on the rocks, to make signals, and dispose of the goods when landed; the other, of which he was one, manned the boats. The night was intensely dark; and but little progress had been made in discharging the vessel's cargo, when the wind rose, with a heavy sea. To prevent their vessel from being driven on the rocks, the seamen found it necessary to stand off from the port, thus increasing the hazard of the boatmen. Unfavourable as these circumstances were, all seemed resolved to persevere; and several trips were made between the vessel and the shore. The wind continuing to increase, one of the men belonging to the boat in which Samuel sat had his hat

blown off, and, striving to recover it, upset the boat. Three of the men were immediately drowned, Samuel and two or three others clung to the boat for a considerable time; but finding that it was drifting from the port, they were obliged to abandon it, and sustain themselves by swimming. They were now about two miles from the shore, and the darkness prevented them from ascertaining its direction. Samuel had given himself up as lost, when he laid hold of a mass of floating sea-weed, which afforded him a temporary support. At length he approached some rocks near the shore, upon which he and two of the men, the only survivors of seven, succeeded in getting; but they were so benumbed with cold, and so much exhausted with their exertion in swimming, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could maintain their position against the force of the sea, which sometimes broke over them. Their perilous situation was not unperceived by their companions; yet their calls for help, if heard, were for a long time disregarded. When the vessel had delivered her cargo, and put to sea, a boat was despatched to take them off; and now, finding in what condition Samuel and his wrecked companions were, after having been three hours in the water, and half of that time swimming about, the others endeavoured to compensate, by a shew of kindness, for their previous inhumanity. Life being nearly extinct, the sufferers were carried to a neighbouring farm house, and the inmates compelled by threats to admit them. A fire was kindled on the hearth, and fresh faggots piled on it, while the half-drowned men, who were placed in a recess of the chimney unable to relieve themselves, were compelled to endure the excessive heat which their ignorant companions thought necessary to restore animation. One of the party, supposing too, that fire within would not be less efficacious than fire without, and believing brandy to be a universal remedy, brought a keg of it from the cargo landed, and, with the characteristic recklessness of

a sailor and a smuggler, knocking in the head with a hatchet, presented them with a *bowlful*. 'Whether,' observed Mr. Drew, on relating this most perilous adventure, 'we drank of it, or not, I do not know; certainly not to the extent recommended, or I should not now be alive to tell the tale. My first sensation was that of extreme cold. Although half-roasted, it was a long while before I felt the fire, that burnt my legs, and occasioned wounds, the marks of which I shall carry to my grave. After leaving the farm house, I had to walk about two miles through deep snow, to my lodgings. When I think of the complicated perils of that night, I am astonished that I ever survived them'."

When his father heard of the above narrow escape from death, he exclaimed, "Alas! what will be the end of my poor unhappy boy?" It was natural that after such a perilous adventure, his father would be anxious for his removal from a place, which offered too many temptations to adventure and consequent peril; he succeeded in securing him employment with a saddler, in St. Austell, who was commencing shoemaking also, whither he went, after spending the Christmas in his father's house.

In January, 1785, Mr. Drew joined his new employer at St. Austell as a journeyman shoemaker; he was then in his twentieth year. We have already seen Samuel Drew as the self-willed, intractable child; as the wild, thoughtless, fearless boy; as the daring, resolute, enterprising youth; all of which, in almost any individual, are the sure forerunners of future independence and thought of action; and in him the first dawnings of that intellectual greatness to which he afterwards attained. In regard to his mental acquirements, at this period, he says of himself, "I was scarcely able to read, and almost totally unable to write. Literature was a term to which I could annex no idea. Grammar I knew not the meaning of. I was expert at follies, acute in trifles, and ingenious about nonsense."—Again he states, "My

master was by trade a saddier, had acquired some knowledge of bookbinding, and hired me to carry on the shoemaking for him. He was one of those men who will live any where, but will get rich no where. His shop was frequented by persons of a more respectable class than those with whom I had previously associated, and various topics became alternately the subjects of conversation. I listened with all that attention which my labours and good manners would permit, and obtained among them some little knowledge. About this time disputes ran high in St. Austell between the Calvinists and Arminians, and our shop afforded a considerable scene of action. In cases of uncertain issue, I was sometimes appealed to, to decide upon a doubtful point. This, perhaps, flattering my vanity, became a new stimulus to action, I examined dictionaries, picked up many words, and, from an attachment which I felt to books, which were occasionally brought to the shop to be bound, I began to have some view of the various theories with which they abounded. The more I read, the more I felt my own ignorance; and the more I felt my ignorance, the more invincible became my energy to surmount it. Every leisure moment was now employed in reading one thing or other. Having to support myself by manual labour, my time for reading was but little, and to overcome this disadvantage, my usual method was to place a book before me while at meat, and at every repast I read five or six pages. Although the providence of God has raised me above this incessant toil, when I could "barely earn enough to make life struggle", yet it has become so habitual, that the custom has not forsaken me at the present moment.

"After having worked with this master several months, a neighbouring gentleman brought "Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding" to be bound; I had never seen or heard of this work before. I took an occasion to look into it, and I thought his mode of reasoning very pleasing, and

his arguments exceedingly strong. I watched all opportunities of reading for myself, and would willingly have laboured a fortnight to have the books. I had then no conception that they could be obtained for money. They were, however, soon carried away, and with them all my future improvement by their means. The close and decisive manner of Mr. Locke's reasoning made on my mind an impression too deep to be easily effaced; and though I did not see his Essay again for many years, yet the early impression was not forgotten, and it is from this accidental circumstance that I received my first bias for abstruse subjects."

At another time he observes, "This book set all my soul to think, to fear, and to reason, from all without and from all within. It gave the first metaphysical turn to my mind: and I cultivated the little knowledge of writing which I had acquired, in order to put down my reflections. It awakened me from my stupor, and induced me to form a resolution to abandon the grovelling views which I had been accustomed to entertain." Again he remarks, "In this situation, I found myself surrounded with books of various descriptions, and felt my taste for the acquirement of information return with renewed vigour, and increase in proportion to the means of indulgence which were now placed fully within my reach. But here some new difficulties occurred, with which I found it painful to grapple. My knowledge of the import of words was as contracted as my ideas were scanty: so that I found it necessary to keep a dictionary continually by my side whilst I was reading, to which I was compelled constantly to refer. This was a tedious process. But in a little time the difficulty wore away, and my horizon of knowledge became enlarged."

It was during the period to which these extracts refer, that Mr. Drew became the subject of religious impressions. Previous to 1785, he had had no serious thoughts upon

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masters of religion. Speculatively considered he was an Armenian in sentiment, but his religious views or opinions were those of the head, not of the heart; he was without a serious thought, and, to use his own expression, had no intention of joining the Methodist body. But just then, he continues, a thin, active stripling came into the St. Austell circuit as a preacher, of the name of Adam Clarke. Him I heard with surprise and attention. I followed his preaching whenever I could; and so did a multitude of others. He gave us no dogmas, he forced upon us no doctrines; but he set us a thinking and reasoning, because he thought and reasoned with us himself. Crowds followed wherever he went; and his word, spirit and conduct were severally made blessings to many, while his zeal was the wonder and profit of multitudes. His sermons were short, numerous, and earnest; and, though young, and looking even younger than he really was, yet he gained and maintained an influence and respect which none felt afraid or ashamed to own. I well recollect the time, when having to preach in St. Austell, the crowd was so great that he could not get into the chapel. At that time, the males and females sat on opposite sides of the house; and, that on which the women were being nearest the street, he got in at one of the windows, and was borne along upon their hands and heads, till, without touching the floor, he was safely landed in the pulpit. An elderly member of the society once said to me, "When I saw Adam Clarke enter our pulpit for the first time, I thought within myself, Well, what does Mr. Wesley think of us, to send us such a boy as this? but when I heard him preach, I was astonished; and heartily glad I was that I did not then tell my thoughts to any other person." During Mr. Clarke's stay in St. Austell, which was only one year, he added my sister and me, and many others, to the Methodists' society. This was certainly the most important epoch in Mr. Drew's life.

During this year (1785) Mr. Drew's brother Jabez was taken ill, and becoming gradually worse, was desirous of seeing his brother and sister. Samuel, although possessed of a high degree of sensibility, had hitherto exhibited the most marked indifference as regarded his brother's condition; but a person being despatched to inform him of his dying brother's request, his conduct underwent a marked change. No one was present at the interview between the brothers, but the effect was such that Samuel Drew became a changed character. On the day of his brother's interment, Mr. Clarke preached out of doors to a large concourse of people, from these words, "We must needs die, and be as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again." "In the course of his sermon," says Mr. Drew's eldest son, "which was most impressive, and rendered a blessing to many, he took occasion, while expressing his conviction that the eternal safety of Jabez Drew was beyond a doubt, to describe the nature, trace the progress, and enforce the necessity, of conversion to God. This sermon Samuel heard. The fallow-ground of his heart had been just broken up by the interview with his dying brother; his attention was awakened; and on this occasion he appears to have obtained those views of divine truth which had a saving influence on himself, and were afterwards maintained by him from the pulpit and the press."

We may here mention a circumstance in connexion with Mr. Drew's religious condition, which though trivial in its appearance, and, perhaps, so in itself, might have been attended with unfortunate results, not only to his future spiritual improvement, but also to a large portion of his fellow-men. On a Lord's day evening in June, 1785, Mr. Drew attended the religious service at the chapel; after which, the superintendent, when about to address the society, observing a few individuals remaining who were not members, remarked that it was a meeting of the Society *only*, but any

seriously disposed person might remain. By this time, Mr. Drew had withdrawn. A female said aloud "Sammy Drew wishes to stop;" an old man ran out and overtaking him, persuaded him to return. In relation to this Mr. Drew often said, "I felt so much on being indirectly ordered to leave the chapel, that but for the personal and pressing invitation of the old man, I believe I should never have been a Methodist." What a lesson does this single sentence inculcate upon those who bear rule over the church! Shortly after this circumstance, Mr. Drew stated in a love-feast that he first felt that peace of mind which arises from "the remission of sins that are past", while secretly engaged in prayer under a tree.

Of the early course of Mr. Drew's reading little is known, farther than what the extracts previously made afford. We can easily conceive of it, as being similar to that of almost every great mind, with whose history we have been made acquainted; for a considerable time desultory, and tending to no fixed object. He has however, mentioned the "Pilgrim's Progress" of John Bunyan as the first book he could lay claim to as his own; in the perusal of which he took great delight. A work destined to be read when the English language may be no longer a spoken tongue.

In detailing the incidents of his early life, Mr. Drew states, "My master growing inattentive to his shoemaking, many of my friends advised me to commence business for myself, and offered me money for that purpose. I accepted the offer, started accordingly, and, by dint of application, in about one year, discharged my debts, and stood alone." Mr. Drew had only fourteen shillings of his own, when he commenced business as a master. A friend who was urgent for his beginning, and to whom he mentioned his pecuniary difficulty, said, "That shall not hinder you from beginning I'll lend you five pounds upon the security of your good character, and more if that's not enough, and I'll promise

not to demand it till you can conveniently pay me." On entering upon business on his own account, Mr. Drew determined to act upon the principles laid down by Dr. Franklin in his "Way to Wealth". "Eighteen hours out of the twenty-four," he says, "did I regularly work, and sometimes longer; for my friends gave me plenty of employment; but until the bills became due, I had no means of paying wages to a journeyman. I was indefatigable; and at the year's end I had the satisfaction of paying the five pounds which had been so kindly lent me, and finding myself, with a tolerable stock of leather, clear of the world."

About this time his sister became his housekeeper; and frequently were they obliged to submit to severe privations from Mr. Drew's determination to keep out of debt; and from a desire to uphold a respectable appearance among his neighbours and employers. Miss Drew appears to have been endowed with a large degree of shrewdness and reflection; and many schemes, truly commendable, did she resort to lest their poverty should be discovered, and her brother's business injured. "Sometimes," says she, "my spirits would fail me under these trying circumstances, and my mind would sink into a state of gloom and despondency. But my dear, noble-minded brother was just the spiritual preceptor and comforter I wanted. When he saw me in perplexity, he would say, 'Cheer up, my sister;—have faith in God;—there are brighter days in store.' And very soon the clouds began to pass away."

By the beginning of 1788, Mr. Drew's circumstances had considerably improved. Industry and economy removed the necessity of his going to bed supperless to avoid rising in debt. His desire for the acquisition of knowledge he was now, somewhat enabled to gratify; and, considering the laborious nature of his every day occupation, Mr. Drew may be

said to have begun to be a "hard student.;" By practicing industry, he says, I at length surmounted such obstacles as were of a pecuniary nature: this enabled me to procure assistance in my labours, and afforded me the common relaxation which others enjoyed. This was the only leisure at which I aimed. In this situation, I felt an internal vigour prompting me to exertion, but I was unable to determine what direction I should take. The sciences lay before me. I discovered a charm in each, but was unable to embrace them all, and hesitated in making a selection. I had learned that

"One science only will one genius fit,
So vast is art, so narrow human wit."

At first I felt such an attachment to astronomy, that I resolved to confine my views to the study of that science; but I soon found myself too defective in arithmetic to make any proficiency. Modern history was my next object; but I quickly discovered that more books and time were necessary than I could either purchase or spare, and on this account history was abandoned. In the region of metaphysics I saw neither of the above impediments. It appeared to be a thorny path; but I determined, nevertheless, to enter, and accordingly began to tread it."—On another occasion, in reply to the enquiry whether he had not studied astronomy in his time, he said, "I once had a very great desire for it, for I thought it suitable to the genius of my mind, and I think so still; but then

"Chill penury repress'd the noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul."

Dangers and difficulties I did not fear, while I could bring the powers of my mind to bear upon them, and force myself a passage. To metaphysics I then applied myself, and became what the world and my good friend Dr. Clarke call, 'A METAPHYSICIAN.'

Besides the literary topics discussed in the shop of his master, politics were not forgotten. The American war was then occupying a large share of public attention : to this subject Mr. Drew's mind was insensibly drawn ; he became a warm partisan of the Americans. Commencing business for himself politics were overlooked, while he was struggling with the difficulties incident to his trade, during the first year. But no sooner did his means afford an appearance of leisure, than his desire for political discussion returned, and he entered upon this dangerous and delusive path with a zeal incompatible with the acquirement of more useful and important information. To use his own words, he very soon entered as deeply into newspaper argument as if his livelihood had depended on it ; his shop was often filled with loungers, who came to canvass public measures ; and not unfrequently *he* went into his neighbours' houses with the same object. From these encroachments on his time he found it necessary sometimes to work till midnight to make up for the hours he had loitered away during the day. One night, having closed the shutters, while he was employed with his work, some little urchin put his mouth to the key-hole of the door, and called out, " Shoemaker ! shoemaker ! work by night and run-about by day ! " " Had a pistol ", says Mr. Drew, " been fired off at my ear, I could not have been more dismayed or confounded. I dropped my work, saying to myself, ' True, true ! but you shall never have that to say of me again ! ' I have never forgotten it ; and while I recollect any thing, I never shall. To me it was as the voice of God, and it has been a word in season throughout my life. I learned from it, not to leave till to-morrow the work of to-day, or to idle when I ought to be working. From that time I turned over a new leaf. I ceased to venture on the restless sea of politics, or trouble myself about matters which did not concern me. —

LIFE OF S. DREW.

“Happy the man, who sees a God employed
In all the good and ill that chequer life;
Resolving all events, with their effects
And manifold results, into the will
And arbitration wise of the Supreme!”

In the year 1788, when in his twenty-fourth year, Mr. Drew was appointed a Local Preacher and a Class-Leader, and appears to have used great efforts to qualify himself for the great and important task of preaching Christ crucified to perishing sinners. He weighed well and seriously the numerous difficulties attendant on his new position, the immense moral and spiritual responsibility which his new engagements imposed—the necessity of a moral and religious instructor not having his information to search for, when circumstances required its application,—and the importance of becoming intimately conversant with the operations of the human mind, as well as with the Record of God’s will to man. His religious views were not the product of a heated imagination, they were the deductions of cool reason conjoined with those pure feelings of earnestness and zeal superinduced by the operations of the Holy Spirit. Notwithstanding these, it was not long before he was accused of *heresy*, and charged with holding and teaching Calvinistic views. The local superintendent conceived it wholly unnecessary to hear evidence on so grave a charge as that mentioned—it was *enough* for him that a richer man than Samuel Drew, had made the assertion—he was refused a hearing in explanation, and was condemned on the most summary procedure. He was denuded of his two-fold standing as a preacher and leader. Like all other acts perpetrated by individuals wielding arbitrary power for the time being, the superintendent’s conduct was severely scrutinized and commented on by many of the members of the Methodists society in St. Austell; the preacher finding that he had

exposed himself to considerable odium waited on Mr. Drew, begging him to resume his two-fold office : His answer was characteristic of that independence of thought, which he manifested through life.—“No, sir, the matter is quite public. You have put me out at the door, and I shall not come back through the key-hole. Before I resume my plan, I must be publicly justified :—the office of class-leader, I believe, I shall never accept while I live in St. Austell.”

At the first local preachers' meeting, after that which we have just narrated, the subject was sifted, his conduct approved, and he was requested by his fellow-labourers to resume his preaching ; the opinion of the people being also in his favour, he complied, and continued to preach till within a few weeks of his death. This affair begat in his mind “a settled dislike to the exhibition of arbitrary power.”

“During several years,” says Mr. Drew, “all my leisure hours were devoted to reading or scribbling any thing which happened to pass my mind ; but I do not recollect that it ever interrupted my business, though it frequently broke in upon my rest. On my labour depended my livelihood—literary pursuits were only my amusement. Common prudence had taught me the lesson which Marmontel has so happily expressed : ‘Secure to yourself a livelihood independent of literary success, and put into this lottery only the overplus of time. Woe to him who depends wholly on his pen ! Nothing is more casual. The man who makes shoes is sure of his wages—the man who writes a book is never sure of any thing.’

Mr. Drew is, at this time, stated to have read the poetical works of Milton, Young, and Cowper with much avidity : Pope's *Ethic Epistles* he frequently perused, and Goldsmith's works he valued highly, having committed to memory the whole of the “*Deserted Village*,” many traits in it relative to the village pastor being exemplified in the every day practice of his own life.

Young as he was, and short as he had been in business, his punctuality and integrity procured him general respect; his judgment was held in high esteem; and as arbitrator of differences among his immediate neighbours and friends his decisions were acquiesced in without a murmur. The slightest attempt at any thing savouring of duplicity met his instant displeasure, while the appearance of truth and honesty always commanded his sympathy and secured his influence on the side of the suffering party.

His shop was the rendezvous for all the individuals belonging to the neighbourhood, who felt inclined to the discussion of religious and literary topics. The desire for information which he had exhibited while the servant of another master, he encouraged in the minds of those in his own service. Frequently after a discussion or argument on a philosophical subject with any of his visitors, he would ask his workmen questions on the points at issue, always endeavouring to render the subject palpable to their intellectual capacity.

In April, 1791, Mr. Drew married Honour, eldest daughter of Jacob Halls, of St. Austell. "In her," to use his son's expressive language, "he found a suitable helpmate—one ready to second all his exertions"—and who identified herself with all his interests in the same manner as his sister had all along done. His wedding coat was one "*as good as new, of a plum colour, with bright buttons, very little worn, and quite a bargain.*" His wife's fortune amounted to ten pounds, which was increased, sometime after, by a legacy of fifty pounds. These amounts, although received at distant periods, were of vast importance in enabling him to extend his business with considerable advantage. He now held the rank of a respectable, reflecting, intelligent tradesman; and was esteemed as a popular local preacher. Although Mr. Drew had extricated himself from the

meshes of political discussion, he entertained a high admiration of the political and religious freedom enjoyed by the Americans. These feelings were not only, for some years, sustained but increased from the circumstance of several families having emigrated from the neighbourhood of St Austell to the New World, from whom he received many invitations to join them, with glowing accounts of their comfort and future certainty of wealth and independence. But Mr. D's mind was largely endowed with caution—he was not the man to take a hasty step—he calculated the effects or failure with its consequent disappointments and privations. Having applied to a friend in Alexandria, in Virginia, for information on the subject of emigration; but apprehending that it would be unsafe to rely wholly on the statements of one who had been but a short period in the country; he applied to the official members of the Methodists' society in that place; their answer corroborated all that his friend had stated. An intimate friend of Mr. D's, residing at Camelford, was in the meantime the suspending cause; he entertained similar views on the same subject, but apprehending the chances of being captured by the French on the outward passage, both parties therefore suspended their desire for emigration, till international circumstances might prove more favourable. The feeling was again revived, when he not only determined to emigrate, but to take his father with him. It was meantime again abandoned.

Mr. Drew when asked what reason he had to assign for giving up a scheme which had occupied his mind for so many years, replied, "You may call it weakness or superstition; but I have ever regarded it as among those junctures of my life in which the finger of Providence turned the scale by an almost imperceptible touch. Goldsmith was one of my favourite poets; I had read his beautiful ballad of Edwin

and Angelina before, and admired it; but happening, just at this crisis, to find it in some magazine, I reperused it; and these two lines,

‘Man wants but little here below,
Nor wants that little long.’

seconded by my wife's disinclination for the adventure, produced such an effect upon my mind as led me to abandon all intention of crossing the Atlantic. To these two lines of Goldsmith, under a providential direction, it is owing, that I and my family are now inhabitants of Great Britain. The thought of going to America did, indeed, occur to me some years afterward, in consequence of local distress and stagnation of business. By this time, however, I had lived longer in the world, and had read and seen enough to convince me that America was no Utopia. There were certainly, according to my views, political imperfections at home; yet imperfection, I was convinced, would attach to every form of government, and I could not but appropriate Cowper's exclamation,

‘England, with all thy faults, I love thee still.’

To this were added other considerations of a personal nature. Though I could not expect to accumulate wealth where I was, I could maintain my family in credit; and a removal to America could not be effected, without exposing my wife and children to the perils of the ocean. I therefore concluded with Collins, that

‘The lily peace outshines the silver store,
And life is dearer than the golden ore.’”

Such was the opinion of leaving one's father-land, formed after the most matured consideration, by one of the wisest and best men our country has had to boast of.

Mr. Drew's first literary efforts were, like those of almost every self-taught student devoted to the muses. His first production, is stated to have been a poetical epistle addressed to his sister; the next an elegy on the death of his brother; these were followed by several others; after which he produced a piece entitled "A Morning Excursion," in blank verse. None of these have been preserved; nor can the dates of their composition be accurately fixed. "An Ode on Christmas" is the earliest existing composition from his pen. In the language of his son, "There is enough of poetry in the piece to establish a claim to genius, and render it valuable as a relic; and enough of deviation from propriety and the rules of versification, to shew the difficulties with which uneducated genius has to contend." His next effort was "Reflections on St. Austell Church Yard;" from the erasures and alterations on the MS. it appears to be the original copy, and was at one time designed by its author for publication. The chief value attachable to this piece, which contains about twelve hundred lines, is, that it appears to have been the first outline of the Essay on the Soul. *

Mr. Drew has stated that the first sketch of the Essay was drawn in 1798, it is obvious from what has just been stated, that his mind had been occupied with this great and important subject several years before. In relation to this work, he remarks, "I had long before this imagined that the immortality of the soul admitted of more rational proof than any I had ever seen. I perused such books as I could obtain on the subject; but disappointment was the result. I therefore made notes of such thoughts as occurred, merely for my own satisfaction, without any design of publishing them to the world."

His own description of his manner of study, at this period,

* Written about the year 1792.

must have interest to every individual, who desires to be intimately acquainted with the subject of our memoir. "During my literary pursuits, I regularly and constantly attended on my business, and do not recollect that one customer was ever disappointed by me through these means. My mode of writing and study may have in them, perhaps, something peculiar. Immersed in the common concerns of life, I endeavour to lift my thoughts to objects more sublime than those with which I am surrounded, and, while attending to my trade, I sometimes catch the fibres of an argument, which I endeavour to note, and keep a pen and ink by me for that purpose. In this state, what I can collect through the day remains on any paper which I have at hand, till the business of the day is despatched, and my shop shut, when, in the midst of my family, I endeavour to analyze, in the evening, such thoughts as had crossed my mind during the day. I have no study—I have no retirement—I write amidst the cries and cradles of my children—and frequently, when I review what I have written, endeavour to cultivate 'the art to blot.' Such are the methods which I have pursued, and such the disadvantages under which I write." His seat was a low nursing-chair by the kitchen fire, his desk the bellows on his knees! What an important lesson does this convey to scholars trained in our Colleges, who sustained on the valuable livings which they afford, have done nothing to advance the interests, or increase the stores, of literature and science! We speak not of Religion.

The circumstances which led Mr. Drew to become an author were the following. A young surgeon, with whom he was intimate, had become a convert to the principles advocated by Voltaire, Rousseau, Gibbon, and Hume, and which led to a disbelief of the truth of Scripture. 'Paine's Age of Reason' had just then been published, with the contents of which he made himself acquainted and commenced

an undisguised attack against Revelation. Mr. D. and this gentleman had often previously discussed the nature of evidence, the primary source of moral principles, and other points closely connected with these subjects; finding that Mr. D. was not only willing to listen but also ready to make the object of the work the subject of fair argument, he requested him to give it an attentive perusal, after which they would discuss the contents of the work, with a direct reference to their truth or error. The work was examined by Mr. D. and the debate commenced, and continued from time to time, till the surgeon began to make admissions unfavourable to his own views; then to waver, till at last he gave up the principles as wholly inadmissible. "His suspicions were transferred from the Bible to the 'Age of Reason,' and his confidence in Thomas Paine was happily exchanged for a more pleasing confidence in the authenticity of Divine Revelation." The various arguments which occurred in debate Mr. Drew committed to writing.

Conceiving that the discussions which had obtained between his friend and himself, if published, might induce other Deists to examine minutely the foundation upon which their theological systems rested, the notes were submitted to two preachers, who recommended their immediate publication. The work was brought out in a pamphlet, and addressed to Thomas Paine, who was then alive. * In the prefatory remarks our author says, "In proportion as infidelity takes root in the mind, those principles by which vice is counteracted will be eradicated, and iniquity, founded upon sanctions of public opinion, like a destructive torrent, will inundate the civil and religious world. I would not, however, insinuate from hence, that every Deist in theory must be immoral in practice, because I frequently observe

* Sepr., 1799.

the contrary ; but I am satisfied that morality cannot arise from the principles of infidelity. It is possible for men to derive a practice from principles which Deism derides, and to attribute the effect to causes which are incapable of producing it.

“Deism appears to me to have but little to recommend it. Its existence is grounded on the fancied inconsistencies which it discovers in religious creeds, without having one original virtue to entitle it to respect. It is a system of negatives, if system that may be called, whose only boast is, that it discovers errors in Revelation, and hence assumes a title to credit, by instructing its votaries to disbelieve. Under the influence of this pure negation of excellence, it promotes its interest by the irritation of those passions which it should be the business of our lives to subdue, and fortifies itself in the strange commotions which it contributes to raise.”

Mr. Drew forwarded a copy of the pamphlet to the Rev. John Whitaker, then rector of Ruan Lanyhorne, about twelve miles from St. Austell, at the same time apologizing for the liberty he had taken. This led to a correspondence, which ripened into personal friendship, and which only terminated with the death of one of the parties. Mr. Whitaker reviewed our author's work in the *Anti-Jacobin Review*, and conferred on it the highest commendations. This production was considered a complete refutation of the principles inculcated in Paine's book ; the work met with a rapid sale on the ground of its merit alone.

Our author, being thus encouraged, published an Elegiac poem, which, from the circumstances to which it owed its origin, gave it much local popularity ; the opinion of Mr. Whitaker, on this production, is supposed to have deterred him from again appearing before the public as a poet ; it is in these words :—“ I received your poem on Mr. Patterson's death, and thank you for it. *But I like not your poetry so well as I do your prose.*”

Mr. Drew's talents were next directed to the correction and exposure of a small work entitled "Anecdotes of Methodism," by the Rev. Richard Polwhele, vicar of Manaccan, Cornwall. The production was a gratuitous and unprovoked attack on a religious body, not one of whom had given the writer of the "Anecdotes" the slightest ground of offence either personal or religious. Mr. Drew attacked the work on the *facts*; the result was one of the severest, as well as one of the most justly merited, castigations that a religious libeller ever received. His opponent was silent; acknowledged his error; and shortly afterward sought the friendship, and became the favourer of Mr. Drew. *

Notwithstanding the many marks of esteem which he had received from Mr. Whitaker; and the numerous letters that had passed between them, they had not met personally, until the end of the year 1800. In a letter † written subsequent to this interview (which took place at Mr. Whitaker's residence,) mention is made of the Essay on the Soul, as accompanying the communication, with the expressed desire that Mr. W. would give it a careful examination and revision; and a declaration that its publication would depend solely, on the opinion which he might think advisable to express on that point. The MS. was returned with an expression of its high merit, and power to use Mr. Whitaker's name to any extent, and in whatever manner Mr. Drew might think most conducive to his interest. In 1802 proposals were issued for publishing the Essay by subscription; and in a few months 640 copies, out of an impression

i * This quarrel arose from an attack on the ministerial exertions of the late Dr. Hawker, of Plymouth. Would that the Church had many such men within her pale. The absence of itinerancy and ministerial visitation have done the Church more injury, than she can ever recover. It has been a great cause of the increase of dissent, in England and Wales.

† July, 1801.

of 700, were subscribed for, chiefly by the nobility and gentry of Cornwall.

The work was noticed in the *Anti-Jacobin Review*, and highly commended as a publication deserving the patronage of every mind capable of appreciating its rare merits, and noticing its obscure author in the most flattering terms. Mr. Whitaker designed, and had made arrangements with the editor of the *Anti-Jacobin*, to have reviewed his friend's work:—the necessity was superseded—Mr. Polwhele, author of the “*Anecdotes of Methodism*,” had voluntarily performed the task! An act, which redounded as much to his credit as a scholar and a gentleman, as it did honour to his feelings as a Christian minister.

We have now to notice a circumstance, as singular as it is important, in the literary history of this distinguished self-taught writer. It is elicited from the contents of a letter addressed by Mr. Drew to the Rev. Dr. Lyne. It might naturally be supposed from what has already been stated, without at all referring to our author's increased means, and consequent capability to acquire whatever might be deemed likely to be of advantage, in the prosecution of his studies, that such a deservedly popular work and held in such repute in both ends of the island, as “*Dr. Watts's Treatise on Logic*,” would have been well known to his mind. Mr. Drew's words are these:—“After a delay of which I know not how to account or apologize, I return you your book. A treatise of that kind I had never seen before, but have found, on its perusal, a mirror in my mind. I have found it of great service to me in methodising, and arranging my ideas, and in separating those ideas which nature had made distinct, but which habit and prejudice had associated together. In addition to that benefit which I have received from the perusal of ‘*Dr. Watts's Logic*,’ I have to acknowledge my obligations to Dr. Lyne, for his kindness in favouring me with it”

After the proposals, for publishing his Essay, were circulated, our author became acquainted with John Britton, Esq., the well known antiquarian and topographical writer. They subsequently became ardent friends. Mr. Britton has always been distinguished as the fosterer of genius and the encourager of literary talent.

Shortly after the publication of the work, Mr. Edwards, then a bookseller in Bristol, made a proposal to purchase the copy-right from Mr. Drew, who was requested to name his terms. *Twenty Pounds*, and thirty copies of the new edition, was the extent of Mr. Drew's ideas of dealing as an author. On these terms the bargain was closed.

In regard to the second edition of the Essay on the Soul, Mr. Drew states, "When this Essay was about to undergo a second edition, a friend from Bristol suggested to me the utility of dividing the work into chapters and sections. This, for some time, I hesitated to do, from a foolish notion that it would be an assumption that could not be detached from arrogance; and, though it was at last done, the work was re-published before I had time to reflect on the import and bearing of its various passages. In short, I no more thought that it would ever have gained celebrity in the literary world, than I now dream of being made a doctor in divinity. I applied, indeed, to several of my friends whom I thought capable of entering into the subject; but not one could or would impart the information I both solicited and wanted. Notwithstanding the numerous acquaintances to whom I was soon introduced, every one almost wanted me to solve difficulties, to answer questions; but none could I find who would attempt to meet my inquiries, or correct my views; and I began to conclude, that, in point of assistance I was 'out of humanity's reach, to finish my journey alone.'"

In 1803, through the kindness of Mr. Whitaker, our au-

thor became acquainted with the Rev. William Gregor rector of Creed, in Cornwall. In this gentleman he found a judicious and friendly counsellor when Mr. Whitaker had closed his earthly career. To the libraries of these gentlemen as well as that of Dr. Lyne, and others, he had, at all times, unlimited access, and was always an acceptable and esteemed visiter.

Through the publication of Mr. Britton's "Cornwall" and Mr. Polwhele's "Literature and Literary Characters of Cornwall," Mr. Drew's fame, his origin, situation, and labours became extensively known; and, as a consequence, he became an object of considerable attraction. The greater portion of the strangers who visited Cornwall paid "the metaphysical shoemaker" a visit. To many men this would have been matter of no small gratification, and would have pampered their vanity: In regard, however, to such visitors Mr. Drew observed, "These gentlemen certainly honour me by their visits; but I do not forget, that many of them merely wish to say, that they have seen the cobbler who wrote a book."

There were, however, many noble exceptions to this sweeping expression of our author, among which may be mentioned the very Rev. George Moore, archdeacon of Cornwall, who, in the course of his annual visitation, called with his daughter and spent several hours in the society of Mr. Drew. *

Mr. Drew was already placed in too flattering a position, from his reputation as an author, and the pressing invitations of his numerous literary friends, to allow his pen to rest: He set himself actively to the collecting of materials for his Work on the Identity and Resurrection of the Human Body. He, however, found the subject surrounded with

considerable difficulties; he was not, however, the man to be easily daunted. He saw, or thought he saw, a variety of sources from which arguments might be drawn, all tending in one direction, and uniting their strength to authenticate the fact which he wished to establish. Communicating this to a friend, he was pressed to proceed, at the same time aware that the existing literature of the country could afford no assistance, in a task such as that he had voluntarily undertaken. He pursued his work through difficulties inseparable from the undertaking, and much increased by the disadvantages peculiar to his position.

In his preface to this work, Mr. Drew observes, "It was about the close of the year 1805, that I had, in my own estimation, completed the manuscript; and I fully expected that I should shortly submit it to the inspection of my much lamented friend.* For it was a resolution which I previously formed, that, if it possessed any merit, Mr. Whitaker should have the first opportunity of making the discovery of it; and, if it had nothing that would render it worthy of preservation, he alone should witness its disgrace.

"But here an unforeseen and unpleasant difficulty arose. Preparatory to his inspection of it, I proceeded to give the whole a cool and dispassionate perusal, that in one view I might take an impartial survey of the import and connexion of all its parts. In prosecuting this perusal, I had the mortification to find that the arrangements were bad,—that my thoughts appeared confused,—and that in many places, the chain of reasoning had been broken by frivolous digression, and impertinent reflections:—that in some places the arguments were defective; and, in others, those which were good in themselves were placed in an inauspicious light. On the whole, I sank down into a kind of careless apathy, half resolved to touch it no more."

* Mr. Whitaker died Oct. 30, 1808.

The work was laid aside for some time, till urged by the opportunity of friends, he commenced his revision and determined not to desist until he had "extracted order from confusion, lopped off redundancies, supplied defects, and placed his reasonings in a clear and unbroken light." This being effected the MS. was confided to the inspection of his long tried friend, Mr. Whitaker. It was next examined by the Rev. William Gregor, who suggested the propriety of prefixing to the work a plain narrative of the incidents of his life, and the circumstances which first led him to metaphysical inquiries. Mr. Whitaker agreed with his reverend brother in the suggestion thus made. Through the kindness of Dr. Adam Clarke the work underwent a very minute examination by a number of the members of the Philological Society resident in London.

This Essay underwent another revision by its distinguished author, in which he readily availed himself of the critical hints thrown out, by his clerical and philological friends. Issuing a prospectus for publishing it by subscription was speedily met by orders for eight hundred copies. Mr. Edwards, the proprietor of the copy-right of his Essay on the Soul, made overtures for the purchase of the new work, which was agreed on. Mr. Drew receiving five hundred copies in boards. The proof-sheets were examined by Dr. Clarke, who evinced an increasing interest on behalf of his metaphysical friend.*

Notwithstanding the novel nature of the undertaking and the almost unequalled talent and excellence with which it was executed, only one or two reviews of the work appeared. The reason will be at once apparent to those minds competent to grapple with the reasoning of such a work, and who have bestowed upon it an attentive perusal. But the Edi-

† The Essay was published in 1809.

tors of some of the leading periodicals assigned the reason at once. Mr. Parker being asked if any person was reviewing it for the Eclectic, replied, that it was difficult to get a *proper* person to do it *justice*. A London bookseller made the following request to Mr. Drew: "I wish you could contrive to send me a review of your new Essay for the E—— M——. They have wished me to get a review of it by some friend of mine, and I know no one who is *able* and *willing* to do it in the manner that it deserves. If you could do something in that way, it might remain a secret between you and myself." The hint was not acted on. Mr. Drew's mind was *differently* constituted from that of the late Sir Walter Scott; and his remark on this point is characteristic of that independence of thought and action which he exhibited, and undeviatingly maintained throughout life. "Such things may be among the tricks of trade; but never will I soil my fingers by meddling with them. My work shall honestly meet its fate. If it be praised, I shall doubtless be gratified—if censured, instructed—if it drop still-born from the press, I will endeavour to be contented."

Anxious to preserve the literary continuity of this memoir, we now revert to Mr. Drew's less public avocations. Our author began to feel all the natural cares and anxieties incident to the two-fold relation of a husband and a father. His literary fame presented the chances of his occupying a different rank in society from that which he had hitherto trodden; and conceiving it a duty, which he owed to those now dependent on his exertions, he determined on devoting his spare time to such purposes, as might prove most advantageous to the future comfort and prosperity of his young family. In the year 1804, he commenced giving instructions in the Elements of English Grammar, in the form of lectures; he used no books; prescribed no tasks, but subjected his young auditors to constant examinations on the

points brought under their notice; and not unfrequently he purposely violated the rules he had himself laid down, in order to test the attention and perception of those committed to his charge. His course was completed in a year. On subsequent occasions he added to his prelections on Grammar the principles of Geography and an outline of the Solar system. Mr. Drew's method of instruction was the most successful which could possibly be adopted with profit to the instructed. It will be long, however, before we again have an illustration of the philosopher stooping from his lofty pinnacle to become the instructor of the young and ignorant.

In the same year a gentleman, writing to Mr. Drew, remarks, "Two days ago I received a letter from my friend Adam Clarke, who mentions their having elected you a Member of the Manchester Philological Society, and says, he wishes to encourage you in your literary pursuits." a few days subsequent, Mr. Drew received the Society's Diploma accompanied by a letter from the secretary and one from Dr. Clarke, both written on the same sheet. What was the "Literary and Philosophical Society" of the same place engrossed with, so as to neglect the first metaphysician of the period?

The year 1805 is marked by a complete change in Mr. Drew's occupation. Literature had hitherto been the employment of his leisure hours; from this period it engrossed his whole time and attention. To use the expressive language of his son "His allegiance to St. Crispin was now dissolved; and the awl and lap-stone were exchanged for the pen."

About this time Dr. Thomas Coke was engaged in soliciting support for the Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Cornwall and the adjacent counties. On this occasion he came into personal contact with Mr. Drew, and being much struck with his general intelligence made proposals to our

author, which cannot be better explained than in his own words. "Very early in the year 1805, I became more particularly acquainted with Dr. Coke than I had been before. At this time, his Commentary on the Bible was verging towards a close, and his History of the West Indies had acquired an embodied form. Being constantly engaged in soliciting support for the missions, and finding their claims upon his exertions to increase daily, he lodged some papers in my hands, requesting me to examine them with attention, to notice defects, to expunge redundancies, and to give, on some occasions, a new feature to expression. All this was accordingly done; and, in many instances, my recommendations were fully adopted. This intercourse subsisted for several years; and I received from Dr. Coke a pecuniary remuneration, in proportion to the time that was expended in his service."

The following extract, from Mr. Drew's life of Dr. Coke, will set this literary co-partnership in as clear a light, as any means which may afterwards be discovered can possibly do. "From motives to which the author will not give a name, many questions have been asked, in consequence of the preceding compact, which, in the eye of ignorance, would seem to terminate to Dr. Coke's disadvantage. In a letter which is now before the writer, this sentiment is expressed in the following words: 'What effrontery must any person be possessed of, who imposes upon the public, by publishing books or tracts in his own name, though written by another, and not ingenuously giving the honour to whom honour is due.' To this family of questions, propositions, and apostrophes, Dr. Coke, in a letter now in my possession, has furnished a satisfactory reply. In the year 1811, when this letter was written, he proposed to incorporate my name with his own; but in the title-pages of works that had already appeared this could not be done. In such

however, as were then designed to be published, it is probable that this incorporation would have taken place, if a change in the mode of his proceedings had not rendered *it* impracticable, by the disposal of his works to the Conference; and, consequently, by suspending the plans which he had in contemplation. Let such as charge him with 'effrontery' say what, under existing circumstances, they would have expected him to do more."

There are other documents affording information upon this subject, which it is not needful to refer to here. Enough may be gleaned from the above extracts to enable the reader to judge how far the works published, with Dr. Coke's name prefixed, from 1805 till 1812, are to be imputed to our author. There can, however, be little doubt expressed as to the important assistance rendered by Mr. Drew to Dr. Coke in the responsible and laborious duties arising from the superintendence of the Wesleyan Methodist Missions. In the words of our author's Son, "Mr. Drew not only benefitted the Wesleyan body generally, but also prepared the way for, and was virtually the almost immediate predecessor of, the late gifted and lamented Richard Watson."

We have already mentioned the visit of the very Rev. George Moore to our author: this gentleman, in his annual visitations continued his personal attentions to Mr. Drew. In 1805, although aware of Mr. Drew's attachment to the principles of dissent, he proposed that our author should become a candidate for Holy orders; at the same time promising his influence to secure that preferment in the Church, which his high literary reputation deserved. The offer was respectfully declined. Mr. Drew entertained no feelings repugnant to the best interests of the Church; but considered that the adoption of such a course would interfere with the usefulness to which he had already attained. It is evident, notwithstanding, the high literary station to which

Mr. Drew had reached, that his knowledge of the views and feelings of the general body of the people of the country towards the Church, must have been limited, either by the narrow circle of his own immediate friends, or the product of the prejudices incident to, and arising from, his own peculiar position. A similar offer was subsequently made from another party, and was also declined

In 1806, Mr. Drew commenced as a reviewer on the suggestion and recommendation of his valuable friend, Dr. Adam Clarke. His first effort in this line was devoted to Professor Scott's "Elements of Intellectual Philosophy," which was well received and highly esteemed, as a critical production, by those considered as the most competent judges, in that department of literature. "Though Mr. Scott did not acquiesce in all the strictures of the reviewer of his work, yet he confessed he was highly praised, and much gratified; and I thank *you* for taking care not only that the desire I expressed when I sent the book should be fulfilled, but that it has been exceeded." * His next attempt, in this line, was an *attack* on Mr. Forsyth's work; which was followed by an article on Dr. Williams's theological system in his "Essay on the Equity of the Divine Government," and of a series of pamphlets written for and against his hypothesis. The fate of this critique will be best explained in Mr. Drew's own words: "When the passive power hypothesis of Dr. Williams first made its appearance, and the controversy was carried on between his friends and those who opposed his system, I occasionally wrote articles for the Eclectic Review, and by the editor was desired to review these pamphlets, which were written with a considerable degree of acuteness. This I undertook; and not knowing that the Review was so much the instrument of a

* Professor Bentley to Dr. Clarke

party as I afterwards discovered, I animadverted on the hypothesis with more freedom than Dr. Williams's friends were willing to allow. In some places I pointed out what I conceived to be the vulnerable parts of his fortress, and the defective branches of his system. This was sent to the editor: but it was never printed; nor have I, from that time to this, written any thing for that journal. My critique I never recalled; so that it still lies among their papers, and there in all probability it will perish."

About this period Mr. Drew's labours suffered a slight interruption from an attack of fever; relative to which, in writing to a friend he says, "You may probably recollect, that when you called upon me I complained of being unwell. Since that time I have been ill of a slow fever, and am but just recovered. The disorder through Almighty goodness, has entirely left me; but I feel myself very much debilitated, and am at present but badly calculated to enter into the thorny regions of metaphysics." For the benefit of his health he resided a short period at Fowey, a neighbouring sea-port.

During the currency of 1809, Mr. Drew became acquainted with the late Lieutenant-Colonel Sandys, a gentleman highly distinguished for his Christian character, with whom he continued on the most intimate footing till the death of the colonel terminated their friendly intercourse. It was also about this time that a correspondence began between our author and Professor Kidd, of Marischal College, Aberdeen. The professor had read Mr. Drew's two Essays from which he, not only entertained a high opinion of the writer, but also felt solicitous in what way he might render his influence useful to "profit merit emerging from hardships;" and for the attainment of this important object directed his attention to the subject of the Burnet prize on the "Being and Attributes of the Deity." On the subject

of this great literary task Mr. Drew expressed his apprehension to professor Kidd as to his chance of success, where the largeness of the "bait" while it invited must be withheld from his grasp, even by its own greatness: and relative to which, he remarked, "England, no doubt, will produce new Lockes and Clarkes; and Scotland new Beatties and Reids; and I can hardly arrogate to myself the character of becoming their rival, without placing myself in the situation of Andromeda, who, contending with the Nereides for the prize of beauty, was by them bound to a rock and condemned to be devoured." * Despite his own doubts, we observe from his frequent communications with the professor that he began to entertain serious thoughts on the subject of the prize Essay. His weighty literary engagements with Dr. Coke proved a heavy obstacle to the rapid advancement of a task such as that to which he now purposed directing his attention. The occasional time he could snatch from his engagements, to which we have just made reference, was devoted to preparatory reading; in 1811 he commenced arranging his materials; and in the following year he had made considerable progress in the work. In the summer of this year, (1812) the MS. was submitted to the inspection of the Rev. William Gregor, of whose remarks, as well as the many valuable suggestions made by Professor Kidd in his letters, he at once availed himself; and after subjecting the work to a thorough revision, laid it before Mr. Gregor for a final examination; whose opinion was given in the following terms:—

"I return your manuscript. You will find my pencil notices very few. I have read the whole over carefully, and I think that you have very materially improved your Essay by condensation, &c. Your language is simple and perspicuous, and, in cases that demand it, it possesses great

* Letter to Professor Kidd

strength and energy. I feel much interest in the success of your work. It possesses so much merit, that it is not my wishes alone that make me sanguine as to its success. It appears to me that you have pursued the line marked out for you in the advertisement, and fulfilled its conditions. And what momentous subjects have you investigated! Amidst *such* contemplations, the world and the things of the world appear but as the mere dust in the balance."

In the latter end of 1813, the MS. was forwarded to Aberdeen.—The competitors amounted to about fifty.—The award was not made until August, 1815. The two successful Essays were the productions of Dr. Brown, then Principal of Marischal College, and Dr. Sumner, the present Bishop of Chester.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Drew, from the high reputation he had previously attained, conjoined with the opinions of his literary friends, must have entertained considerable expectation on the subject of, at least, the second premium. Professor Kidd was the first to inform his friend of the decision of the judges. On this subject Mr. Drew remarked, "I felt a little, for a few minutes; but it soon subsided, and left me as I was before." "I had flattered myself," says Mr. Gregor in writing to Mr. Drew, that you would have gained one of the prizes; for I thought it highly probable, that what you had written would contain more *original thoughts* upon the subject than the works of other candidates who had perhaps read more deeply and learnedly than yourself. I am glad, however, that you are so soon reconciled to the event, and that you intend to publish your book in some form or other." In writing to our author Professor Kidd remarks, "I have glanced through several parts of your Essay; and it strikes me, at present, that the extreme profundity of thought which it contains was against it. I hesitate not to say, that the one which gained the prize is ~~nothing~~ like so deep."

We shall continue the subject of the Essay, that the literary part of this memoir may be rendered perfectly continuous. Professor Kidd, after perusing the MS. recommended its being placed in the hands of Dr. Gregory of Woolwich : To this suggestion Mr. Drew readily assented. The work was accordingly forwarded by the Professor to the Doctor, who after carefully examining it, forwarded it to its author, along with the critical remarks of his northern friend.

In the commencement of 1819 proposals for publishing, in two octavo volumes, "An Attempt to Demonstrate the Being, Attributes, and Providence of the Deity" were circulated. About 400 copies were individually subscribed for, and 200 by the trade and the Wesleyan Book Committee. The work appeared in 1820 ; and, in 1824, the remainder of an impression of 1000 copies was purchased by Messrs. Baynes and Son. The work was too profound for general readers, and the same difficulty appears to have retarded its rapid circulation, by means of the periodical press, as had been previously experienced by at least one editor, viz. "I know no one who is *able* and *willing* to do it in the manner it deserves." Only one critique appeared, which might be considered as at all commensurate with the merit of the work.

The Methodist Conference having, in 1812, become the proprietors of all Dr. Coke's literary property, Mr. Drew's time was, in a great measure, at his own disposal. Being thus without regular literary employment he thought of becoming editor of a newspaper, in consequence of overtures made to him by Mr. Flindell, at that time proprietor and editor of the Cornwall Gazette. Mr. Drew, on this occasion, had recourse to the opinions of Dr. Adam Clarke and Lieutenant-Colonel Sandys, which coinciding, in a considerable degree with his own, he entered on negotiations with Mr. F., but the conditions not being satisfactory, the scheme was relinquished.

It was the wish of Dr. Coke, before proceeding on the East Indian mission, that Mr. Drew's literary services might be made permanently available to the interests of the Wesleyan Methodist body generally: more especially in answering the work of Dr. Williams, to which reference has already been made; and although the subject was frequently brought forward previous to the Doctor's departure, and seconded by Mr. James Wood, and other influential members of Conference, the proposition was negatived.

In May, 1813, Mr. D. published a discourse, delivered at Redruth, entitled "Scriptural and Philosophical Arguments to prove the Divinity of Christ, and the Necessity of his Atonement," which attracted much notice, had a large circulation, and drew forth an amazingly weak production, under the title of a "Reply," from a Unitarian of Falmouth. He would have taken no notice of this sophistical and unscriptural production, had it not been for the urgent solicitations of many of his religious friends, who afraid that Mr. Prout's pamphlet might fall into the hands of pious persons, who unacquainted with controversy, might not be able to distinguish Socinian sophistry from solid argument, he was induced to strip off the mask by which it was concealed, that the unsuspecting might neither be led to forsake "the fountain of living waters," through the delusion of false appearances, nor be induced "to turn aside from the holy commandment delivered unto them." The result was a large pamphlet, entitled, "The Divinity of Christ, and the Necessity of his Atonement, vindicated from the Cavils of Mr. Thomas Prout and his Associates." The Socinians were much annoyed by this second production.

Mr. Drew was much importuned to write a larger work on the subject of Redemption through the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; other matters, however, soon occupied his attention; and the circumstance of knowing that his friend

Professor Kidd was engaged with his essay on the Trinity might present another cause for declining the task so congenial to his own mind, and to which had his attention been once systematically directed would have, in all propability, proved a complete extinguisher to every thing savouring of the insidious sophistry of Unitarian Antichristianism.*

In 1814 Mr. Drew's father died. For some time previous he had given up his small farm, retired to a lodging, depending wholly for his support upon our author and Mrs. Kingdon his daughter. Shortly before his death Mr. Drew had him removed to his own chamber, where the old man breathed his last. In a letter to one of his children he speaks thus of his aged parent:—"In him I behold an evidence of what vital religion is able to accomplish. Having made his peace

*"The object of your pamphlet is to establish what I conceive to be the very essence of our religion, and to vindicate important and awful truths from cavils. I have read what you have written with much satisfaction. There is considerable acuteness in your mode of treating your subject, and also originality in your arguments, which upon a question so often and so variously discussed, was not to be expected. It is, I think, calculated to do much good: it will have weight with those who are humble and teachable;—but, alas! there are those still in the world, 'who seeing will not see, and hearing will not understand.' I fear that Mr. Prout, and men of his character and opinions, will not easily be silenced. There is a flippant self-sufficiency in the style and argument of all the Socinian writers whom I have consulted, that seems to bid defiance to conviction. After what the sober part of mankind would consider as a defeat, they will patch up their broken weapons, and limp again into the field: and when they have tired and disgusted both opponents and readers, they will utter the shout of victory."

"The renowned Socinian champion, Priestly, with all his arts and antics of controversy, serves as their fudge-man, in the field. Your parallel between Thomas Paine and Thomas Prout happens very happily, and the coincidence is to be easily traced up to natural causes. Such men cannot brook to be hemmed in by the ordinary barriers which restrain opinions within reasonable limits. 'Let us break their bonds asunder, and cast away their cords from us.' But 'professing themselves to be wise, they have become fools.' Letter from the Rev. William Gregor, of Creed, Cornwall. June 1814."

with God, and lived in a state of preparation for eternity, the prospects of death and judgment are so familiarized to his view, that he can contemplate both with tranquility. May we be equally prepared !” A few weeks after, he writes, “ Your grandfather is no more. He departed this life, in the full triumph of faith. May you and I follow him, as he, for more than sixty years, followed Christ, that like him, we may at last end our days in peace ! On the preceding evening, when I asked him how he was, he replied, ‘ Strong in faith—full of hope—my fears are wholly gone.’ Thus ‘ like a shock of corn fully ripe ’ was the old man gathered into the heavenly garner.”

During the summer of this year Professor Kidd requested Mr. D. to subject his “ Essay on the Trinity ” to a critical examination before its going to press. The task was a difficult one, both as regarded time and talent ; and so conscious was the Professor of the value of our author’s revision, that upon Mr. D’s suggestion, he reconstructed a large portion of his treatise. Having again revised and altered it, it was once more submitted to Mr. Drew’s examination, as well as that of Dr. Adam Clarke. In speaking of this work the latter says, “ I consider his work to be a mighty effort of a mighty mind ; and, should he even fail in the main argument his work, I am certain, will do much good. He has dared nobly ; and if he fall, it must be by the sun’s melting the wax of his pinions, through the sublimity of his flight. I believe there is not a Socinian in Britain this day that will be able to demonstrate him to be wrong : and I fear not to pledge myself to eat the book, though a folio, in which his chain of argumentation can be fairly proved to cut the opposite way.” What an eulogium, and from such an individual ! Dr. Kidd’s work deserved it well.

Towards the end of 1814, Mr. Drew commenced the “ History of Cornwall ; ” proposals for publishing which had

been previously issued by Fortescue Hitchens, Esq., of St. Ives, a poet of some local reputation. The publisher for the work having received the names of many subscribers, engaged Mr. D. to finish what, as yet, was scarcely begun, as far as authorship was concerned. When our author commenced his labours there was only two sheets and a half of manuscript from the pen of the already announced author. Mr. Drew was however, contented to proceed in the prosecution of this important historical task in the humble capacity of *editor*, although the work as subsequently published was entirely the production of his pen, with the exception of the quantity already mentioned.

The first portion of the work was delivered to the subscribers early in 1815, and proceeded with regularly till the publication of the eighth part, sometime in 1817, when it was stopped from the failure of the publisher, by which Mr. Drew sustained considerable loss. The remainder was not published till several years after, owing wholly to delay caused by the assignees on the bankrupt's estate; and over which our author had no means of control.

Previous to Dr. Coke's proceeding to the East Indies, he expressed a desire, that if a biography of him should be published, that Mr. Drew should be the writer. This being known to the Doctor's executors, the information was communicated by them to the Wesleyan Book Committee, who concurred in the choice their distinguished brother had made. Mr. D. was therefore, requested to meet the executors at Bath relative to the Memoir. From that place he went to London to consult with the Book Committee. During his stay in the Metropolis he took up his residence at the house of his long tried friend Dr. Clarke, by whose kindness and influence, he was introduced to many distinguished individuals; among whom were the Rev. Iegh Richmond, author of the "Diaryman's Daughter," and the

late Dr. Mason, of New York. He was also introduced to the Royal Society and the Society of Antiquarians. This was the first time Mr. Drew had travelled beyond the western boundary of Devonshire. Having completed his arrangements for the Memoir of Dr. Coke, he returned to Cornwall.

In August, 1815, he received the following resolution of Conference confirming his engagement as Dr. Coke's biographer. "That the Book Committee shall have authority to conclude, in conjunction with the executors of the late Rev. Dr. Coke, an agreement on such terms as they may think fit, respecting a Life of Dr. Coke, to be written by Mr. Drew, of St. Austell, and that, if such agreement be concluded, the life so written shall have the sanction and support of the Methodist connexion." The executors of Dr. C. were the parties alone responsible to Mr. D. for the remuneration of his services in this important task.

Having arranged his materials Mr. Drew proceeded with the Life, which he finished about March, 1816, and sent off the MS. for the inspection of the parties who considered themselves entitled to be consulted: although Dr. Coke had previously given Mr. Drew a memorandum constituting him sole judge in this important matter.

Our author now learned how difficult a task it is to please many masters. The circumstances will be best explained in his own words:—"Two days since I had the MS. of Dr. Coke's Life returned to me, to undergo alterations. I wish it had been returned sooner, as the long delay will prove injurious to the sale. It has now been in the hands of the executors, I believe, five or six months, for examination; and all the animadversions that are made might have been made within a fortnight. But it has been in London, with Mr. Holloway; in Lincolnshire, with Mr. Brackenbury; and in Bath, with Mr. Roberts." "To please the

executors alone," says Mr. Drew's Son, "would not have been difficult. But the Biographer had also to please the Book Committee,* and then to satisfy himself and the public, as to the faithfulness of the narrative, and the correct delineation of character." In February, 1817, Mr. Drew forwarded the revised MS. for inspection; and the work appeared in the course of the same year, under the patronage of the Book Committee. It is admitted that the remuneration afforded was as ample as the subject was in itself important.

In 1816, and previous to the publication of the Life of Dr. Coke, Mr. Drew was appointed postmaster of St. Austell, on the recommendation of Charles Rashleigh, Esq. An appointment as well deserved on the part of our author, as it was creditable to the gentleman, who interested himself on his behalf.

It appears that Mr. Drew, at one period, entertained the idea of combatting the views laid down in Dr. Williams's Essay upon the Equity of Divize Government, in order to the evolving of the great question, whether man be a *free* or a *necessary* agent. He was anxious, that if the task was undertaken, it might be made a permanent work of Metho-

* It appears from this expression that Mr. Drew's Son is dissatisfied with the interference of the Book Committee in this respect. There was no necessity, however, for the remark. Dr. Coke was, for many years, one of the most distinguished members of the Wesleyan Conference—for a long period the General Superintendent of the Wesleyan Methodist Missions—the Founder of the East Indian Missions, and author of several works, for the consecutive publication of which that body had become responsible; and from Mr. Drew's previous consultation with them on the subject of Dr. Coke's Biography, his receiving and acquiescing in the contents of the resolution of Conference relative to the same work, he thereby more than tacitly admitted their undeniable right, from the first, to ascertain and determine whether in the Life produced, there might be any thing inimical to the general system of Methodism, or reflecting, in any degree, on the character of their late distinguished colleague.

dism, in which its doctrines might be defended on rational principles ; and that, passing through the ordeal of such as were competent to judge, it might be considered as a standard work among the body. The Rev. Thomas Jackson had addressed Mr. Drew, on this, to the Methodist body, all engrossing subject, offering if he undertook such a work to subscribe for fifty copies, and to use his utmost influence in favour of the circulation of the book. Dr. Clarke had also urged our author to proceed with the same subject, but Mr. Drew was less sanguine than some of his friends, and more cautious than to risk the chances of being remunerated from a work, in which it was attempted to overthrow the leading principles of Calvinism. He therefore proposed to take the matter into his serious consideration, provided the Conference took one thousand copies of such work when executed !*

In October, 1818, Dr. Clarke wrote to Mr. Drew, stating that the partnership between Messrs. Nuttall, Fisher, and Dixon was dissolved ; and that the whole of that extensive printing establishment was in the hands of Mr. Fisher ; and that after finding him fairly settled, he had earnestly recommended him to engage Mr. Drew, as a writer and editor ; that it would not only be beneficial for his general business, but that Mr. F. ought also, on the other hand, to make it worth our author's *while* to be so engaged. The Doctor pressed the subject upon Mr. D's attention with marked earnestness ; and the result was that in a short time the Cornish metaphysician was established in Liverpool as the Editor of the " Imperial Magazine, or Compendium of Re-

* We can have no idea of the nature of the unpublished critique by Mr. Drew, sent to the editor of the Eclectic Review ; but this much we do know, that had the refutation been undertaken, even under the patronage of the Conference, our author would have found it the most difficult task he had ever embraced to upset the positions laid down in Dr. Williams's Essay, and requiring logical talents of the highest order ; and, that too, wholly free from Sectarian prejudice.

ligious, Moral, and Philosophical Knowledge." We have no details of the terms upon which this engagement was concluded; but if we may judge from the language of Dr. Clarke, when writing to Mr. Drew, the remuneration must have been ample. "Lastly, and most important, he proposes to give you, for the first year, you giving up your whole time to his work, and finding yourself every thing in the house way ——— pounds. I pulled it up from ——— guineas to the above sum; and my dear brother, I do think, it is only under the influence of an *especial providence*, that a man in your circumstances, or a literary man of any kind, in such times as these, can get so much per annum." Besides the heavy duties arising from the editorship of the Magazine, Mr. Drew had other important works to execute for Mr. Fisher.

During his residence in Liverpool Mr. Drew seldom failed, when the state of the weather permitted, to take a walk in the morning, about a mile, towards the country, "to look on furze bushes and a few daises." "I have every thing to make me comfortable which it is in the power of strangers to bestow, and perhaps am out visiting four evenings of each week. Many, I believe, are invited, on these occasions, to be introduced to me, and to have me introduced to them. I can plainly perceive that the people are anxious to fix me here; but all entertain suspicions that I am not securely anchored until my wife come. I have preached every Sunday, except one, since I have been in Liverpool. I seem to hold a kind of middle rank between the local preachers and the travelling." "If our magazine will pay, I do not think that any pecuniary considerations will suffer me to leave Liverpool; and the fate of this work a few months will decide."*

* Letter to his Wife and Children, March, 1819.

Three months after Mr. Drew writes, "Our Magazine goes on exceedingly well. We have sold thus far, upwards of 7000 of each number." In July, of this year, (1819) he visited his family at St. Austell, returning immediately to Liverpool. In the summer of the year following, Mrs. Drew and his youngest daughter joined him there; "but, for domestic reasons, Mrs. D. returned to Cornwall in the following November, and continued in a state of voluntary separation, until the removal of the Caxton establishment from Liverpool to London."

In the month of January, 1821, the whole of the extensive establishment, with which our author was connected, was reduced by fire to one general mass of ruin. This sad catastrophe did not, however, impede the regular publication of the Magazine. The proprietor, at the following Midsummer, transferred his establishment from Liverpool to London. This afforded Mr. Drew an opportunity of again visiting Cornwall, after which he commenced his labours in the Metropolis.

The only difference which obtained from Mr. Drew's residence in London, compared with that of Liverpool, was a change of friends and the renewal of old friendships. His every day occupation was similar to what it had previously been; all the works which issued from the Caxton Press were subjected to his supervision; and owing to their number and importance required him to be constantly at hand. His residence was in the immediate vicinity of the printing establishment. He filled the office of Class-leader, and had scarcely ever a spare sabbath, in consequence of his frequent engagements to preach in the different circuits, being viewed as the common property of all.

In May, 1824, the degree of A.M. was conferred upon Mr. Drew, by Marischal College, Aberdeen. "I congratulate you," says Professor Kidd, "most cordially, on your

new title of A.M. Our College has enrolled you among its *Alumni*; and I hope this will be henurable to both parties. It was your gratitude that first drew my attention to you. Your expressions of grateful regard to Mr. Whittaker, of Ruan Lanyhorne, first attracted my notice of your name. You are indebted to Mr. G——, for first interesting himself in procuring you this honorary distinction. To him, I know, your heart will feel grateful." The degree is dated May 6th. 1824.

Mr. Drew on this occasion also received a letter from the gentleman to whom Professor Kidd refers, in which he says, "Dr. Brown, the principal, remarked, that he should feel particularly gratified in assisting to confer an honour on one who was his antagonist in the prize Essay; and Dr. Glennie is equally desirous of lending his countenance." In thus honouring Mr. Drew the Professors of Marischal College conferred on themselves a lasting memorial of sound judgment and just discrimination.

In 1827-8, Mr. Drew revised and corrected the proof sheets of a work entitled "Principles of Self Knowledge, by Stephen Drew Esq., Barrister at Law, Jamaica. This gentleman although a native of the same county was in no way related to our author. Mr. D. was requested to undertake the revision and correction of the work from the high estimate the author had formed of his capabilities from the perusal of his works. The writer of the treatise died previous to its publication: and on writing to his sister, after having inspected the MS. our author remarks, "I find it, on perusal, to be a work of merit, and one that is likely to be useful to such as patiently investigate first principles. It is a work that will do the writer credit, and prove highly serviceable to the church of Christ."—"I have read every line with attention; and whether I consider the work as a literary production, or a theological treatise, it needs no emendation."

On its appearance the work was scarcely sought after; and Mr. Drew expressed his regret that a work of s ch vast importance commanded no attention from the periodical press. Although the treatise was primarily offered to the Wesleyan Missionary Committee, to be published for the benefit of the mission fund; and had been favourably spoken of by the late Mr. Watson, yet the work was *unnoticed* in the pages of the magazine representing the opinions of that body. Mr. Drew's remark on this point receives considerable strength from his own previous experience on the same point:—"The plain reason is, the book will require much time and thought to examine. This very few are disposed to bestow; and many are afraid of risking their reputation, in giving an opinion on a work they but partially understand. Silence tells no tales."

From this time forward, Mr. Drew's residence in London is chequered with but few events worthy of notice. His time was wholly employed with the business arising out of his engagement with Mr. Fisher. He could have but little leisure, nor did he desire any. He maintained his correspondence with his friends and his family, amid his multifarious engagements, which at one period he states thus:—"Besides the Magazine, I have, at this time, six different works in hand, either as author, compiler, or corrector. 'Tis plain, therefore, I do not want work; and, while I have health and strength, I have no desire to lead a life of idleness;—yet I am sometimes oppressed with unremitting exertion, and occasionally sigh for leisure which I cannot command."

From the time Mr. Drew left Cornwall for Liverpool, he determined on paying a triennial visit to his native place. On one of these occasions (1828) with his wife as his companion, after having spent a fortnight at St. Austell, Mrs. Drew complained that she felt unwell, notwithstanding

which, they went on to Helston. "On her arrival," says her Son, "she retired immediately to bed,—from which she never rose. The next day there were alarming symptoms of cholera;—the day following, her case was deemed hopeless, and shortly after midnight she breathed her last. She was then in her fifty-seventh year." "She died in resignation to the will of God, and relying on Christ for Salvation." How expressive are the words of our author, as exhibiting the nature of his feelings on the occasion of this severe bereavement; "When my wife died, my earthly sun set for ever!"

In one of his letters written shortly after this painful dispensation are these words: "My bereavement has rendered the world to me a dreary blank; as all our dreams of crowning 'a youth of labour with an age of ease,' are totally defeated; and, like Selkirk, 'I must finish my journey alone.' I am, however, aware, that 'troubles spring not from the dust, nor sorrows from the ground,' and I trust I can say, 'The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord!' I have received a wound, the poignancy of which, time may mitigate, but which nothing can fully heal."*

From this time Mr. Drew's health began to sustain a visible decline. His mind no longer exhibited its accustomed buoyancy; and old age advanced with more rapid strides, than before. During the day the painful subject did not recur to his mind, but when evening came, he felt the loneliness of his situation in all its force. And he remarked himself that his sleep was frequently broken and disturbed. At this time, too, he regarded himself as in a state of exile from the place of his birth; and he not unfrequently sighed for the period that would put an end to all

* To his sister, Mrs. Kingdon

his toils, and of his final rest in that place which contained almost all that was dear to him on this earth.

This feeling in favour of returning to his native place continued to occupy Mr. Drew's mind, despite his numerous engagements in the metropolis; and in writing to his Sister, he says, "I still look forward to a residence in Cornwall; but such is the uncertainty of life, and of all our calculations, that we know not what a day may bring forth."* Subsequently he remarks, "I am visited with the infirmities of *sixty-five*, but they are not severe. They only operate as friendly monitors, that others more decisive in their character, and more momentous in their consequences, are not distant. May I be prepared to meet them! Thus far have I visited Cornwall once in three years. I was there in the never-to-be-forgotten year 1828, and hope, should Providence spare my life, to revisit it in the summer of 1831, when we shall once more have an opportunity of meeting. Indeed, if I find my health decline, so that I cannot attend to the duties of my office, I may see you before; for I never intend tarrying here longer than I am able to transact my business:—while I have health and strength, I would as soon be employed as do nothing. Should I live to see you in 1831, I shall then have come to some decision respecting my future movements"†

This year a proposition was made to Mr. Drew, by several members of the council of the London University, to allow himself to be nominated as Professor of Moral Philosophy in that Institution. This offer, so highly honourable to the parties making it, will be best answered in his own words:—"When it was made to me, the time of my intended stay in London was drawing near its close; and, for a year or two only, I did not think it proper, or worth my while, to engage."

* July, 1829.

† March, 1830.

The summer of 1831 arrived and Mr. Drew revisited his native place. Though his general appearance bore the impress of advancing age, yet he seems to have been more affected by, and concerned for, the marked change which "rolling years" had made on the companions of his early days. On ascending the Chapel pulpit of his former place of residence, for the purpose of preaching, he was so deeply affected from this cause, that he could not proceed, until his emotion found vent in tears. This was the period which he had fixed as the time destined to release him from his long and severe literary exertions. For the sake of his children's future interest he, however, determined on applying himself to his wonted engagements for two years additional. To this determination it was probably owing that his life was not prolonged to a more lengthened period than it was. There was little appearance of increased failure of his physical powers, until the summer of 1832, when from having caught cold, he began to be teased with a cough, which never wholly left him. This was followed by the death of his distinguished and long-trying friend Dr. Adam Clarke. He remarked that this event was a death-blow to him—a stroke from which he seemed unable to recover. This conception so wrought upon his mind, that one day he said to his daughter, who remained with him in London, after Mrs. Drew's death, "I have been thinking, Mary, that if I should be taken ill, or die, suddenly, you would be at a great loss how to act about my papers. I now intend to keep them in a certain place, (naming the part of the house,) that they may be always at hand when required." In the autumn of this year he still complained of the cough, while at the same time he was expressing a hope, that his health would be soon perfectly restored:—

"Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die."

In the beginning of 1833, a friend of Mr. Drew's, while

at Helston, in Cornwall, received a letter from his lady "stating among other proofs of Mr. D's excessive debility, that, calling at their house, as he had been in the habit of doing, he sank down in a syncope through the exertion of walking, and scarcely recovered during the day. His children being apprised of this, besought him instantly to leave London; and two of them proposed proceeding thither, to accompany him to Cornwall." To their expressed anxiety for his removal from the scene of his labours, he assured them that he had not yet become the infirm, debilitated old man, scarcely able to do any thing without assistance; which they, in their exaggerated apprehensions, supposed. Assuring that he was, by no means in the weak, sickly condition, which they had been led to suppose their anxiety was thus allayed. Every week brought fresh indications of increasing infirmity; still his strong feeling, or the interest of his family shut out from his mind the full conviction of the truth. He was at length induced to consult a physician, who declared that he ought not to leave London, as his case required the best advice the place could afford.*

Mr Drew began now to think that decisive steps were necessary: he therefore thought of relinquishing at once his editorial engagements with Mr. Fisher; and for this purpose, proceeded to the office of that gentleman; but shortly after his arrival there, becoming weaker, he was removed to his daughter's house, without having been able to enter upon the subject of his visit. On Thursday, March 7th, he proceeded to the office, accompanied by his daughter, for the purpose of a final arrangement. "The exertion and excitement were too much for him. He sank on a chair in a state of great exhaustion, and was brought to his daughter's house, unable to walk without assistance."

It was now obvious that his mind, as well as his body,

* Feb. 1833.

was affected. Of this he was conscious. His physician's opinion was, "It has been your misfortune Mr. Drew, to enjoy almost uninterrupted health. You thought your constitution would submit to any thing; and you have tasked it beyond endurance. Your soul, Sir, has been too great for your body. This is breaking down, and is bearing that with it; and nothing can restore your energies, but complete freedom from labour and excitement."

From his great bodily weakness it was, at first, deemed advisable that his removal should be by water, but that being considered too dilatory, it was determined that he should travel by coach. Every means was adopted for rendering his journey as easy as possible, with which he was much gratified, and induced the expression that he would perform the journey with but slight inconvenience.

On Monday afternoon, March 11th, Mr. Drew took his departure from London; and proceeding by easy stages reached Helston on the afternoon of the following Friday, by which time he had somewhat rallied, exciting in the minds of his children the hope of his recovery. They had recourse, therefore, to such measures, as in their joint opinion would be most likely to attain this desirable end. Their hopes were illusory. A few days after his arrival at Helston, his case was declared to be one of incurable consumption, which would soon terminate fatally.

"With the exhaustion of physical strength," his Son remarks, "the aberration of his intellect increased; and, during the last week of his life, the periods of collected thought were so brief and infrequent, that few of those observations which might otherwise have been expected from a dying christian philosopher, could be recorded. Yet, amidst the wanderings of his mind, the kindness of his disposition frequently discovered itself in its solicitude for others, especially for the comfort of those who were attend-

ing him. When he perceived their anxiety on his account, he would make an effort to cheer them, by alluding to the mercy and goodness of God in surrounding him with so many comforts and kind friends; and more than once he reminded them that he always liked to see smiling faces. Throughout his sickness he frequently expressed his gratitude to God in short ejaculations: 'Bless the Lord for this,'—'Thank God for all his mercies,'—Bless the Lord, O my soul,'—were words often uttered by him; and at other times he was evidently engaged in prayer."

The language of this great and good man, when about to enter on eternity, is deserving of being recorded. "I have the fullest hope, and the most unshaken confidence, in the mercy of God, through our Lord Jesus Christ."—"O glorious sunshine! yes! blessed be God, I shall enter in."—"Will the Lord leave my Soul in darkness? No: he will not. When the door is opened, I shall enter in. Yes, I shall." About eight o'clock on the evening of Friday, March 29th, respiration ceased, and, without pain or struggle, "the spirit returned to God who gave it."

On the Tuesday following, his body was interred beside that of his much-loved wife.

The inhabitants of St. Austell, in remembrance of their distinguished townsman, erected, in the parish church a very handsome tablet, bearing the following inscription:—

To the Memory of
SAMUEL DREW,
A native of this Parish,
Whose talents as a Metaphysical Writer,
Unaided by Education,
Raised him from Obscurity
Into honourable Notice,
And whose Virtues as a Christian
Won the Esteem and Affection
Of all who knew Him.

He was born March 3rd, 1765,
 Lived in St. Austell until January, 1819,
 And, After an Absence of Fourteen Years,
 During which he conducted a literary Journal,
 He returned to end his Days in his Native County,
 As he had long desired,
 And died at Helston, March 29th, 1833.

To record their sense
 Of his literary merit and moral Worth,
 His fellow-townsmen and Parishioners
 Have erected this Tablet.

Mr. Drew was in height rather above the middle size ;
 his head small ; his features pale, and his whole countenance
 implying considerable emaciation over which the marks of
 thought were deeply indented ; his eyes dark and expressive :
 his eye was keen,

With sweetness mix'd.

In his exterior he exhibited nothing savouring of gentility,
 and though accustomed to walk quickly " his gait and ges-
 ture were not ungraceful. His voice, neither harsh nor
 melodious, was clear and powerful ; producing, by the firm-
 ness of its intonations, a conviction that the speaker was no
 ordinary man."

In his domestic habits he was what may be termed regu-
 lar ; he generally rose about seven o'clock, and if the weather
 was favourable, walked till eight, which was his usual hour
 for breakfasting. From that to nine was occupied with the
 morning's meal and family devotion ; in which duty Mr.
 Drew set an example well worthy the imitation and adoption
 of all christian parents. A chapter was read by one of his
 children, the duty falling on each by turns, which was fol-
 lowed by prayer, unless the portion of Scripture read required
 explanation, which lengthened the morning's exercise. He

then entered on his literary labours, which he pursued with intense application, with the exception only of the time necessary for dinner and tea, till seven in the evening. The remainder of the evening was occasionally devoted to the duties of religion, the society of friends, or in conversing with his children. The evening closed with the performance of family devotion. On the Lord's day the morning walk was omitted, and the hour so occupied on the week days was devoted to attendance at Chapel. Previous to our author leaving St. Austell there was no forenoon service performed in the Methodist Chapel there: this portion of the day was allotted to the religious instruction of his children, in which, he took great care not to beget a disrelish for holy things, but while he inculcated the first principles of religion, and moral duty, endeavoured also to lead them to think on subjects of the most vital importance, as regards time and eternity.

In the correction of his children Mr. Drew was averse to the application of corporal punishment, from a conviction that its frequent repetition blunts the "finer feelings and sensibilities of nature, and degrades the child into the mere animal." His affection for his children was strong and ardent beyond expression—their welfare and interest continually engaged his thoughts, as we have already noticed in his solicitude for their future comfort and advancement, evinced in his unwillingness to cede his literary engagements in London, for a given period after the time he had originally assigned for retiring to his native place. In regard to the period of their youth his expression was, "To keep my children wholly from bad associates is out of my power. I can only endeavour to instil good principles, shew them a good example, and commend them in prayer to God." When farther advanced in years their religious improvement engaged his attention as an object of constant

new title of A.M. Our College has enrolled you among its *Alumni*; and I hope this will be honourable to both parties. It was your gratitude that first drew my attention to you. Your expressions of grateful regard to Mr. Whitaker, of Ruan Lanyhorne, first attracted my notice of your name. You are indebted to Mr. G——, for first interesting himself in procuring you this honorary distinction. To him, I know, your heart will feel grateful." The degree is dated May 6th. 1824.

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The catholicity of his spirit and his perfect freedom from sectarian prejudice, in the most extended acceptation of these expressions, is beautifully exhibited in one of his letters, when speaking of the anniversaries of different religious and charitable institutions: "For this diffusion of benevolent feeling we are indebted to Christianity. Under any other system we seek in vain for such amiable features in the human character. It is pleasing, on such occasions, to behold all sects and parties laying aside the colouring of their respective creeds, meeting on ground where nothing but essentials will take root, and extending to each other the hand of brotherly love. Before these institutions were established, we saw each other only in caricature, and were terrified at the creatures of our own imaginations. But these anniversaries have stripped the scarecrow of its frightful aspect; and those whom we fancied to be monsters we find to be men. Toleration generates faction, and uniformity begets superstition. Hence, in England, we have so many sects and parties, and in papal countries, such a crop of ridiculous absurdities. But no comparison can be made between them. The former calls forth our mental energies, and directs us to defend the frontiers of our creeds; the latter paralyzes the intellectual powers, and throws the soul into a state of torpor."

As a preacher he abounded in anecdote, and possessed a peculiar humour which gave a relish to his occasional remarks and to his conversation; but let him ascend the pulpit, and deliver a set discourse, and he infallibly opened up some question of abstract science, as the immortality of the human soul, or the being of God. But the discussion of these and similar questions, though frequently repeated before the same congregation, never tired. The acuteness of Mr. Drew's perceptions, and his quick and clear apprehension of the successive links in the chain of an argument,

combined with uncommon facility and volubility of utterance, though entirely unassisted by any of the graces of oratory, obtained and secured attention without ever wearying it. It is probable that few persons who have heard Mr. D. preach entertained so clear notions of the subject on which he discoursed, as those which they received on hearing him; and the monotopicism of his sermons was the less to be regretted, as in the great variety of pulpit talent, there are few preachers who have the ability, or, having the ability, are governed by the inclination, to introduce the metaphysics of theology into the pulpit.*

The following passage contains the opinion of a gentleman, who frequently heard him preach during his residence in the metropolis:—"As is usual in the public ministrations of the Wesleyan Methodists, Mr. Drew's sermons were delivered extemporaneously, and, though highly argumentative, were truly evangelical. Notwithstanding his natural aptitude for abstruse and subtle disquisition, the various striking remarks with which his oral addresses abounded, were sure, even in regard to the plainest understanding, not only to rivet attention but affect the heart. The impressiveness of his discourses could not be imputed to extravagance either of voice or gesture; yet he was an energetic and efficient preacher. This I attribute to his fervour of spirit; to the uncommon pains he took, first to select and submit an important proposition, and then to prove what he proposed; and to his endeavour to explain, and enforce upon the judgment and conscience of the hearer, the truth under consideration. His discourse was usually so linked together, from beginning to end, by a chain of consecutive reasoning, that, unless the hearer regarded each point as it was handled, the process was disturbed, and the force of the whole weakened or lost. Superficial and drowsy hearers deemed

* Christian Advocate.

him a dry preacher. To all such he must have been so. By the earnest and watchful listener no such complaint was made."

Among those whom Mr. Clarke joined to the Methodist's society, (in St. Austell,) was *Samuel Drew*, then terminating his apprenticeship to a shoemaker, and since become one of the first metaphysicians in the empire; as his works on the *Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul of man*, the *Identity and Resurrection of the Human Eody*, and the *Being and Attributes of God*, sufficiently testify. A man of primitive simplicity of manners, amiableness of disposition, piety towards God, and benevolence to men, seldom to be equalled; and, for reach of thought, keenness of discrimination, purity of language, and manly eloquence, not to be surpassed in any of the common walks of life. In short, his circumstances considered, with the mode of his education, he is one of those prodigies of nature and grace which God rarely exhibits; but which serve to keep up the connecting link between those who are confined to houses of clay, whose foundations are in the dust, and beings of a superior order, in those regions where infirmity cannot enter, and where the sunshine of knowledge suffers neither diminution nor eclipse.*

Of Mr. Drew's personal character it is not easy to speak too highly. He was not puffed up by the success which crowned his unassisted efforts in the pursuit of letters; and, though his superiority of mind was easily discernible in his conversation, yet he was exceedingly unassuming and unostentatious. His piety, like his habits generally, was not showy, but it was consistent. He was a real christian philosopher. His understanding was of an elevated order. His mind was richly endowed by nature, and it was highly cultivated by diligent study, and by unwearied assiduity; so


* Dr. Clarke's Autobiography.

that his society was always a luxury both to the literate and illiterate, to the scholar and to the Christian. His philosophy and his piety bore immediately and equally on the happiness of life, and the daily habits of mankind; and they were equally free from the pedantry of human learning, and from the solemn and disgusting farce of a religious austerity. In the decease of Adam Clarke, and Richard Watson, and Samuel Drew, the Methodist connexion has lost three of its brightest luminaries. They have shone a while together in the church below, and they have set nearly together; but they are only set, to rise again where suns and stars shall set no more.*

The longer I was honoured with Mr. Drew's friendship, the more I admired him. His vigour and grasp of intellect were united with such christian simplicity and genuine piety, as placed him high in the scale of intelligent beings; whilst his singular modesty, and cheerfulness of disposition, joined to his exhaustless fund of anecdote and interesting information, rendered him a delightful friend and companion.† Speaking of Mr. Drew, Dr. Olinthus Gregory states, that he exhibited an extraordinary union of the finest intellectual and moral attributes of our nature; and Davies Gilbert, Esq., styles him the *English Plato*.

* Christian Advocate.

† Rev. Dr. Townley.



AN
ORIGINAL ESSAY

PART. I

ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMMATERIALITY
OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

CHAP. I.

OF MATTER.

SECT. I.

Every thing in Nature included within the confines of Matter and Spirit.—Man consists both of Matter and Spirit.—Substance defined.

IN the vast empire of created nature, there are but two primary substances with which we are acquainted, which have in themselves a positive existence, and these are, MATTER and SPIRIT. Within the confines of these two substances, all species of Being, whether animate or inanimate, as well as the individuals of each species, claim their existence, and ultimately resolve themselves. And although the diversified scenery of nature, may furnish the senses with an infinite variety, yet these two substances are invariably, in their physical natures, the same; and the phenomena of nature is nothing more than the distinct modifications under which these substances are presented, through the senses, to the intellectual powers.

These two substances have their beings independent of each other, having properties which are totally distinct, and which they cannot partake in common with one another.*

* In the commencement of this Essay, it will instantly occur to the intelligent reader, that I have either designedly deviated from the common path in which many writers on this subject have walked, or that I have been guilty of a flagrant omission. It may not, therefore, be unnecessary in this place to avow, that the former has been the case.

It has frequently been asserted—that man is a threefold compound, consisting of BODY, SOUL, and SPIRIT;—that the BODY is formed of gross corporeal particles; that the SPIRIT is pure intelligence; and, that the SOUL is a kind of ethereal vehicle, in which the spirit is enclosed, in order to its union with the grosser compages of the body. Such is the notion of BODY, SOUL, and SPIRIT!

Perhaps an inability to comprehend, how pure spirit could be immediately connected with particles so gross as those of which the human body is composed, may be among the primary causes of this theory of man. And hence the conception of this ethereal vehicle, which is presumed to act as a medium between these two distant natures.

That we cannot conceive how two natures, so physically distant from each other, as matter and spirit, can be immediately united, is a truth which I readily admit; but I fear that the admission of an ethereal vehicle, will give the difficulty no solution. The sublimation of matter can never destroy any of its permanent properties, nor in any wise change the identity of its nature. Let any given portion of matter pass either through an alembic of alchymy, or an alembic of the mind, the same conclusion must inevitably follow. “There can be nothing but matter which refinement can leave behind, and there is nothing but matter which refinement can take away.” The only changes which refinement can produce in matter, are, an alteration of its specific quantity, or a new arrangement of its component parts: but how this new arrangement of parts, or alteration in quantity, can render it more capable of an immediate alliance with pure spirit, I confess myself wholly unable to discern. The rarest atmosphere with which we are acquainted, can be no nearer in point of nature to pure spirit, than a rock of adamant; and we can no more conceive how an alliance can be effected with the one than with the other. The union of two distinct natures, which in themselves have no relation to one another, can never be produced by any thing in the natures themselves, and can be ascribable only to the power of that God, to whom all things are possible.

However much refined the soul or ethereal vehicle may be, certain it is, that it must be either matter or spirit; if the former, we are exactly at the same loss to account for its union with pure spirit, as

The design of the following pages, is to make a rational inquiry into the existence of these substances, to point out a few of the most distinguishing properties of these distant natures, and appropriate to each a few of those discriminating properties from whence their distinct natures are denominated and known ;—properties which are at once inseparable from the substances in which they inhere, and inapplicable to each other

It is foreign to my present design to investigate all those properties, which may either positively or relatively claim their existence in these substances ; my aim being only to ascertain certain prominent features by which these separate natures may be distinguished from one another.

It is certain, that whatsoever is an essential property of any substance, must be always applicable to that substance—applicable to each species which it includes, to each individual of that species, and inseparable from it ; to suppose otherwise

we are for that of the body, if we suppose no such thing as an ethereal vehicle to exist. If, on the contrary, we suppose the soul to be SPIRIT, the same difficulty meets us in another stage ; for although we might be able to assign some reasons how a spiritual substance could be enclosed within a spiritual vehicle, yet how a spiritual vehicle can unite with the gross matter of our bodies, I fear we shall feel ourselves rather at a loss to say. The admission, therefore, of a third principle in the compound of man, appears in my view, to add to the embarrassments which are necessarily included in the union, without affording us a single ray of light, or removing a single obstacle. I shall therefore use the words SOUL and SPIRIT indiscriminately through this Essay, and consider its union with the BODY among those mysteries which human ingenuity can never penetrate, and which must for ever rest in the eternal God.

It has, indeed, been said, that unless pure spirit be enclosed in a vehicle which is material, we cannot conceive how pure spirit can be rendered visible to our bodily organs. But surely this is not the language either of reason or philosophy. If the souls of the departed be ever rendered visible to our bodily organs, it must be through the agency of supernatural power. and to attempt to account upon natural principles, for a phenomenon which is admitted to be supernatural, is to destroy the very foundation upon which an apparition is supposed to stand. The very moment we can account for the visibility of spirit upon principles of reason, from that very moment it ceases to be supernatural ; and by attempting to make that to be natural, which we admit to be supernatural, we attempt to account for that which we admit to be unaccountable. (Drew.)

is a contradiction; for if any property can be separated from that nature which it is essential to the existence of, the property so separated, is no longer essential to the existence of that nature; and we are led to this conclusion,—that it is an essential property, and not an essential property at the same time.*

I cannot doubt, but that both *matter* and *spirit*, have a variety of latent powers, which may for ever elude the researches of finite penetration, and, in their physical origin, rest for ever in the Great Supreme. Nevertheless, we behold in each of them a variety of emanations, from whence we obtain the knowledge of the certainty of their existence, while the primary qualities, together with the substances in which all known properties inhere, must remain permanent in themselves, in order to the emission of those sensible qualities, which are invariably the same, and from whence we denominate both *matter* and *spirit*.

But while the Almighty God has made these substances distinct from one another, and incorporated with them certain primary qualities which are necessarily co-essential with themselves, and incommunicable to each other, the *substratum*

* Modern Chemistry, aided by the Baconian method of induction, proves, that what was previously considered by many philosophical writers as qualities, at all times, essential to a substance may be taken away from one portion of a substance, while other portions of the same substance not subjected to chemical operation, will still retain the whole properties which were at first held as belonging to it. If so in regard to any given substance, how much more may this obtain among individuals of a species of the same substance? Hence, the value of Locke's observations on this point: We find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one species, have yet qualities depending on their constitutions, as far different from one another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies; so chemists especially are often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they sometimes in vain seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists.

or *substances* in which these qualities exist, are concealed from the researches of philosophy, if not placed beyond the reach of all finite comprehension.*

It is from observing the differences in these qualities, that we know to what substance they belong, and from thence we decide whether the substance be *spiritual* or *material*.

I had long thought, when revolving these abstruse subjects in my mind, that the term *substance* was inapplicable to any thing of an immaterial nature; but if I mistake not, Mr *Locke*, in one of his letters to the Bishop of Worcester, observes, "that the term substance, when thus applied, is only used to express that nameless something, in which those qualities exist which we perceive, and is used thus, for want of a more expressive term."

* We think not; and for this reason that if we take a piece of glass, a substance familiar to almost every person, and of which many have a sufficient chemical knowledge to be acquainted with its composition. If the question be asked, What is the substance termed glass? the answer will vary according to the view that is taken of it. If it is considered merely as a continuous whole, we will in that case say, that it is a compound of alkaline and silicious matter; meaning that particles of alkali and flint coexist, and are apparently continuous, in that mass of which we speak. On the other hand we may think only of the changes to which it may be subjected, without reference to its constituent parts. Thus we observe that it is transparent—that agreeable to the laws of refraction the light is bent in passing through it according to the density of the media through which it has, or is, to pass on either side---it is fusible at a certain temperature---not dissolvable in every kind of acid,---and that under certain circumstances it possesses the power of attraction and repulsion. Here we have clearly a knowledge of both the substrata or substance and the qualities derivable therefrom.

Dr. Crombie's reasoning on the subject of a substratum is completely conclusive.---When Mr. Drew speaks of a substratum, we must understand that, in which qualities inhere; a substance, a something, to which they belong, apprehended, or at least spoken of, as existing by itself. Now when a person perceives an external object, what does he see? An expanse of light and shade. Is this a substratum? What does he feel? Heat or cold, pain or pleasure, or perhaps resistance. Is any of these feelings, or these qualities, a substratum? Is magnitude, or figure, length, breadth, and thickness a substratum? They are qualities; and when these qualities are abstracted, where is his substratum? Nay, is it quite certain, that his hand ever came into contact with the external body, or that any two particles of matter are in actual contact?

Dr *Watts* also says, "a substance is a Being which can subsist by itself, without dependence upon any other created being.* The notion of subsisting by itself, gives occasion to logicians to call it substance."†

From these definitions given by Mr. *Locke* and Dr. *Watts*, if I understand their words aright, it evidently appears that

* By independent existence, we mean an existence that does not depend on us, so far as we know, or any being, except the Creator. Berkeley and others say, that matter exists not but in the minds that perceive it; and consequently depends, in respect of its existence, upon those minds.

That matter or body has a real, separate, independent existence; that there is a real sun above us, a real air around us, and a real earth under our feet, has been the belief of all men who were not mad, ever since the creation. This is believed, not because it is or can be proved by argument, but because the constitution of our nature is such that we must believe it. It is absurd, nay, it is impossible, to believe the contrary. I could as easily believe that I do not exist, that two and two are equal to ten, that whatever is, is not; as that I have neither hands, nor feet, nor head, nor clothes, nor house, nor country, nor acquaintance; that the sun, moon, and stars, and ocean, and tempest, thunder and lightning, &c., have no existence but as ideas or thoughts in my mind. and independent on me and my faculties, do not exist at all, and could not exist if I were to be annihilated; &c. I affirm, that it is not in the power, either of wit or of madness, to contrive any conceit more absurd, or more nonsensical, than this, That the material world has no existence but in my mind. (See Beattie's Essay on Truth.)

† The general definition which has been given to substance, is, that it is that which supports accidents. I see nothing erroneous in this definition, but I conceive that it is defective. For if the idea of its supporting accidents, be admitted as a full definition of substance, I humbly conceive that it will be attended with some difficulties to distinguish substance from the primary modification of it. For although in a primary sense, all accidents are supported by substance, yet in a secondary sense the modification of substance is essentially necessary to the existence of some accidents which we perceive resulting from that peculiar modification; and the shades which divide these two species of accidents, are so minute and imperceptible, that the mind is oppressed with difficulties in drawing that line of demarkation which divides them from one another. But in admitting the definition here given by Mr. *Locke* and Dr. *Watts*, the horizon is widened, and a larger latitude is assumed, which, while it includes all that is comprehended in the former definition, avoids those difficulties which are inseparable from it. (Drew.)

the term *substance*, is not necessarily confined within the limits of corporiety, but may be with equal propriety applied to any thing which includes within its nature the idea of self-subsistence, though to corporeal Being, that nature bears no physical relation. If then we feel within ourselves the two ideas of *consciousness* and *perception*,* the mind is necessarily conducted to some substance in which *consciousness* and *perception* claim their inherence, and without which it is impossible they could have either a positive or relative existence. For should we admit the existence of *consciousness* and *perception*, and yet attempt to deny the existence of a conscious and preceptive *substance*, these absurdities will immediately follow. †—If consciousness and volition be admitted to exist abstracted from all inherence in a substance, (which existence is supposed under the present consideration) they must include within themselves the nature of self-subsistence, and must for that reason exist abstracted from their own activity, (for without this the idea of *self-subsistence* is done away);‡ but in admitting consciousness and volition to exist abstracted from their own activity, we are obliged to admit the existence of an *uncon-*

* Consciousness and perception.---It will be evident to every philosophical student, from the application of these terms, that Mr. Drew's knowledge of the works of metaphysical writers was confined chiefly to those of the old, and long since, exploded school. His language ought to have expressed the two great divisions alone applicable to the human mind, namely the Understanding and the Will, consciousness being the result of the one, and volition that of the other. In which sense it will be well to use them throughout the whole Essay. That he was cognizant of Locke's great work is obvious from his quoting that distinguished writer's definition of substance; and it is matter of surprise that he did not make greater use of that work than he did. We should, however, remark, that the circumstance now mentioned affords a strong proof, were that needful, of the confidence Mr. D. entertained of the powers of his own vast mind.

† For should we admit, &c. Read either consciousness or volition to exist, while we deny the existence of a substance which is conscious and which wills, we necessarily involve ourselves in the following absurdities, &c.

‡ Or thus: for it would be absurd to imagine that a self-subsisting principle depended for its existence upon its own activity.

conscious consciousness, and a *will* which has not *volition*. In pursuing these absurdities we must be led also to deny the necessary connexion which must subsist between those mental powers which we feel; (possess?) for if *consciousness* can include within it the idea of *self-subsistence*, it may be separated from all the other powers of a soul, which while it destroys its unity must also annihilate its identity.*

Such are the absurdities which must result from the supposition that the soul is not a substance, or a something distinct at least in idea, from that *consciousness* and *volition* which are and must be qualities of it. And whether the soul be matter or spirit, certain it is, that as these faculties cannot include within themselves the nature of *self-subsistence*, some substance must be admitted to exist, in which alone these properties can inhere.

If, then, the term *substance* may be applied both to *corporeal* and *incorporeal Being*, I shall, in the following pages, use the term indiscriminately, as expressing that *something* in which those qualities inhere, that are essential to those natures of which I may have occasion to speak.

SECT. II.

Nature and essential Properties of Matter.

WHATEVER is material, must have all those properties which are essential to its nature, because, it is from these essential properties that its nature is both denominated and known. Among those properties which are necessary to the existence of matter, may be included its *solidity*, its *magnitude*, and *figure*. Without these distinguishing properties, we can form no conception of any thing that is material, and in what sub-

* In like manner, *volition*, by being thus endued with the power of *self-subsistence*, may exist without any dependence upon a prior principle, and without any of those efforts by which we are conscious of its existence. Hence, each power of the mind becomes a separate and independent substance, which would destroy the mind's unity, tending to the conceptional destruction of its identity; and the substances thus conjured into existence will usurp that position which man's folly renders vacant.

ject soever we find these properties, from that discovery we denominate this substance to be material. Nor are these properties mere accidents of matter. The impossibility of conceiving any thing which is material, to exist where these properties are not; will satisfactorily prove that they are essential to its nature, and therefore necessary to its existence. For if any given portion of matter, though ever so *minute*, can be conceived to exist, (though it have undergone every modification of which it is capable in the endless series of divisibility) still these properties must invariably adhere to its minutest parts, and are as applicable to an atom as to a globe. Neither is it possible for us to conceive a separation between them. Where there is *solidity*, there must be *magnitude*, and where there is *magnitude*, there must be *figure*; and if we could conceive either of these qualities to be annihilated, there the idea of matter can be no more.

In addition to this, all matter must be *extended* in proportion to its *magnitude*. For, if we substract the idea of *extension* from any material substance, the ideas of *solidity*, *magnitude*, and *figure*, must perish with it, and the mind is left in possession of a perfect *nonentity*. The idea of matter is also necessarily connected with that of space; not, that space is an essential property of matter, or to be reckoned amongst its modes or accidents, but it is that *pure expansion* in which all substances must exist.* The identity of pure

* The idea of Space in whatever manner formed, is manifestly accompanied with an irresistible conviction, that Space is necessarily existent, and that its annihilation is impossible; nay, it appears to be also accompanied with an irresistible conviction, that Space cannot possibly be extended in more than three directions. It, therefore, follows from the sensations of which we are necessarily the subjects, that Space is that in which all material or created things are comprehended. Space will thus become synonymous with Extension in its most common acceptation, the knowledge of which is obviously acquired by abstracting this attribute from the other qualities of matter.

Locke and others have endeavoured to persuade themselves that they have a clear idea of Space perfectly distinct from that of Extension, and adopt this mode of illustration. "The extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable parts; and the extension of space, the continuity of un-solid, inseparable, and immoveable parts." I admit, that it is quite

space can be no otherwise affected by matter, than, that it is engrossed or empty in proportion to its presence or absence; and in proportion as space is devoid of matter, matter is devoid of existence.* If, then, matter cannot exist abstracted from those given spaces which it occupies, space itself must be necessary to the existence of matter, although it is not an essential property of its nature. And as the ideas of *solidity*, *magnitude*, *figure*, and *extension*, are all necessary to our idea of matter, and are inseparable from it, and from each other; it follows, that matter, under every mode of divisibility which it is capable of undergoing, must be a *solid extended, divisible substance*, always partaking of *magnitude* and *figure*. Indeed, *magnitude* and *figure* are but mere-properties, and therefore can have but relative existences; and whenever we form conceptions of them, we mention them in relation to some *substance* in which they inhere: and if we destroy that relation, we can no more form an idea of either, than we can of *black*, *blue*, or *red*, without having a reference to some portion of matter in which these colours exist by inherence, which every one knows is totally impossible.

SECT. III

There may be Spiritual Substances, although we be ignorant of their Essences.

Not only the existence of matter is so evident that it admits of sensible proof,—but there are spiritual substances, which

possible for the human mind to conceive of such a condition of things as that now stated, as well as it was possible for Berkeley and Collier to conceive in their minds, as a mere theory of abstract conception, that the Material World had no existence. But unluckily for the doctrine contained in the passage quoted, we have the best evidence, from mathematical demonstration as well as chemical analysis that created substance presents no such parts as those asserted to be “inseparable and immoveable;” the consequence of such a state of things would be that motion must for ever cease.

* Neither can we conceive of space being devoid of matter in any given proportion---they are necessarily coexistent. In the use of the term ‘necessarily,’ I apply it in a strictly philosophical sense, without any intended reference to the deduction of religious doctrines.

also must have a positive existence; though, by being incapable of communicating themselves through the medium of sensation like matter, they are more remote from common apprehension. Distance in nature, is, however, no more a proof of the nonexistence of *spirit*, than distance in space is a proof of the nonexistence of *matter*. Positive existence can have no relation, either to distance or perception: it is true, that clearness of apprehension communicates to the mind, the idea of *assurance*, and this assurance certainty of its Being; but Being itself, exists independent either of our clearness of apprehension, or our assurance of the certainty of its existence. Not only so, but whatsoever has a positive existence, must have existed antecedently to our apprehension of it; because apprehension, in its very nature, supposes the pre-existence of that which is apprehended; for to suppose it possible, for us to have an apprehension of what had not a previous existence, is to suppose we can apprehend what has no existence, which includes this contradiction, that we can apprehend, that of which it is impossible for us to have the most distant apprehension.

Hence, then, it follows, that there may be substances, the *natures* of which, although totally *unknown*, may nevertheless be certain and positive; and certain qualities in those substances, with which we are unacquainted, that are too remote for the human intellect to grasp. For, as our preception of existence depends upon existence itself for its own being, and not existence upon our perception of it, nothing more is necessary to our certainty of the existence of an immaterial substance, than some line which will lead us with precision to that spiritual source from whence it emanated. And if in exploring these intellectual regions, but one ray can be found, which will infallibly lead us to the genuine source from whence it sprung, it is sufficient to all the purposes of demonstration; and that demonstration will as infallibly prove both the real existence and nature of that source, as if it had been an object of animal sensation.

That matter does exist, has been already admitted and defined; and, that spiritual substances exist also, is a truth no less certain: it is true, we can by no means comprehend the physical nature of spirit, neither can we comprehend

that of matter; but this want of comprehension, no more precludes the possibility of the existence of the former, than the latter. That secret extended *something*, in which magnitude and figure inhere, has hitherto eluded the researches of philosophy; and rendered itself known by those properties only, which are at once essential to, and inseparable from its nature; and, in like manner, the real essences of all spiritual substances, are in themselves unknown to the human mind, and the substance itself is demonstrated to exist, only by those qualities which we discover in the faculties of our own minds, qualities which matter is incapable of producing, and which therefore can flow from no other than a *spiritual substance*.

It is certain, from what has been already said, that, whenever *consciousness* and *volition* are found to exist, they plainly demonstrate the existence of some common principle in which they inhere, to which they belong, and from which they are inseparable. For could we suppose that there might be *consciousness* and *volition*, while we deny the existence of a conscious and willing principle in which they inhere; we should be under the necessity of admitting that there may be consciousness, while nothing is supposed to be conscious, and that there may be volition, although there be nothing which wills. If, then, it can be proved, that consciousness and volition do exist, it necessarily follows, that there must be some primary *principle* from whence they flow, some *substance* in which they inhere, and without which they could have no relative existence: and to trace this consciousness to its substance, to examine whether this substance be *material* or *immaterial*, is one principal design which I propose to myself in the following sheets.

When the infinitely wise God, for physical reasons which he has thought proper to conceal from us, called into existence a race of beings, which he has denominated human; he united in this link in the vast chain of Being, those different qualities, from the existence of which we denominate both *matter* and *spirit*. How this strange connexion is formed, or by what secret ties these distant natures are united together, is not placed within the reach of human discernment to discover; nor is the discovery thereof any

ways concerned in the subject which lies before us. That Man, with respect to his body, is material, no one can doubt; we partake, in common with all other given portions of matter, all its essential properties. Our bodies partake of magnitude and figure; they are necessarily extended; and they occupy empty space.* This is so evident, that proof itself would be an insult on so clear a point.

In addition to those corporeal parts of which our bodies are composed, every man feels within himself, an evident consciousness of his own existence.† We perceive the existence of material objects by sensation; and by recollecting the past, and anticipating the future, we take into one view the relations which subsist between things, and discover the necessary connexion which there is between certain *causes* and their *effects*.

SECT. IV.

Volition, Judgment, and Perception, having no positive Existence, demonstrate the positive Existence of Substance.—Substance farther defined.

WHILE the ideas of consciousness, volition and perception are admitted to exist, the understanding is necessarily carried, in a retrospective manner, to some *substance* in which these

* See the note on Space; page 27.

† Descartes was the first, who clearly saw that our idea of Mind is not direct, but relative;---relative to the various operations of which we are conscious. What am I? he asks, in his second Meditation: A thinking being,---that is, a being doubting, knowing, affirming, denying, consenting, refusing, susceptible of pleasure and of pain. Of all these things I might have had complete experience, without any previous acquaintance with the qualities and laws of matter; and therefore it is impossible that the study of matter can avail me ought in the study of myself. This, accordingly Descartes laid down as a first principle, that "nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at all subservient to the knowledge of Mind;" and that the sensible images involved in all our common forms of speaking concerning its operations, are to be guarded against with the most anxious care, as tending to confound, in our apprehensions, two classes of phenomena, which it is of the last importance to distinguish accurately from each other.

properties unite together; and at the same time is carried forward to some certain object of which we are conscious, and which we must perceive.* To suppose otherwise, would be to suppose that we were conscious without being conscious of any thing, and that we perceived without having any perception. If then, consciousness, volition and perception imply both a source and an object, it follows from hence, that this mental vacuity is the great field of action in which the understanding operates, and by forming intermediate ideas, proceeds, step by step, until it has connected together apparently distant objects, and without the aids of which we could not perceive the connexion. As, then, the activity of the mind implies both a source and an object in all its operations, it is a sufficient demonstration that consciousness, volition and perception do exist, and from this existence an active principle must follow also; without which, nothing but absolute *inertness* could exist.

But while these primary actions of the soul are necessarily admitted to exist, we feel in our minds, a judgment forming itself upon discernment,† and *electing* or *discarding* objects which are presented to our view, in proportion as the real or fancied excellencies of these objects are supported by evidence.

I said, forming itself upon our *discernment*; for in the nature of things, it is evident that discernment must have existed previous to our judgments; for unless we admit this previous existence of discernment, we must suppose the judgment to decide upon what (*to us*) can have no existence. In addition to this, we feel certain preponderations of mind, by which we either adopt or reject such things as present themselves to our view. These adoptions or rejections, may be termed *volitions*, or the actions of the mind. That every volition is but *an action*, will appear when we consider, that

* It is plain as regards any given substance either retrospectively or subsequently considered, we must first have a perception of it before we can be conscious of its existence. The consciousness must follow the perception.

† Logically speaking we form our judgments by perception. Discernment, as a term, is not used in the explanation of intellectual phenomena. Wherever the word occurs, the reader will do well to view it in this sense.

volition can have no independent existence : * whatever has a positive existence must be independent, and what is independent must be invariably the same. Without this uniformity, its existence cannot be ascertained; and to speak of *positive existence*, which at times may BE, and at other times may cease to BE, is a contradiction. For could we conceive any thing which has a *positive existence*, which can dispense with its Being for any given time, and yet retain its name; by the same mode of reasoning it might dispense with its Being entirely, and we must give in this case, a positive existence to a nonentity.

That volition does not invariably exist, is evident, not only from the irregularity of its existence, but from its passing from one object to another. And if it be admitted, that it is capable of exerting itself in different directions; I would ask—What is become of its existence in that *moment* of duration in which it passes from one object to another?—Between its forsaking one exertion, and putting forth another, in the next link of successive action? Here it is certain it can have no existence. Or if it have, it must be a volition without any volition, which is a contradiction in terms.

As volition must in this interim necessarily cease to exist; it follows from hence, that its existence cannot be *positive*; and if not positive, it can only exist in relation to some principle from which it results. *Nothing* can produce no action. *Mere nothing* can have no accidents. And as nothing, must ever result from nothing, volition itself demonstrates the positive existence of some primary sub-

* This at least, I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing, or not doing, such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and VICE-VERSA, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or, its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called voluntary. And whatever action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. LOCKE.

stance. As, therefore, volition is what every man feels,—as it can have no positive existence of itself,—and it can never result from nothing, the positive existence of some *primary substance** necessarily follows. †

* Whatever the real, internal nature of substance may be in itself, it is very certain, that our abstract idea of it is very confused and incomplete. But it is equally certain, that the confusedness and incompleteness of our ideas, can in no case effect the certainty of its existence. The existence of all material substances, become certain, from the knowledge which we have of those primary qualities which cannot exist of themselves, whether they be separately or collectively considered. When we perceive magnitude, ponderosity, and figure, in any given portion of matter, we well know, that magnitude, ponderosity, and figure, cannot exist of themselves; but we are naturally led to conceive the existence of something in which these qualities do exist, and from whence we derive our ideas of them. Thus for instance---the ideas of magnitude, ponderosity, figure, and solidity, are all necessary to our idea of IRON; but neither magnitude, ponderosity, figure, nor solidity, whether taken separately or collectively, can give to us the idea of IRON; and yet so closely interwoven in the very nature of iron, are these qualities, that if we substract all, or either of them from the nature or idea of iron, both the idea and nature of iron must necessarily perish also. It is from hence we learn,---that the substance of iron, must be a something distinct from all these qualities, though totally inseparable from them. This secret something, in which these qualities exist, is, therefore, that to which the term substance is justly applied in all material bodies.

When from a substance which is material, we turn to one which is immaterial; the same modes of reasoning will carry us up to the certainty of its existence; although we can form no idea whatever of the internal constitution of its nature. For neither consciousness, volition, perception, nor judgment, include within themselves the ideas of self-subsistence; nor can these qualities, whether taken individually or collectively, include within themselves the nature or idea of an immaterial substance. The substance in which these qualities exist, must be a something distinct from the qualities themselves but totally inseparable from them;---a something which has hitherto eluded all human penetration, and baffled the researches of philosophy, both in material and immaterial natures. DREW.

† If it be admitted that the fittest and most correct division of the Mind, is that of the Understanding and the Will the reasoning of our author might be held in this case as equally applicable to the understanding. Thus the converse of the statement relative to the will would at once lead to the complete annihilation of the mind. The power of perception is that which we call the understanding: And

But although I have hitherto spoken of the *understanding*, *perception*, *judgment*, and the *will*, I would not wish to insinuate that these qualities can have any existence independent of one another. They are only the modifications of the actions of that common principle in which they inhere; and as none of these qualities can have but a relative existence, they plainly carry the mind up to that source from whence they flow:—A *source*, which must be immaterial, or else we must suppose matter to have communicated to these qualities, a *nature* which it does not possess, and consequently a nature that it could not bestow.

SECT. V.

Thinking not essential to Matter.

THE positive existence of some source being thus far explored the great question now presents itself to our view. Is this common principle or substance from whence these qualities, flow—*material*, or *immaterial*. Can *consciousness*, *volition*, *perception*, &c. be essential to, or result from matter? Are these qualities material in themselves? If they be, does not the supposition include within it several contradictions? If

we are somewhat of opinion that Mr. Drew neither saw, nor contemplated the dilemma into which this mode of reasoning might lead. It appears that our author depended in no small degree upon the significations of the terms he applies as they were used by the parties with whom he was in every day contact. But however accurately the mass of mankind may, in a general way, have a perception of each other's meaning, their acceptance of terms necessary to philosophical analysis cannot be taken as either safe or advisable; for such a mode of using terms has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to the mind.

The careful reader will at once observe that Mr. Drew has, as a sequence of his own reasoning, contradicted that which he has before admitted. He has assumed the Will as one of the principal faculties or powers of the mind; while here he asserts it as having no certain existence. There can be no disputing as to the fact, that the will is, at all times, in as high a state of activity as the powers of perception: in reference to this opinion, the process of dreaming cannot be taken as an exception to the general law.

not material, can *matter produce qualities* whic' have no relation to itself?*

If this *substance*, from whence these qualities flow, be *material*, it then follows that matter itself must think. And if mere matter, considered as such, be capable of thinking, thinking must be an essential property of its nature; and if thinking be an essential property no portion of matter can exist abstracted from it; without admitting this, its *essentiality* is done away. Now if we admit every portion of matter, whether animate or inanimate, to think, this thinking must be essential to it, under all its mutations of infinite divisibility; and then, either this *thinking* must adhere to some particular part of this divided portion; or be divided with it. If the former, then those portions of matter, which are detached from that part to which this quality adheres, must exist where no thinking can possibly be; and this demonstrates—that thought is not essential to its nature. But if we suppose thinking to be divided with the divisions of matter, it can then exist in no *part* of this divided portion. For to suppose a *divided quality* to exist by inherence, in several portions of divided matter, is to suppose it *to exist*, and *not* to exist, at the same time. As therefore, the idea of a divided thinking includes a contradiction; it necessarily follows—that in either case, thinking cannot be essential to any material substance.

It has been already proved,—that *matter* is an extended substance; and if it be capable of thinking, thinking must be either as *extensive* as its dimensions, or confined to some particular part. If the former, let us suppose any given portion of this extended substance *to exist, throughout* which we will admit thinking to be diffused.† In this case, if the

* Instead of defining mind to be a thinking substance, it seems much more logically correct to define it a thinking being. Perhaps it would be better still, by the use of the pronoun that, any substantive whatever, "Mind is that which thinks, wills," &c.

† In this case our author has had before his mind the discussions which obtained among metaphysicians relative to space. The idea which he here employs is evidently borrowed from Dr. Watts's "Inquiry concerning Space" by merely changing the terms of the subject of discussion. In various parts of this work there is strong internal evidence that he was not only indebted to Watts, but also to Locke's "Essay" for many of his views.

volitions of this diffused quality, were to be at once directed to the central point of this extended substance, thinking, must operate in opposite directions, which opposition in its directions will at once prove the *diversity* of its nature, and consequently destroy the *identity* (unity?) of its existence. For if a *simple* action of the mind, can arise from a principle which is necessarily extended and diffused; this action must derive its being, from an energy which cannot equally contribute to its existence. But if it be the latter, then it follows, that matter is different from itself, because one part is supposed to be capable of thinking, and the other parts not; which ends in this contradiction—that matter thinks, and does not think at the same time.

The *former*, supposes an action of the mind to arise from a cause which can give it no existence; and the *latter*,—that matter is capable of thinking, and incapable at the same time: the rational result therefore is,—that matter cannot think.

Nor can we suppose, that the *refinement* or *subtilty* of any substance, can give to itself a quality which it does not naturally possess. Matter, under every modification, is but matter still. No matter, therefore, can be refined beyond the boundaries of its nature; it is a contradiction to suppose it. If, therefore, the soul be material, it must be formed of parts;—must be an *extended* substance, and *capable* of divisibility: and from hence it follows, that there can be no distinction between soul and body, except in modification; and what is divided by nothing but modification, must leave the natures physically alike. And if those *essential properties* which are applicable to the body, be alike applicable to the soul, all distinctions vanish in an instant, all distinct identity as well as the unity of the soul is at once done away.

If thinking be essential to the nature of matter, thinking can assume no variety of modes. The essential properties of a material substance must be as permanent in their natures as the substance itself, with which its *essential* properties must be coessential; for certain it is, that nothing which includes mutability and diversity in its nature, can be an essential property of a substance which is of itself restive and inert. The physical nature of all substances must be permanent and fixed, in order to the establishment of their Being and

the preservation of their identity; and to make *that* which includes *mutability* and *variableness*, an essential property of a substance, to the very identity and existence of which permanency must be admitted to be absolutely necessary, we make *that* which is *mutable* and *variable* to be an essential property of that which is *uniform* and *immutable*. If, therefore, thinking be an essential property of matter, either activity and variability, must be excluded from its nature or with its activity and variability, thinking must be an essential property of an inert substance from the permanency and stability of whose nature, activity and variability must be excluded:— in the former case we must destroy every idea which we have of thinking, in order that we may establish its source, which is proving the existence of a substance, by the annihilation of what is supposed to be an essential property of its nature; and in the latter, in order to preserve its nature we make thinking itself (from the activity of its nature) to destroy the permanency of that substance from whence we attempt to derive its existence. I, therefore, conclude, that thinking cannot be an *essential* property of any material substance.

To affirm the soul to be material, and yet to deny it those properties by which alone matter can be known; supposes it to be matter and not matter at the same time: but, if the soul have those properties which are inseparable from material substances, (which must be admitted if it be material) it then follows, that thinking must be either extended through the whole soul, or it must not. If it be, then no *part* of the soul can possess thinking; and what is not virtually included in every *part*, cannot possibly arise from a *whole* which is formed of those parts; if not—then the whole soul is not necessary to its own existence; and in either case the mind is conducted to a contradiction.

If matter be capable of thinking, and thinking be essential to its nature, (which is presumed under the present consideration) thinking must have been coeval with its existence, or it must not. If coeval, there could then have been no previous existence of a capacity in matter for thinking; and if there were no previous capacity in matter, we must suppose it *capable* of thinking without any *capacity*, or without being *capable*; which is a contradiction. But if we suppose in matter a

previous capacity, thinking cannot be *coeval* with its existence. It then follows, that matter *can*, and actually *did*, exist abstracted from, and previous to, thinking;—that thinking is not necessary to its existence, and consequently—that thinking is not an essential property of matter. And whether we conceive thinking to be coeval with matter or not; the evidence is sufficiently clear to produce conviction,—that mere matter, considered as such, cannot think.

If thinking be essential to matter, then matter must not only think always, but think always in the same direction.

To suppose otherwise, is to suppose that matter is capable of producing *effects*, which are contrary to its own *effects*; or, that the necessary effects of matter, are contrary to the necessary effects of matter, which is a contradiction. And to suppose the soul to think always in the same direction, is to contradict what every man feels. To admit its uniformity, is to admit that to *be* which we know is *not*; and to admit the reverse, is a contradiction. And the certain conclusion from each side is—that matter cannot think. And should any one wish for another proof of this point, I think it may be found in this:—The human mind is conscious of the existence of matter, but it is self-evident, that matter must have existed prior to a consciousness of its own existence; and from hence it undeniably follows, that consciousness cannot be essential to matter—and consequently that matter, merely considered as such, cannot think.*

* It may perhaps be objected to the force of this argument, that the same reasonings which I have employed to exclude thinking from being an essential property of matter, will apply with equal force against its being essential to an immaterial substance. I wish it to be understood that in this place I am not speaking of any modification of matter, but of matter in its most simple state; and am contending that thinking cannot be an essential property of its nature. If the activity of thought be an essential property of matter, a consciousness of matter must have been coeval with the existence of matter itself, which supposition is refuted by the nature of existence itself. To admit in matter a capacity of thinking which is called into action after its existence, is to make the activity of this con-

SECT. VI.

Consciousness cannot be the Result of Matter.

As thinking and consciousness, for reasons already assigned, cannot be an *essential* property, so neither, for the reasons following, can it be the *result* of matter. The only possible ways in which consciousness can result from matter, must be from matter as a *substance*, or from some peculiar *modification* which it assumes. The influence of matter can extend no further than the contact of its surfaces ; and under every form which it is capable of assuming, *matter* can be but *matter* still. If the *mutual contact* of material bodies be entirely annihilated, in that instant it is certain, that all influence must cease to exist.* For could we suppose the influence of matter, to extend beyond the physical contact of material bodies, we must suppose it then to *be* where it is *not* ; and to operate and produce effects, beyond those confines of nature which limits its existence.†

If a ball shot from the mouth of a cannon, were to move onward with all its velocity to some destined object, it could produce no effect, but in proportion as its surfaces were brought into contact with the surfaces of other bodies : and though in the progress of its motion it might rouse from a

consciousness not to be an essential property of, out to result from matter, which is not the case now under consideration, but which will be the subject of the next section, in which it will be considered whether or not thinking can result from matter. DREW.

* Mr. Drew has entirely overlooked magnetic attraction and the principles of gravitation, in relation to the general arrangements of the solar system. It may, perhaps, be argued that his limited means of information might have precluded his cognizance of these great principles ; but we cannot, however, yield assent to such supposition, knowing as we do, that our author was in the habit of delivering lectures on astronomy.

† The above note will, at one glance, render the absurdity of this deduction obvious. The demonstration did not require so much. What could he mean by "beyond those confines of nature which limits its existence?" What do we, or can we, know of the limits which bound matter? absolutely nothing.

state of mere passiveness, other portions of matter, and communicate to them a motion from its own impulse; yet it must be evident, that these portions of matter thus put in motion, could produce no effect, but by bringing their surfaces into contact also with those of other bodies on which the effect was to be produced. Such, therefore, is the uniform manner in which all material bodies influence one another, and without which no effect whatever can be produced. And to suppose matter to produce effects where it is *not*, is to suppose it to extend itself beyond its own existence;—to act, where from its absence it can have no power of acting,—and that it is *present*, and yet *absent* at the same time. As matter, therefore, cannot possibly extend itself beyond its own existence, nor ever act where it is not, it necessarily follows, that consciousness cannot result from any material substance.

If consciousness result from matter, it must depend upon matter for its existence; and if it thus be dependent, consciousness cannot possibly exist where matter is not. And if matter be not infinite in its extension, (and that it is not I hope soon to make appear) there must be in the immensity of space, pure expansion where no matter is.* In this case I would ask,—Is the mind of man capable of extending its actions through this pure distance, which is thus supposed to be devoid of matter, or not? If it be, we have then a clear idea of the mind acting where no matter is; and if it can exist and act where matter is not, it undeniably follows, that it (consciousness) neither results from matter, nor can be dependent on it for its existence. But, if the mind cannot extend its actions in this pure expansion, it must be because something hinders; but this is contrary to the supposition in the case given. For as every thing capable of obstructing its operations, is supposed to be removed, it must follow, that the mind must be at full liberty to perform its operations, or we must be driven to this conclusion, that *something* must obstruct when every thing capable of obstructing is supposed to be removed.

If consciousness *result* from matter, it must exist *virtually*

* See the previous note on Space.

in the cause, as it does *formally* in the effect; for if this be not admitted, we must suppose matter to be *capable* of producing effects which it has no *power* to bring to pass, (into existence?) or that it does what it is incapable of doing, which is a contradiction. But if consciousness exist virtually in the cause, as it does formally in the effect, the divisibility of matter must be done away. For if we annex the idea of divisibility to any portion of matter in which a principle of consciousness is supposed virtually to reside, it will be impossible to detach the idea of divisibility from this inherent conscious power. And to admit the possibility of an effect to arise from a power which is necessarily divided with that substance on which it (this power?) depended for existence, is to admit the certainty of an effect to arise from a cause which must be necessarily annihilated.* But if the producing power be annihilated by divisibility, (which must be admitted) it necessarily follows that no effect can possibly be produced by a power which is not; and consequently, that consciousness cannot result from matter as its cause.

As then, a potential or virtual energy must necessarily inhere in matter, in order to the production of mental action, as its result; (which must be if consciousness result from matter) and as all matter is capable of infinite divisibility, it necessarily follows, that no such energy can reside within it: and consequently that no such action can result from it; and therefore, matter considered merely as such, can have no such energy resident within it to produce, and can have no such action as its result.

That matter is not infinite in its extension, is evident from its motion, and its capability of division. If matter were infinite in its extension, there could be no portion of space where matter is not. And if infinite space be full of matter, there can be no vacuum in which it can possibly move: all matter must necessarily be in a quiescent state, nor could it be possible that any portion of matter could take possession of that space, which must be pre-occupied by another. No foreign impulse could remove it, because

* The meaning is obviously, that if division obtains, the effects which flowed from the cause in its entire state must, as a sequent, be destroyed.

there can be no room for such impulse to act; nor if there were such a power, could it remove a single atom. Every atom must be supported in its station by the contiguity of surrounding atoms; and if we were to conceive it possible, that any atom could possibly be moved, it must enter into that portion of space which another atom occupied at the same time. If the space which any single atom occupies, could admit another atom without removing the former, it would follow, that this portion of space could not be filled with this pre-occupying atom; which at once destroys the infinitude of matter; and to suppose that the space which any atom occupied were entirely full with this pre-occupying atom, and yet that it could admit another within the bounds of its superficies, is to include this contradiction,—that space is full, and yet not full of matter at the same time. Matter, therefore, is not infinite.

If, then space can, and necessarily must, exist where matter is not, and if consciousness (the mind ?) can extend itself through this pure distance, it follows, with all the decisiveness that reason can require—that consciousness can no more result from matter, than it can be an essential property of its nature.

SECT. VII.

Thinking cannot result from any Modification of Matter.

As consciousness cannot be an *essential* property of matter nor *result* from it, (merely considered as such) for reasons which have been already offered, the next question which offers itself to the mind, is—Whether consciousness can result from any *peculiar modification* of its parts, or combination of those particles of which any being* is composed.

To consider the human soul as distinct from the body, while both are supposed to be material, is a mere fallacy;—matter, under every form, can be but matter still; and whether it be denominated *body* or *soul*, its real essence can be by no means altered by this distinction. If it be matter, it

* Any material substance.

must, in all its states, have all its properties ; and by all the modifications which it is capable of undergoing, it can acquire nothing new. A being which is physically incapable of thinking in *any* state, must (if it be the same) be necessarily incapable in *every* state. For if no new powers be added to any being, its modification can only affect the arrangement of its component parts, while the physical state of its nature must remain entirely the same.*

To suppose that the *mere modification* of any *body*, will enable that *body* purely from this modification, to be capable of producing effects, with which all the parts of the body modified have no relation, is to suppose that it receives an additional power which nothing but modification can communicate ; while modification itself can have no existence but what it derives from the parts which are modified, and which of themselves can possess no such power, which is a palpable contradiction.†

All bodies, under every modification, must be formed of parts, and though united together, they are still the same ; and if a power to produce consciousness, under any modification, do exist in any body, it must result from the particular arrangement of its component parts.

Every *whole* must be formed of those parts which are necessary to its existence : and to conceive that consciousness can result from any modification of these parts, is to conceive, that the whole possesses a power that *all* and *every* part of which it is composed are totally destitute.‡—That the whole, which is formed only of certain parts, is capable of communicating what it neither possesses, nor has received ;

* This is only a repetition of the previous part of the passage, and tends rather to confuse the conceptions of the reader, than to throw additional light on the demonstration.

† No previous writer, I think, has attempted to put forth such a supposition as that now made.

‡ It is evident from the nature of the mind that consciousness is the result of a certain modification of something of which, as yet, we are totally ignorant. But that any single part of that which has been so modified could of itself, separated from the other parts, be the complete cause of consciousness, we think, no person will assert.

or in other language that it is capable of producing consciousness, and yet incapable at the same time.*

An assemblage of atoms may produce an increase of magnitude. A modification of parts may produce a change of figure. A new disposition of surfaces may produce different sensations, and variously affect the organs of vision ; but all changes which matter is capable of undergoing, are only capable of *enlarging* or *lessening* the extent of those essential properties of its nature, which always exist in proportion to the specific quantity of matter which is thus modified. If all consciousness result from any modification of matter, it is certain, that consciousness could not have existed previously to the existence of that modification from which it results ; and if so, no consciousness could have existed prior to the existence of matter. The arrangement of materials must necessarily be posterior, in point of time, to the existence of those materials which are thus arranged ; and if we admit the pre-existence of those parts which are thus modified, and admit consciousness itself to be the result of a *modification* which depends upon those *parts* for its own existence ; we behold, not only the pre-existence of *matter*, but the pre-existence even of that *modification* from which consciousness itself must be supposed to result. And yet, to make consciousness result from any modification of matter, we must deny the existence of all consciousness, previously to that which results from a modification, which must be the effect of consciousness itself.†

* If applied to mere matter it becomes self-evident, and requires no argument.

† I have frequently been inclined to think, that the doctrine which makes consciousness to result from matter, or any modification of it, approaches nearer to atheism than its advocates are aware. If matter, under any modification, be capable of thinking, we shall, perhaps never be able to know by any modes of reasoning which are placed within our reach,---whether God himself be not a material Being ? And whatsoever opens the door to the materiality of God, commences an attack on his immensity and infinity. For certain it is, that whatsoever results from any modification of matter, supposes the previous existence of the thing modified. If, therefore, the Divine consciousness result from any modification of matter, there must

If, then, consciousness be the result of the modification of matter, this *modification* must have been made without any consciousness. But to suppose *consciousness* to result from any thing which is of itself *unconscious*, is to suppose that what *is*, could be begotten by that which *is not*,—that *nothing* itself is capable of acting, although we admit that it has no existence.*

If consciousness result from any given modification of matter, the stability of that peculiar modification is necessary to the existence of that consciousness, which can only result therefrom. To suppose the contrary, destroys the supposition; and to admit the supposition, is as repugnant to every principle of philosophy, as it is false in fact

have been a period when the Divine consciousness was not; and consequently God can be neither eternal nor infinite. Such is the inevitable result of the supposition---that the Divine consciousness can result from any modification of matter.

But if we admit the supposition---that God is a material Being, abstracted from all ideas of the manner or modification of his Being; we then make consciousness to be an essential property of matter, and banish at one stroke all spiritual substances from existence. Without entering into any detail of argument in this note, I assume it as a self-evident proposition---“that matter cannot be infinite in its extension, but that some boundaries must limit its existence.” If, therefore, God be a material Being, his immensity must be given up, because that which is limited by any boundaries, can never include the idea of immensity within its dimensions. But as eternity, infinity; and immensity, are inseparable from God, it clearly follows, that God cannot be a material Being; and I consider this as no contemptible argument, to prove that matter cannot think. DREW.

* If such a supposition was to be entertained it would be equal to the admission that an effect could arise without any previous cause. Under such a supposition the language of Locke sets the case in its proper light; “Man,” says he, “knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If therefore we know there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by something else.”

The human body is continually in a state of instability and mutation. Effluvia are continually exhaling by degrees which are imperceptible, those particles which were previously in union with one another. Nutrition is constantly invigorating with new supplies, those successive wants which unavoidably arise from this impermanent state of things.

The rage of disorders,—the accidents to which we are exposed,—the very atmosphere which we respire, all conspire to tell us that—*stability is not for man*. Nor is it probable that those particles of which the body of an infant is formed, when he enters this world, are carried with him in hoary age to the silent grave. The continual diminution of old particles, and the constant accession of new, in the human system, are so evident to our senses, that the subject precludes the necessity of further proof.

That modification is nothing but an *arrangement of parts*, is a position, which I believe, no one will dispute. And to suppose consciousness to result from a *mere arrangement*, is to suppose that those parts which are thus arranged, have communicated to the arrangement of themselves, a potential quality which they did not possess—and that they have communicated what they could not communicate.

As the *modification* of all material substances can have no positive, but only a relative existence, and can exist no further than as it depends upon matter, so it can of itself have no effects. Nothing can result from a *mere relation*. For if a mere relation can produce consciousness, this relation must be its cause; and to suppose any thing to be a cause, which of itself has no positive existence, is to suppose it to act without a being—and that it begets what it has no power of begetting.

Whether consciousness result from matter, or from any modification of it, it must still depend upon matter for its existence; and, in admitting consciousness to result from any given modification of it, we must admit that matter under that given modification, is capable of producing effects, with which, in its abstracted state, it could have no connexion. The whole, in this case, must be supposed to possess what

is not physically included in all its parts ; which is as contradictory as it is absurd.*

Consciousness, resulting from the modification of matter, must still look up to matter as its remoter cause ; and whether we suppose consciousness to be the remote, or the immediate result of matter, it must either be a necessary effect, or an accident of it. To suppose it to be a necessary effect, is to make a quality to result from matter with which it (matter) can have no relation ; and to suppose consciousness to be an accident of it, is to destroy the *necessity* of any peculiar modification of matter, in order to its existence.

Thus, then, consider consciousness in what relation soever we may to matter, it ends either in an absurdity or a contradiction ; and in no case which can be given, can any such relation be made out, as is necessary to establish that connexion between consciousness and matter, which must ever subsist between an effect and its cause. And if this relation (without which no such connexion can be established) be done away ; the undeniable consequence is, that consciousness cannot result from matter, nor from any modification which it may assume.†

The order of nature can receive no outrage without revolting at the violence of the attempt. Nature will not war, to serve the private systems of men, nor accommodate herself to those modes of thinking, which are adopted without consulting her dictates. The grand chain of things lies straight before us ; and though the human mind may be influenced by prejudice, or rendered tenacious through ambition, no inroads can be made. A deviation from the voice of nature may be rendered plausible for a season ; till, divested of those mists in which error conceals herself, she unveils the contradictions which await those, who, borne on the wings of presumption, dart into those regions where nature never travels, and on which account she refuses to become their guide.

* Mr. Drew means to imply that the modification, in such a case, must act as an agent and possess qualities, which the merely physical parts of the thing modified cannot be proved to possess.

† Or rather, to invest some peculiar modification of matter with a power to which matter, considered by itself, can lay no claim.

SECT. VIII.

Consciousness is not a Quality superadded to Matter.

BUT while I assert—that thinking cannot be an essential property of matter, nor result from any modification of it, it may be said that—Consciousness may be a superadded quality. That a *mere quality, considered as such*, cannot possibly have an abstract existence, I feel no hesitation in asserting. Whatever is a quality, must be a quality of some substance; the mind is necessarily obliged to associate together the two ideas.

To suppose any thing to be a quality, without admitting the existence of some substance of which it is the quality, is a contradiction.—It supposes it to be a quality, and not a quality at the same time. If consciousness be a quality superadded to matter, which is the case now supposed, I would ask—What is consciousness a quality of? It must be of matter, or it must not. If it be a quality of matter, matter must be its cause, and if so, it ceases to be *superadded*; if not, its existence is thus ascertained distinct from matter, and the mind, in order to find its substance, is led to explore another source. If consciousness be a quality *superadded* to matter, both consciousness and matter must have existed antecedent to their union with each other. Matter must have existed previous to this accession of quality, for a quality could not be added to that which did not exist. Consciousness must have existed also, or it could not have been *communicated* to matter. Existence must always be previous to any modification of it. And if both matter and consciousness exist, prior to their union with each other, it then follows, that this new accession of quality in matter, (the previous existence of which must be admitted) does not depend for its existence upon its union with matter. And if this dependence be taken away, it must also follow that consciousness may as well exist after its separation from matter, as it did before its union with it.* Either this qual-

* If our reasonings and passions, and whatever forms our consciousness, be only certain particles variously mingled, and variously

ity must have *existed* prior to its union with matter, or it must not. If it did, it cannot be a quality of matter; if not, it cannot be superadded.

Should it be said, that—"though the pre-existence of a conscious quality be admitted, it may, nevertheless, be incapable of action, until this union takes place; and that all its actions are the result of this union"; to this also I answer,—that the supposition includes several contradictions.

To suppose a conscious quality to exist without a conscious capacity, is to suppose it to be, and not to be, at the same time. It also supposes the quality to be conscious, and yet it makes all its consciousness to depend upon its union with matter. So that a conscious quality is supposed not to be conscious; and its consciousness is supposed to result from a union of this quality with an unconscious substance. If this *consciousness* must *result* from such an *union*, it must follow that this conscious quality must be an unconscious one previous to this union, and that the idea of a superadded conscious quality is an absolute *nonentity*.* If the super-

adhering or changing their place, according to the new play of chemical affinities, as new elements may be added to disturb the particles of thought, or certain other elements substracted from the thinking compound, But on this supposition of the particles of thought, the whole force of the conclusion from the change in decomposition of the other bodily particles, depends. If our material frame be not thought itself, but only that which has a certain relation to the spiritual principle of thought, so as to be subservient to its feelings and volitions, and to perform the beautiful functions of life, as long as the relation, which he who established it made to depend on a certain state of the corporeal organs, remains, it is as little reasonable to conclude from the decay or change of place of the particles of the organs essential to the mere state of relative subserviency, that the spirit united with these organs, has ceased to exist, as it would be to conclude, that the musician to whom we have often listened with rapture, has ceased to exist when the strings of his instrument are broken or torn away. BROWN.

* When Mr. Locke says (vol. ii. p. 140.) "We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks or no," I am rather at a loss to discover his meaning.

If Mr. Locke means---that finite comprehension cannot fathom the modes in which infinite wisdom can operate, and that we know

added quality be *conscious* in itself, there can be no necessity for its union with a substance which is *unconscious*; if not, consciousness can never result from such an union.

CHAP. II.

OF SPIRIT.

SECT. I.

No created Being can fully comprehend itself—A conscious Principle is essentially immaterial—No divisible Being is capable of Consciousness—Consciousness is not an adventitious Acquisition—Matter cannot abstract.

HAVING in the foregoing pages been advancing reasons to prove that matter cannot think, that thinking cannot be either an essential property of it, or belong to its modes and accidents, and that it cannot result from any combination of particles, or modification of matter; I now proceed to investigate those *mental* qualities which we feel within ourselves, and without which the station that we fill in the vast chain of existence, is done away.

Whatever real qualities we possess, whether they be corporeal or mental, they are equally necessary to our present state of being. And if any power or quality necessary to

not what latent properties God may unfold to produce this phenomenon; I most heartily assent to his proposition. But this is bidding adieu to our circle of comprehension, and means of knowledge; and is in effect saying no more than this—"that what is to us unknown, is unknown to us." But if Mr. Locke intend, by that proposition to intimate ---that in the present state of things, and under the present modes of human knowledge, operating upon the known qualities of matter, no certainty of reasoning can be obtained to prove that matter cannot think; I feel some hesitation (from reasons which I have already advanced in the preceding sections) in giving it my assent. It is with the profoundest diffidence that I presume to depart from such a genius as Mr. Locke; but if an implicit confidence be placed in any man, an embargo is laid on free investigation, and unbiassed inquiry can be no more. DREW.

our present state of being be annihilated, the present mechanism of man is entirely destroyed, and a new era is formed in the present state of things.

How any created being can fully comprehend itself, is to me a problem which I cannot solve. A full comprehension, implies an expansion of mind which takes a circuit round itself, and travels on those margins of existence, where *entity* both begins and ends. A mind, therefore, which can fully comprehend itself, must be expanded beyond itself, and exercise its actions where it has no being. It must act where it is not, and exist in its *comprehension*, where, in its *real Being*, it has no existence. Whether such a Being can possibly exist, which *is* and *is not* in a given place at the same time, every man is at liberty to decide.

If the human mind cannot expand itself beyond its own being, that reason, which God has planted within the human soul, brands with presumption and folly, the arrogance of those, who dare to reject certain truths, of the existence of which, they may be fully assured, merely because they are beyond the reach of human comprehension.*

We know not the physical nature of any substance; but the assurance of existence, and a knowledge of the physical nature of that existence, are distinct ideas, which bear to one another but little or no relation. It is not the physical essence of things that we inquire after, but a certainty of their existence, and of that connexion which subsists between substances and qualities, and the relation which they bear to one another.

I have already endeavoured to prove that matter cannot think. I now proceed to prove that the human soul cannot be material. Indeed, the inevitable result of what I have already advanced; fully tends to establish this point. For if the soul be admitted to have any existence—if there be but two substances in which all things inhere—*matter* and

* It is quite impossible for the human mind to possess a knowledge of certain truths, which are beyond the grasp of its comprehension. It will be understood that we speak only in relation to philosophical analysis, and not in regard to the Revelation of God's will to man. In demonstrative evidence we never appeal to the Sacred Scriptures.

spirit; and if the soul be not material,—there must be an immaterial principle in man.

Whatever has any existence, must be material, or it must not. And that which has any existence, and is not material, must be immaterial; there can be no medium between these two extremes. If, then, there be in the human mind, *consciousness, volition, and perception*, there must be some primary principle which is *conscious*, which wills, and which *perceives*. And whatever the physical nature of these qualities is, such must be the physical nature of that primary principle also, to the existence of which these qualities are essential.

If any *substance* can be of a nature distinct from the nature of those *qualities* which are essential to its existence, this substance must be different from itself. And if the qualities which are supposed essential to the nature of this substance, be different in nature from that substance, to the being of which they are supposed to be essential; their essentiality is done away, and the relation between them can be no more.

The same reasonings will hold good through the modes and accidents of substances;—Nature is invariably inseparable from herself. If man be supposed to possess any knowledge, he must have a capacity suited thereto; and in their physical natures, there must be a congruity between them. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose, that man has knowledge without any capacity for it; which is a contradiction.* If, then, we have knowledge, and this knowledge, and the capacity thereof, be of the same physical nature, it necessarily follows, that either knowledge itself must be *material*, or that both knowledge and capacity must be destitute of *corporeity*. That matter is unable to extend itself beyond its own being, will, I believe, be readily admitted; and that knowledge is able to operate beyond the limits of corporeal being, will not, I believe, be denied. If, then, knowledge can go beyond the compages of body, and if

* Between this knowledge and capacity there must be a physical congruity; and from the nature of the former, that of the latter may be inferred.

matter can not extend beyond itself, it undeniably follows, that knowledge is not from matter—and that there must be an immaterial principle in man. Knowledge implies a capacity, and this capacity implies a substance in which it must inhere; and which, for reasons already assigned, must be of the same physical nature with itself. And from hence the conclusion follows, that there must be an immaterial substance in man.

To form an idea of any substance which is not material, abstracted from consciousness and volition is absolutely impossible. For if we detach from any material substance, the ideas (properties?) of magnitude, solidity and figure; and from any substance which is not material, the qualities of consciousness and volition, we can form no conception of either; for when the only properties are destroyed, from whence these distinct natures are denominated; there remains nothing to which we can attach any idea, and the mind is left in possession of a mere *nonentity*. But while every man feels within himself, that volition and consciousness which it is impossible to divest the mind of; and while we can by no means annex the idea of corporeity to such volition and consciousness; and, while it is certain that a sameness of nature must subsist between this volition and consciousness and that substance from whence they flow, the mind is carried to the same conclusion—that there must be an immaterial principle in man.

In addition to this volition and consciousness which every man feels, we find other powers similar in their natures, but operating in different directions. The understanding and the will, have each their relative existence; and both unitedly declare the necessity of some substance in which they must inhere. And to suppose, that volition can exist abstracted from any relation to some common substance; is not only to give to this volition a distinct and independent existence, but it is to abstract all the powers of the soul from one another; and if so, the understanding must exist independent of the will, the will independent of all others, &c.; and thus we lose ourselves in a chaos of contradiction, or a labyrinth of absurdities.

If, then, a conscious substance cannot exist abstracted from

the other surbordinate powers of the soul, it necessarily follows, that these powers must be essential to its existence ; and if essential, the soul itself must be the same in nature, consequently immaterial.

That these powers which we possess cannot exist independent of one another, will appear evident, if we reflect but a moment on the absurdity of the supposition.

Let us suppose for instance, the judgment to exist alone ; it then follows, that we must judge without perceiving. And to suppose that the mind can judge without perceiving, is to suppose it to decide upon a subject of which it can have no perception. If again, we suppose perception to exist abstracted from judgment, it will end in the same absurdity ; for it supposes the mind to be certain of its own perception, while it is destitute of all judgment, whether it have any perception or not. Or, if we suppose the understanding to exist alone, we must then suppose it to be an understanding destitute of both perception and judgment ; or in other words—that it is an understanding without any understanding, which is a contradiction.

From these observations, if I am not greatly deceived it must follow, that no one single attribute of the soul can exist alone ; and consequently that it must inhere in some substance distinct from matter, which substance must necessarily be immaterial.

If *consciousness* and *volition*, *perception* and *judgment*, necessarily suppose the existence of some substance they cannot, by inhering in that substance either communicate to, or acquire from, that substance, a nature totally opposite to their own and distinct from it. Nor can a whole, by any means possess a nature which is not possessed by those powers which are necessary to its existence. If it can, then *consciousness* and *volition*, *perception* and *judgment*, are not necessary to its existence. If it cannot, then either consciousness, and volition, perception and judgment, must be materially extended, or the soul must necessarily be immaterial. That consciousness, volition, &c, are materially extended, I believe no one will affirm ; the reverse may be demonstrated in many ways. No two things which are material, can occupy in one instant the same identity of space ; and if

the powers of the soul be material, they can neither exist at once in the same soul, nor operate inseparably from one another. But, that these powers do, and must, co-exist together, and that it is impossible they can co-exist abstracted from this union, has been already demonstrated; and from hence also it unquestionably follows—that the soul of man must be immaterial.

Whatever has but a relative, must exist in its manner different from that which has a positive, existence. Nothing which is of itself but a *mere quality*, can, *philosophically speaking*, have modes and accidents. Nor can any thing which is but a *quality*, have any *quality* which depends upon it for its existence. To suppose any one quality to depend upon another *mere* quality (except primary qualities, which are totally unknown) for its existence, is to make the former quality to commence cause, and to make the latter dependent quality to derive from the former, a certainty of existence which the former does not possess, and which, therefore, it cannot communicate. And if consciousness, volition, &c., have no relative dependent qualities, they can be but qualities in themselves—qualities of a *substance* as incapable of *extension* as themselves, and consequently as immaterial. As consciousness, volition, &c., can be but qualities, they must bear a strict relation to that substance which they are the qualities of; and from the nature of these qualities, may be known the nature of that substance in which they inhere; and therefore it must be—both *unextended* and *immaterial*.

If the nature of substances were not denominated from their own essential properties, it would follow, that these essential properties were not *essential*, which is a contradiction. But if the substance be denominated from its essential properties, and these essential properties are known; we then have, from our knowledge of these essential properties, all that knowledge of their substance which is within the reach of possibility, supported by the unequivocal evidence of demonstration.* If then, to suppose consciousness to exist, while we deny the existence of a conscious principle,

* I am not sure that in this we are warranted in going beyond an inferential conclusion.

is a contradiction ; if to suppose consciousness to have an *abstract, positive existence*, be equally absurd ; and if to suppose consciousness to be essential to matter, or to result from any peculiar modification of it, be actually *impossible* ; it necessarily follows, from the very existence of consciousness, that there must be an immaterial substance in man.

If consciousness, volition, &c., considered as abstractions of the mind, be immaterial, which must be admitted, I would ask—How can they, by inhering in any common substance, acquire from that substance, a nature, whose qualities are totally distinct from its own ? If they can, then these qualities are not necessary to the existence of that substance, because their nature is distinct ; if not, the principle itself must be immaterial. If these qualities be not essential to the Being of that substance in which they are supposed to inhere, they may be separated ; and if separated, I would again ask—What *idea* can we form of their *abstract existence* ? And what idea can we form of that substance from which they are abstracted ? To suppose this *substance* to be *matter*, is to make consciousness not to be necessary to the existence of the human soul ; and to suppose it to be *spirit*, is to suppose it to be spirit while every property is abstracted, from which spirit is denominated ;—that it is spirit without *spiritual powers*—and that it is spirit, and not spirit, at the same time.

If this conscious principle which exists in man, be material, it must have all the properties which are essential to matter ; to suppose otherwise is a contradiction : and whatsoever has the properties of matter, must fill empty space :—for to suppose any substance, to the existence of which, extension is necessary, to have a Being, and yet to extend in no space, is a contradiction also. And whatever *fills* empty space, must have dimensions. But to attribute dimensions to a substance, whose existence can only be ascertained by those qualities which must necessarily be *immaterial*, and which qualities must be essentially necessary to the existence of this substance ; is to suppose the substance to be material, while we have no conception of such a nature, and while the *only* qualities which denominate and establish its existence, exclude the idea of materiality from our conceptions. And

to suppose, under these circumstances, the substance to be material, is to admit the idea of materiality, while we must confess we have no such idea.* If these conclusions be fair, the necessary result is, that this substance must be immaterial.

If the soul be capable of division, (which must be admitted if it be material) and yet every part be necessary to the existence of consciousness; how can those parts either acquire or lose a property by division, which they did not individually possess when in *union* with one another? Mere modification, can neither communicate nor destroy any property which is peculiar to the nature modified. If a being, under any modification, be capable of thinking, I would ask, Is this being capable of *divisibility*, or not? If not, it cannot be material; if it be, I would again ask,—If it be divided into as many distinct particles as it is capable of, is each of these particles, in this divided state, capable of thinking, or not? If they are, then an *union* of them is not necessary to *cogitation*; but if they are incapable of thinking in this divided state, I would further ask, If two of these particles be united together, can they be capable of that exertion of power, which neither of them possessed in their separate state? If they can, then all besides are useless; if they cannot, can the acquisition of *three*, or *three thousand*, by being united together, confer a quality which is possessed by neither? If a number of particles, whether they be three, or three thousand, possess no quality of thinking in themselves; it is certain that their mere union with one another, can give the whole no quality, of which all the parts are destitute. Can a whole possess a quality, which is possessed by no part of which that whole is composed? If the parts which compose a whole, cannot, and do not, possess that quality which is supposed to reside in the whole, neither can the whole, which is formed of those parts. To suppose that a whole can possess a power, (which none of those parts possessed, of which it is composed) merely by the union of those parts, will end in this glaring contradiction—*that it is capable, and yet incapable of thinking, at the same time.*

* Or, upon the evidence of immaterial qualities, by which the supposition is destroyed.

An union, or disunion of parts, can only affect their modification ; but the essential properties of all substances, are too permanent to be changed by any modification

Nor will the case be altered, by supposing that thinking is a mere *adventitious acquisition*. A quality which is adventitious, is precluded by the same mode of reasoning ; and can no more exist in such a divisible substance, than if it were an essential property. If one atom, of which any being is composed, have not the power of thinking, neither can another of the same nature. If two atoms have not the power of thought four must be equally destitute ; and if we proceed onward in addition, till the mind is lost in the immensity of numbers, the same conclusions will invariably hold good.

The modification of mere matter, whether the particles, of which any given portion is composed, be the same in nature, or diverse from one another, can never communicate to that portion, a thinking power, which neither particle possessed. It may create a new disposition of surfaces, and alter the configuration of its internal parts ; and from this change, new sensations may be excited by its sensible qualities, in the human mind. But all these are only the same numerical particles, differently perceived ; and all the modifications which any quantity of matter is capable of undergoing, from an atom to a world, can never give to any material substance, a single quality, which is not be found, either inhering in, or resulting from, the minutest particle in that modified portion. And the result of all is—that matter, under every form with which we have yet been permitted to view it, is not only incapable, in its own nature, of thinking, but can never admit a conscious quality to *incorporate* with its identity.

Whether it be possible, or not, for any created being fully to comprehend itself, is to me a matter of considerable doubt ; and these doubts I have already hinted. If it can, and the soul being nothing but mere matter, it must extend its comprehension, not only to the boundaries of its own nature, but to the remoter regions of intellectual life. There are certain abstractions, which the mind of man is continually forming, to which mere matter can never reach ; for if matter can never act on any thing but by contact, those abstractions

must for ever elude its approach. But from that internal capacity which we feel, and from the distinct perceptions which we have of those abstractions, that are inaccessible to sensation; we have all the evidence that the nature of the subject is capable of admitting, that there must be an immaterial principle in man.

SECT. II.

The Soul is intelligent—Can anticipate—Is not an Assemblage of independent Properties—Objections answered.

THAT all matter is of itself indifferent to motion or rest, is undeniable, from the instance given by Mr. *Locke*. "If God," says he, "were to place any given portion of matter beyond the influence of all corporeal being, where nothing could either attract or repel it; and were to put this body in motion, it is certain that under these circumstances it must move for ever: And if God were in this case to deprive it of motion, it must be for ever in a state of rest." In this case, all motion must be impressed on all material bodies by some foreign impulse. And if we suppose nothing but material substances to exist, it is impossible for any being to move, unless it be impelled thereto by this impulsions.* That man is an intelligent being, has never yet, I believe, been denied. But if man be wholly material, and nothing which is material can move but by external impressions; it will follow, that man must be *intelligent*, and yet *unintelligent* at the same time. For if the mind of man act continually under the impulsions of foreign causes, (which must be admitted if it be material) every idea of intelligence is rendered useless and done away. Unless intelligence manifest

* In support of this fact we have only to consider the sublime science of astronomy, in which we perceive the operation of a force which is mixed up with every thing that exists in the heavens or on the earth. Which pervades every atom, rules the motions of animate and inanimate beings, and is as sensible in the descent of a rain drop as in the falls of Niagara, in the weight of the air as in the periods of the moon. The very existence of motion proves the existence of something that is radically distinct from matter.

itself, we can have no idea whatever of its existence. And what we know nothing of, we cannot pronounce to have a being. To attribute, therefore, to *external impulse*, every modification of mental action, and yet to suppose man to be an intelligent being, while those very actions of his mind by which alone intelligence can be known to exist, are attributed to another cause; is to suppose man to be an *intelligent*, and yet an *unintelligent* being at the same time.*

If man be not an intelligent creature, he can have no *anticipation* of a future state. Nor can any being, which is not intelligent, associate together the ideas of past and future in his mind, and discover the relation which subsists between them. But this power of associating our ideas we possess, and therefore man must be an intelligent creature; and as man must be an intelligent creature, his mental actions cannot be produced by external impulse. But as all matter must move from some external cause; and as external impulse is incompatible with the idea of intelligence in the same object; and as it is contradictory to suppose an object to be intelligent and yet impelled; it must follow, from the power which we have of associating our ideas, that the human mind must date its origin from another source, and man must have an immaterial principle within.

Nor can the soul be considered as *an assemblage of distinct independent properties*. Such an assemblage supposes the abstract existence of each property, and this supposition necessarily destroys the uncompounded nature of the soul's essence. Whatever is formed of independent and abstract properties, must be capable of separation, and must therefore be a compounded Being. That the properties of the soul cannot exist abstracted from each other, has been already proved; and that they *exist*, every man's feelings sufficiently evince. † The powers of the soul, therefore, which

* It is only from the manifestation of intelligence that we can have any evidence of its existence.

† We need no stronger evidence than the axiom of Descartes, "I think, therefore, I am or exist." See note on page 31. To suppose the non existence of that which thinks, at the very moment it is conscious of thinking, is evidently a contradiction in terms

we possess, may be considered as its attributes, which, unable to exist independently of each other, emanate purely from the soul, as the fountain of intellectual life, and thus diverge, as its streams, into these different directions. These attributes must be the same in their physical nature with the soul itself; the same in modification of existence, and the same in their relations to one another, under every circumstance in which they may be viewed. And if consciousness itself be immaterial and unextended, the soul itself must be immaterial and unextended also.

Whatever is thus founded in one common nature, cannot be capable of divisibility; and what is incapable of divisibility, must necessarily be immaterial in its nature.*

Every power and quality which we can discover in the human mind, uniformly evince this truth—that these qualities are not material in themselves; and that any association which they may, or can possibly form, will only change the manner of their operations, while the identity of their nature must remain entire, is too evident to admit dispute. And as the various modifications which material substances are capable of undergoing, cannot separate them from those properties which are necessary to the existence of matter under every modification; in like manner, *that* substance whence consciousness and volition flow, can be, by no modification in their operations, changed in the identity of its nature, or acquire or lose by such modifications, any property which is, essential to its nature.

The internal real essence of substances is to us totally unknown. The infinitely wise God has rendered such knowledge incommunicable to man; either by placing this real essence too remote for human research, or by laying an embargo on the faculties which explore. To communicate to us the real knowledge of essences, would, in all probability, be to strike us from that rank which we now hold in the

* The reasoning is here slightly defective. Mr. Drew evidently means that whatever has no extension is incapable of divisibility; and whatever is incapable of divisibility can possess no qualities in common with matter; and under whatever circumstances we find a substance existing having no material qualities, that substance must of necessity be immaterial.

vast chain of created being: and even if the knowledge which we now aim at were communicated to us we should, in that advanced state of existence which we now attempt in vain to explore, behold the prospect still opening to our view, and, beyond the boundaries of that superior circle of knowledge, other real essences might give sufficient evidence of their existence, which we might attempt the comprehension of, with as little success as we now have, in attempting to find the real essences of *material* or *spiritual* substances.

The Almighty God has given to us faculties suited to our stations in existence, but has fixed certain boundaries, beyond which we cannot pass. We discover the illimitable region at a distance from us, but the moment we attempt to seize it, it eludes our grasp. What faculties may unfold themselves in another state of existence, is at present unknown. We see not the extent of substances, because we know not their real essences; and for the same reason we cannot say where the intellectual power shall cease to operate. The distance between finite and infinite, must be *infinite*. But to what an extent the human intellect may be expanded in this intellectual infinity, we must change our state of being to understand.

That we know not the internal essence of substances, I have already admitted; and that we know not by what mysterious link this immaterial principle which I contend for is confined within the compages of the body, I am also willing to allow; but can in neither case admit this want of comprehension to be an argument against fact. * The phenomena of both the visible and intellectual world stand

* It is a question which has been frequently asked by a description of men, who display more curiosity than wisdom, "In what part of the human body does the soul reside?" It appears to me to be one of those questions which admit no affirmative answer. The question itself seems founded upon the idea of materiality, which I conceive is foreign to the nature of the soul. It is enough for us to know, that the residence of the soul can be traced within a sphere so contracted as man. Whatever can be so far localized as to enable us to identify the exact limits of its existence, must include within it the idea of extension, and so far occupy this given quantity of space, as to preclude every thing besides from inheriting the limits which it engrosses. ~~Who~~ ^{Who}ever, therefore, can have its residence so far identified, cannot,

on the evidence of their own existence; and the only reason why things are as they are, is because the Almighty Creator has been so pleased. The different parts of the visible creation adhere together by secret, yet indissoluble ties.— They are destined to fill up those distinct stations which are allotted them by the appointment of Heaven, till the periods of their allotment are accomplished, when they shall occupy new stations, in ways and manners, which are at present to us unknown.

The difficulties which are to be met with in the modifications of existence, are, however, no arguments against existence itself. The mind, in investigating a subject which is so abstruse, may be oppressed with difficulties, which to us may be incapable of solution; and in cases like these, it is undoubtedly our highest wisdom to close with that side where fewest difficulties are. * If an inability to comprehend, were admitted as an argument against fact, almost every truth must be rejected. And those who affect to doubt the existence of an immaterial principle in man, merely because they cannot comprehend the matter of its existence; and plead the want of comprehension as a justification of their unbelief,—would do well to be consistent with themselves. †

Against the certainty of an immaterial principle in man, it has, indeed, been urged as follows, and that with much

in the nature of things, be immaterial. I therefore conclude, that no such particular point of space as the question supposes, can exist in the manner which is required; and consequently, that no such distinct apartment can possibly be assigned. An answer to all such inquiries must, therefore, be precluded by the very nature of the soul's existence. DREW.

* Not where the difficulties are fewest; but rather least formidable. Such difficulties will present themselves in admitting the existence of an immaterial substance, with which a thinking principle is not incompatible, although many questions may be proposed, to which it is beyond the grasp of human knowledge to give distinct answers.

† It would be equally consistent on the part of those individuals, who propose technical difficulties on this great subject to afford a demonstration of the mode by which they come to the conviction of the existence of matter, or of the reason they have for the certainty they possess of their own being. Such a course would, at least, show

energy of language,—“That if God can communicate to matter, under any modification of being, a quality of thinking, all rational proof of an immaterial substance must be done away; and if he cannot, it argues in him a want of power, and in this case he ceases to be omnipotent.”

To an objection similar to this, it has been already observed, that in supposing a quality of thinking to be added to matter, the *pre-existence* of matter must be admitted. And if this thinking quality be added, not only the substance to which it is added, but the quality itself must have had an existence also, previous to this union which is now supposed. And if both *substance* and *quality* must have existed previous to their union, the quality itself must ever be extraneous to that matter to which it is united; and what must thus be extraneous to matter, can never derive from inherence, either a real or nominal existence.

If thinking be supposed to be a quality which is thus added to matter, it is self-evident, that this quality must have existed previous to its being added to matter;—for that quality can never be added which has no kind of existence. But if this thinking quality exist prior to its being added to matter, and matter itself also exist previous to its receiving this quality; from whence arises the necessity of this union? If this conscious quality, and that substance to which it is added, have a sufficiency of being to furnish us with two abstract independent ideas; the existence of an immaterial quality * is admitted by that very objection which is raised against it.

It may, indeed, be said, that “what is added is but a mere *quality*.” I would then ask, if it be but a mere quality, how could it exist previous to its union with matter? A mere quality, considered as such, can have no independent existence; there must be something which it is the quality of. I again ask, is this quality a quality of matter, or not? If it be of matter, it could not have existed previous to its being added to it—if not, the immaterial substance must be admitted

* The demonstration being wholly and exclusively applicable to man it might be better to make the predication apply directly to the human soul. Rather than use the word ‘immaterial.’

which I contend for, and in either case this part of the objection is done away.

What is further said in the objection,—That if God cannot make this addition to matter, it argues in him a want of power, and militates against his Omnipotence; I humbly conceive to be a gross mistake. God's power and wisdom always go hand in hand. To add, therefore, to a material substance, a *quality*, (which has been already proved to exist previous to its union with this substance) and to make this quality depend for its existence on its union with matter, argues not power, but militates against wisdom. To suppose that God should add a *thinking quality*, to an *unconscious, unthinking, material substance*, when both *quality* and *substance* are admitted to be in existence previous to their union; and to make this thinking quality to depend for its existence upon this substance, with which it can have no physical connexion; and while it is admitted to exist prior to its union with this substance on which it is made to depend for its existence;—instead of displaying God's omnipotency, is an arraignment of infinite wisdom. If the quality of thinking exist previous to its union with matter, how can it depend upon matter, or any modification of it, for its existence? If not, how can this quality be added to a material substance? In supposing it not to depend upon matter for its existence, we destroy the only reason for which it is supposed to be added; and in supposing it to depend, we make the quality to be *dependent* for its being, even while we admit its *previous existence*.

Thus is this quality made to be dependent, and yet not dependent—to derive its existence from matter, although it is admitted to have existed previous to that dependence; which is as gross a contradiction as can enter the mind of man:—And yet it is supposed to militate against Omnipotence, because God cannot do what is not within the reach of possibility to be done!

No power, whether finite or infinite, can do what is *absolutely* impossible to be done. The instant any thing is placed within the reach of accomplishment, that instant it ceases to be an impossibility. But to suppose a quality of thinking to be added to a material substance and to

suppose this quality to have had no existence, even while it was thus acted upon, is a contradiction;—it supposes an action upon a subject which is supposed to have no existence. And to suppose this quality to date its origin from matter, and yet to suppose that it existed previous to its contiguity with matter, is a contradiction also, and therefore an absolute impossibility. And to assert that omnipotency consists in the accomplishment of what cannot be accomplished, is to make Omnipotence to consist in doing what it cannot do.

However conclusive these arguments may appear, to an unprejudiced inquirer after truth, there have not been wanting men of splendid talents, and profound erudition, who have, under the auspices of philosophy, presumed to call the immateriality of the soul into question. Perhaps the impossibility of conceiving how any thing can exist which is not extended, and which has no relation to space, may have been the principal inducement with these gentlemen, to suppose that refined organized matter might produce those powers, which every man is conscious that he possesses. I am ready to admit, that could matter be so far refined, that its extension and divisibility could be purged away, it would be refined to some purpose. But then it must be remembered, that when these properties are purged away, it is no longer matter; but, divested of those properties which are necessary to the existence of all material substances, and still retaining the certainty of existence; it must be raised into that immaterial substance, from which alone consciousness and volition can flow.

But this cannot possibly be. All matter, however refined or organized, is but matter still. And all matter must be extended, in an exact proportion to its solid contents. Nor can any refinement divest it of any one property which is essential to its nature. The moment in which it is supposed to be thus divested, that moment it ceases to exist; and what ceases to exist, must not only necessarily cease to act, but must be incapable either of consciousness or sensation.

The soul of man must either be material, or it must not. If it be, it must be capable of divisibility; and if it be divided, I would ask,—Does consciousness survive this division, or expire? If it survive, then the adhesion of the different parts

of the soul is not necessary to its existence; which includes this contradiction—that consciousness is dependent for its being, on a substance which is not necessary to its existence. If consciousness expire, then it must have depended for its existence, not upon the *component parts* of the soul, but upon the *adhesion* of these *component parts*; * but in admitting a mere adhesion of parts, to be capable of producing what the parts themselves had no power of communicating, is a contradiction. † It therefore must follow, that consciousness, volition, &c., cannot inhere in any material substance; and if so, a substance which is immaterial must necessarily be admitted.

If the human soul be material, it must be extended; and if the faculties which we possess depend upon this extended substance, they must be diffused, or they must not. ‡ If they be, they may be divided: but to admit the division of any simple power of the mind, (which each faculty of the soul must be) is to annihilate the existence of that faculty, and we shall be obliged, in this case, to admit the division of what can then have no real or nominal existence. But if we suppose those faculties not to be diffused, § an extended substance is not necessary to their existence; and then it follows, that the soul, which must of itself be extended, can exist abstracted from those faculties which we attribute to it; and that the soul, and its faculties, can have no physical relation, but must exist independent of each other. And if those properties, and this substance, which we have been accustomed to associate together in our minds, have no necessary connexion with one another; we must still advance farther to discover a primary principle, the nature of which is congenial to those faculties; while the extended substance,

* In this case nothing but adhesion would be destroyed.

† Which would imply an agency in the power of adhesion.

‡ Throughout the whole soul, or else, we are driven to the admission that each faculty possesses a distinct habitation.

§ The same remark is applicable here.

with which these properties can have no physical connexion, can afford us no conception of its nature, distinct from animated matter in any of its modes or relations.

SECT. III.

Farther Objections against the Soul's Immateriality answered.

THERE is another argument urged against the immateriality of the soul, which is as specious as it is unsound, and is generally stated thus :—" If the soul be a thinking immaterial substance, and thinking be essential to its nature, it must follow, that the soul must always think ; but this is contrary to what every man experiences. We have no recollection of what passes in sleep ; and having no recollection, we are left destitute of all proof, that thinking, or consciousness at that time existed. And to suppose an immaterial substance to exist, and to suppose consciousness to be essential to its nature, and yet to admit an interval in which this consciousness can afford no evidence of its existence ; is to admit as certain what we have no certainty of ; and it is to suppose a man to be conscious, and not conscious at the same time."

To combat theory with fact and incident, must always be forcible, and sometimes conclusive. And when theory can be fairly confronted with such incidents, as its design was to invalidate and overcome, fact and incident must always be decisive on the point in debate. But when theory is established on the firm and immoveable basis of solid and conclusive reasoning, fact itself must be presented fairly to the mind, to counterbalance the efficacy of such reasonings as it has to oppose. The phenomena of appearance are no proof of reality. Speciousness may dazzle the eye, but it cannot produce conviction. The philosophic mind investigates with accuracy, and moves with slow but steady steps, from link to link, in the great chain of causes and effects.

To give the objection that stability which it claims, it is necessary that it should be made to appear, that every man, or some individual man, does not always think. And when

this can be established, the conclusive part of the objection must be admitted ; and it will then appear—that it is contradictory to suppose consciousness to be essential to the nature of an immaterial principle, while an interval can be proved in which this consciousness has no existence. Of every fact which we attempt to establish, we must have some conception ; without this we cannot be certain that it is fact. And every idea which we have of any fact, supposes the existence of this fact. But for any man to prove, or rather attempt to prove, that the mind does not always think, is to prove the positive existence of a nonentity. Should it be asserted, that man does not always think, I would ask,—How can that fact be known ? It must be either deduced from reasoning, must be self-evident, or must exist in common experience. And if I mistake not, it is not difficult to prove that it can be in neither. To prove by reasoning, the existence, of what is supposed to have no existence, is proving exactly the reverse of what is wanted to establish the supposition—it is proving the existence of a nonentity ; which is a contradiction : it cannot, therefore, be known by reasoning.

To suppose it to be self-evident, is to suppose the existence of what is supposed to have no existence : and which, could it be once admitted, would necessarily destroy the very supposition it was designed to establish ; it would prove exactly the reverse of what it ought.—What, therefore, is supposed to have no existence, cannot possibly be self-evident. Neither can it be by common experience. Whatever we experience, we must be conscious of ; without this the very term is done away. It is a contradiction to suppose, that we experience the absence of consciousness, while the very supposition itself, wherever it exists, establishes the fact which we attempt to deny. And for any man to suppose himself destitute of consciousness, is in effect for him to suppose, that he is conscious of the absence of all consciousness,—that he now feels what he does not feel—and that he now knows what he does not know. It is proving the non-existence of a thing by the existence of the thing itself. A non-entity, therefore, cannot be proved ; and the fact which was necessary to support the conclusive part of the objection, is vanished into air.

Nor would it at all affect the immateriality of the soul, if it could be proved that there were intervals in which the mind had no apprehension of its own actions. For, that men are not always conscious to themselves of their own consciousness, I readily admit; but it does not follow from hence, that consciousness in these intervals has no existence. It proves a want of preception of the thing, but does not prove the non-existence of the thing itself. The existence of an action of the mind, and the perception of its existence, are two distinct ideas.* The former may exist abstracted from the latter, but the latter cannot exist if the former cease to be. The existence of a faculty must necessarily precede, in point of time, the perception of its existence; and the action of this faculty must, for the same reason, precede our perception of it. And if existence must necessarily precede our perception of it; our perception is no way necessary to its real existence. It is, therefore, not only possible that he soul may be conscious in the hours of sleep, althought we be totally insensible both of those objects which approach the mind, as well as the manner of its operations; but it appears impossible to conceive that the operations of the mind, and our perception of them, should be coeval with one another. And what we can form no conception of, must necessarily be to us unknown.*

* The inference which the Materialist wishes to establish is, that, as the soul, in certain cases, ceases to act, it cannot be immortal; and therefore is not immaterial. This has been asserted by Cooper in his tracts, by Priestly, Lawrence, and others. This is assuming what no Immaterialist will concede; nor is such a concession necessary. Take, say the former, from the soul perception, memory, and judgment, and the soul is gone; take, we answer, from matter length, breadth, and thickness, and matter is gone. It does not, however, follow, that matter has no existence. While it is charged upon us that we believe that the soul is immortal, we ask in reply, do the materialists not contend that matter is imperishable? The immaterialist does not affirm, that the soul is necessarily immortal, because it is immaterial; but, as he believes that matter is naturally imperishable, and can be annihilated only by its Creator, so he is persuaded, that the soul if immaterial, is naturally immortal, being destructible only by the Author of its being.

Let us apply our attention to the passage quoted as designed by the materialist to militate against the immateriality of the soul. We

Although the faculty of the soul be always the same, it may, nevertheless, vary in the manner of its operations. Thinking may diverge *itself* in a thousand directions; but it does not follow from thence, that we must be always con-

know, from experience, that to consciousness, perception, and memory, attention is necessary; and where this faculty is not awake, that the mind is impercipient. We think frequently, and are not conscious of it; impressions are made on our senses, of which we are not sensible, and of which we have no recollection. Sounds reach the ear, which we hear not; objects meet the eye, but we do not perceive them; and we sit and walk, without being conscious of the sensations of resistance, of hardness, or of softness---unless our attention be called to them by some unusual occurrences. Of these sensations we have no recollection. We dream of circumstances, of which the events neither of the preceding day, nor of years preceding, nay of circumstances, to which no sentiment, no conception, no fact of our past life has any discoverable relation. Unless, then, we believe, that sentiments, and ideas arise spontaneously, having no cause, which supposition would involve an absurdity, or that they are suggested by spirits, or aerial beings, a hypothesis, which the Materialist would certainly ridicule; we must believe, that these new ideas, and combinations, which present themselves in dreaming, have been suggested by a previous train of thought, which, having made no strong impression on the memory, is forgotten in the morning. It is therefore improbable, much less impossible, that, in certain states, the mind may be occupied in thinking, though we are not conscious of our thoughts, or have any remembrance of their existence.

Again, the phenomena of somnambulism lead to a similar conclusion. The somnambulist, unaided by sight, walks, and reads, and writes, nay, has been known to climb, where there was danger in every step, and where he had never trodden before. Other facts might be adduced, all of which conduct to very interesting speculations. If they do not establish the hypothesis, that, after certain mental acquirements, the instrumentality of the sensorial organs is not necessary to perception, they unquestionably shew, that we may think and act without remembering what we said, or did; and that we are not therefore to conclude the absence of thought in a swoon, from the absence of recollection afterwards.

In every moment of our existence, says Dr. J. Hutton, the mind is continually employed, either in one way, or another. The evidence of this proposition arises from our consciousness. Nobody can divest himself of thought, not even for a moment; and no argument against the proposition can, with reason, be drawn from certain periods of time past; during which, no recollection of any thought can be made: for it is a thing undoubted, that after an hour elapses, a very small portion of our past thoughts are recollected. Therefore

scious of the manner of its operations. It is no more necessary to the abstract idea of thinking, that we be always sensible of its operations, than it is necessary to the operations themselves, that we should be always sensible of the secret springs by which they move; or those unknown laws by which consciousness itself is governed.

We may be conscious that we *fear*, or *love*; but no man will pretend to say, that he knows by what secret physical powers those passions are excited. Yet while every man is conscious that these passions are excited, he must be sensible, if he permit his reason to act, that his consciousness, and those secret powers by which it is excited, (and of the existence of which he is conscious) can have with one another no physical relation. The principal defect of the foregoing objection, seems to lie in the associating together the two ideas, of *consciousness*, and our recollection of it. But it is evident, that consciousness must exist previous to our recollection of it. And if we admit the necessary existence of the former, prior to the latter, it must follow—that a recollection of our own consciousness, is not necessary to the *existence* of consciousness itself. If consciousness do not exist previous to our apprehension of it, it must follow—

to allege, that during a particular period the mind has no thought, because we have no recollection of it, would be the same as if it should be alleged, that during certain periods of our past life, we had not existed, because we cannot recollect where we had been at the time.

Further, it seems unquestionable, that, when we are asleep, consciousness is not always entirely suspended. The senses, and the power of volition, are generally, if not in all cases, more or less awake. A person asleep will turn his eyes from a lighted candle, presented before them; and if a limb lies in an uneasy posture, he will change his position. He would err, if he concluded, because in the morning, when he awakes, he has no recollection of the facts, that he lay insensible during the whole night. There are also phenomena, which would lead us to suppose, that we have some consciousness of the lapse of time.

It has been argued, that, “as we fall asleep, we seem gradually to approach to a state of insensibility; it is therefore probable, that at length we arrive at it.” It is answered, that, “if, by insensibility, be meant incogitation, the phenomenon is denied; and that the same kind of argument may prove, that matter may be annihilated by continual division.”

that our knowledge of a fact, does not depend for its existence on the fact itself; and if this be admitted, it then follows—that we may know a fact which is not a fact; which is a contradiction. But as it is impossible to admit a contradiction, it follows with certainty, that every thing which we apprehend must exist prior to our apprehension of it. And when we admit, though but for a moment, the existence of consciousness, previous to our apprehension of it, we at once admit, on the permanent basis of demonstration, what the objection pronounces to be an impossibility.

I am well aware, that to this mode of reasoning, another objection will be made. It will be said—“that if the mind may be conscious without having any knowledge of it, it includes this contradiction,—that a man may be conscious, and not conscious at the same time.” To make this objection as valid as it is specious, and to render the contradiction which it aims at complete, it should be made to appear—“that a man may be conscious of a *fact*, and not conscious of that very *fact* at the same time.” This, however, is not included in the reasonings above; it only supposes that a man may be conscious of one fact, and yet unconscious of another at the same time.

Every man must admit, that [we may perceive the motion of any given portion of matter, while we may have no knowledge of the power which produced it. And it no more implies a contradiction, to be *conscious* of a fact, and yet destitute of any apprehension of that consciousness, than it does to be conscious of motion, and yet to have no knowledge of the power which produced it. To suppose ourselves conscious of a *fact*, while we have no consciousness of *that fact*, is a contradiction; but to suppose a consciousness of a fact, while we have no apprehension of that consciousness, is a totally different case. The first is a contradiction perceived by a simple action of the mind, and refuted by itself; the second implies two distinct actions, which may exist together, or without any reciprocal dependence. Our being conscious of any remote object, is a simple action of the mind, operating upon distant objects; while our being *sensible* of it, is a reflex act of the mind, operating upon its own operations. The former must precede in

point of time, and therefore exist independent of the latter ; the latter, founded upon the former, cannot possibly exist without it. But whether the latter exist or not, it implies neither contradiction nor absurdity.*

SECT. IV.

That the Soul is immaterial, proved by the Affections—They inhere in the Soul—Objection founded on external Excitement answered.

THAT there are certain affections in the human mind, is one of those truths which will admit neither of controversy nor denial. And that these affections cannot exist of themselves,

* Whether the mind of man be necessarily active, without any intermission, is a question of fact which is foreign to my present argument. If the distinct possibility can be made out, that consciousness may exist without ~~of~~ perception of it, all objections against the soul's immortality, drawn from its apparent inactivity during the hours of sleep, are at once done away. An attempt to decide between fact and possibility, is, perhaps, equally difficult and injudicious. That consciousness, and our perception of it, are two distinct ideas, I believe I have sufficiently made out; and although the latter depend upon the former for its existence, yet the former may exist independently of the latter; and, therefore, all reciprocal necessary connexion between them, is rather the produce of prejudice than philosophy.

Whether the intellectual powers be active or dormant, during the recess of nature, is a point of speculation, perhaps, more curious than useful; but however it may be decided, it can prove nothing against the soul's immortality. That we cannot conceive how an immaterial substance (whose real essence we are totally unacquainted with) can exist while all those powers and properties are apparently suspended, through the activity of which we can alone be certified of its existence, I am ready to admit; but it never ought to be forgotten, that our inability to comprehend, is no argument either against THEORY or FACT. If the human soul be an immaterial substance, it is among the grossest of absurdities to suppose, that God has made its existence to depend upon the continual activity of its own powers, or our uninterrupted perception of them; and unless it can be proved, that the real essence of spirit excludes from its nature a possibility of suspending its own actions, it never can be proved, that a suspension of action, and destruction of that substance from whence the action flows, are terms synonymous with one another. DREW

independent of some common principle, must be equally certain. For if either hope or fear, pain or pleasure, can be supposed to have a distinct independent existence, they are no longer affections of any substance, but must be *principles* themselves. And then it will follow, that there are in man, as many distinct independent substances, as there are affections of the mind. And if these affections be independent, they can have no physical relation to one another. To suppose a physical relation between principles, which are of themselves independent, is a contradiction; and to suppose that which is independent, to be destitute of self-subsistence, is a contradiction also;—it is to suppose it to be a substance, and not a substance at the same time.

Those affections, therefore, which we discover in the human mind, can have but a relative existence; and if so, they must inhere in some common substance, which is capable of them; and this substance must be either material or immaterial—it must be either matter or spirit.

If the soul, in which the affections inhere be matter, it must be either union of divisible particles, or one single unextended atom, there being no other light in which matter can be viewed, or manner through which it can possibly enter into our conceptions. If we admit the first case, and suppose the soul to be an union of divisible particles, then, either the affections which are supposed to inhere in the soul, (thus constituted) must inhere in each particle of this union, or they must not. If they inhere in each particle in this union, and each particle in this union have the affections; then an union of these particles cannot be necessary to the existence of these affections, because the affections are now supposed to inhere in each of those particles of which the soul is composed; and in this case, the existence of the soul is not necessary to the existence of those affections, which are supposed to reside within its constituent parts; but in admitting the affections to inhere in, and to result from, a cause which is not necessary to their existence, we not only make the soul *necessary* and *unnecessary* to the existence of those affections at the same time, but we make the affections to exist after we admit it possible that the soul, upon which they depend for their existence may be divided and thereby destroyed. If we

admit the second case, and suppose that each minute particle in this union *have not* the affections residing in them, it must then follow—that an union of particles, all of which are destitute of these affections, can never be necessary to the existence of them. For as no cause or substance, can communicate what it does not possess, and as each particle in this supposed union is supposed destitute of these affections, the affections can never result from a cause which is admitted by the supposition to be devoid from all energy to call them into being. And whether we suppose the affections to depend upon an union of these particles, or upon any single particle in this supposed union; as the former destroys the cause upon which the affections are supposed to depend, and as the latter attributes to that cause an energy of which, by the supposition itself, it is admitted to be destitute, it demonstratively follows—that matter can in neither case give being to those affections which we discover in the human mind.

Should an union of particles be still insisted on as the necessary constituent parts of the human soul, I would ask—If God were to remove any particle from this supposed union of divisible atoms, would the soul retain the affections or not? If it retain them, then this subtracted atom must have been superfluous and unnecessary, which will at once destroy the necessity of such an union of particles, but if the soul would not retain them after an atom is subtracted, I would further ask—is the atom thus subtracted cogitative or not? If *cogitative* the affections must adhere to this single atom, and then all beside are rendered useless and unnecessary; if *uncogitative* the affections can never be destroyed by the removal of an *uncogitative* atom. In either case, the necessity of an union of particles is destroyed, and the plain consequence is—that the affections can neither exist in, nor result from, any union or combination of particles whatsoever.*

* Before we can assent to the Materialist's deduction, it is necessary for him to shew, that whatever is necessary to the production of an effect is the cause of that effect, and that the instrument indispensable to an operation is the efficient and ultimate agent. Destroy,

As an union of particles, from the arguments I have already adduced, are not only absolutely unnecessary, but altogether incompatible with the existence of the affections, the absurdity will perhaps not be lessened by supposing them to exist in any *single unextended atom*. However minute or magnified this atom may be supposed, it must be incapable of division, for unless this be admitted the supposition cannot exist. For unless it be admitted incapable of divisibility, it will still be an union of divisible particles, and, therefore, attended with the absurdities and contradictions stated above. But to suppose a divisible substance, (which all matter is) that cannot be divided, is to conceive what is utterly inconceivable :—it is to conceive an *extended* substance which has no extension ; or a divisible atom which is incapable of divisibility.

as Dr. Crombie has forcibly remarked, the fly of a smoke-jack, and the desired effect will cease ; but is the fly the real or primary cause of the motion ? Destroy the brain and thought ceases ; but this merely proves the necessity of the organ, and nothing more. The destruction of the eye is the deprivation of the visual faculty ; but the eye is only the instrument, and not the percipient being. What may be necessary to an effect is not necessarily its primary cause.

In no case can the instrument and the agent be proved to be one and the same thing. When I speak of myself, I do not mean the brain, or organ of thinking. A paralytic man wills to move a palsied limb ; but the nerves and muscles do not obey his volition ; the limb does not perform its functions. The difference between the person willing, and the instrument which he would employ, is evident. In like manner, I will, but am unable, to recollect a fact, a name, an argument. The brain is the instrument, whose agency is necessary. It does not obey my will ; it is incapable of executing my purpose. The brain seems to be as different from the person willing, as the muscles, the tendons, or the appropriate nerves.

I am conscious, also, that I can exert a direct influence over the agency of the brain. I can affect it with images or impressions, painful or pleasing ; I can continue its action to a certain extent of time, or to a certain degree of exertion ; or I can interrupt its energies by lulling it into a state of inaction. Can an organ, thus subject to my volitions, be identical with myself ? The notion seems to be absurd. No Immaterialist will object to acknowledge, that the brain thinks, in the same sense, in which the eye sees, each being considered as the organ of one simple cogitative being, under whose volitions these organs operate ; but he repudiates the hypothesis, that man is purely a material substance. On this point it is not necessary to say more.

That a capability of division is necessarily included in our idea of matter, I readily grant, it being impossible to form any idea of matter detached from that of its divisibility: the idea of divisibility being necessarily included in that of matter, makes it incapable from its nature. And therefore, to imagine matter to exist, (as matter) after we have excluded from it any property which is inseparable from its nature, conducts the mind to a palpable contradiction.

But admitting it possible that this contradiction could be dispensed with, and that an atom could exist without extension, or a possibility of division, the difficulty would not thereby be removed. For if the soul be a material atom equally removed from extension and incapable of divisibility, (under which consideration we now view it) it is very certain that it can have no parts, and what has no parts, as it can neither be a compound nor liable to change, it can have no variety in its natural tendencies.* If then the affections which must be admitted to exist, reside within or result from this atom, they must be uniform and invariable in their manifestations, or we must admit their existence without admitting the existence of any adequate cause. To make any affections of the mind to be uniform and invariable, is to place theory in direct opposition to fact;—it is to annex the idea of immutability to affections which in their own nature must be fleeting, transitory, and unstable. And to admit the existence of the affections, and to pretend to derive them from a cause which we admit to be incapable of producing them, is to make that cause to be *adequate* and inadequate to the same purpose at the same time.

That the affections are mutable and transitory is as evident as their existence, it being a fact which seems self-evident. And if the soul in which these affections reside be a *simple, unextended atom*, the soul itself must be uniform

* It can be but matter still, and can have acquired no quality by having been positively subjected to loss; as the deprivation of extension and an incapacity of division constitute only simple privation; hence this privation can neither add, or take away any quality of what is material; from which it is evident that no capability is conferred by which it can become the seat of the affections, or that in which they could by possibility inhere.

and invariably the same ; for that atom can admit of no variety which is devoid of all *extension* and totally *destitute of parts*. If then variableness and mutability be excluded from this atom through the simplicity of its nature ; and mutability and variableness be the distinguishing characteristics of the affections—how can the affections diverge themselves into such a variety of directions through an energy which they derive from an atom from whose nature all variety is excluded, and which therefore cannot confer that variety which they possess ? Can the affections which manifest variety result from an atom from the simplicity of whose nature all variety is excluded ? A cause which cannot change, must be the same to-day that it was yesterday, and can therefore produce now, no other effects than it did then. And if the affections result from such a cause, either all the affections must be always felt with an equal impression, or the mind can have but one single tendency and direction. In supposing the affections to be always felt with an equal impression, we render it impossible for any affection to be suspended, or to be removed from one object to another : but in admitting that *Theory* which gives immutability to the affections, while the certainty of their suspension, and the removal of them from one object to another, declares that their stability is done away, we blend the effects of this *Theory* with those *facts* which we draw from common experience, and by placing them in opposition to one another, we are driven to this conclusion,—that any affection of the mind may be *present*, and yet *absent*, at the same time. Should we reject this conclusion, and admit the mind to have but one single tendency or direction, we shall be under the necessity of destroying the *nature* of the affections, in order to establish their *existence*. Thus then, if the soul be an atom, whether it be mutable or immutable, as each of the questions involves us in the grossest absurdities, and as every light in which the supposition can be viewed, involves the grossest of contradictions, the affections we possess can in no case result from matter, neither considered as such, nor in any of its modes or relations.*

* Mr. Drew is frequently too hasty in his deductions as in the case before us. He, not unfrequently leaves out parts of the original

As, therefore, there are affections in the soul, and these affections cannot arise, either from an assemblage of atoms, or from a single particle, it necessarily follows—that the soul cannot be material. And as *matter* and *spirit*, are the only two subjects with which we are acquainted in the vast empire of nature; it follows, with all the certainty that is necessary to produce conviction, that there must be an immaterial principle in man.

It may, indeed, be said—“that the affections of the mind are excited by foreign impulses, and that they depend not upon the nature of the soul, but on the external application of the exciting power.” This, however, can in no case affect the question. For though the affections may be excited by the impulses of external causes; yet these causes must apply to, and operate upon, an internal subject. Even the supposition of an external impulse, implies an internal recipient power; for where there is nothing to be acted upon, nothing can be produced by any action. It is a contradiction in terms, to suppose that an external impulse can *excite*, where there is nothing to be *excited*.* But if something be admitted to exist, previous to its being excited, this carries us back to the original question; and the previous existence of the subject being admitted, it follows, that it must either be material or immaterial. It has been already proved, that it neither is, nor can be material; and therefore, from the admission of its previous existence, it undeniably follows, that there must be an immaterial substance in man.

It is certain that no foreign impulses can communicate to matter, any new quality which is not included within those confines which circumscribe its existence, nor excite within it any affection which these boundaries exclude. And as matter can never act but through the influence of mutual contact, all the affections which are supposed to be excited

syllogism, not from want of capability, but from his own almost intuitive perception of the demonstration in which he is engaged.—He ought to have stated that the affections cannot have their source in an indivisible and unextended atom.

* That an external impulse could act upon nothing; and that the affections had an existence previous to their being called into action.

by *Rectitude*, *Justice*, and *Virtue* (which cannot be material in themselves,) are at once rendered visionary and chimerical. But as *Rectitude*, *Justice*, and *Virtue*, must not only be admitted to exist, but to exist in a region to which material bodies cannot extend, and to extend their influence to a variety of human actions, it is certain, that these principles can only operate upon a substance whose nature is not thus circumscribed by the boundaries of matter; and the affections which these principles excite, plainly demonstrate the existence of a substance to which matter and motion can bear no affinity or relation, and therefore—though foreign impulses may excite, there must be an immaterial principle in man.

SECT. V.

Intellectual Endowments are different—The Cause of this is not physical—Occasioned by the Organization of the Body, and the Operation of moral Evil.

THAT there is a vast difference between the intellectual endowments of individuals, is too evident to admit of any dispute; but whether this difference be *physical* or *moral*, is quite another question. If it be physical, we must look for this variation in the original and primary state of things.—If it be moral, we must look to some cause independent of the original state of man.

Could we conceive, that the variations which we discover in men, depended upon the primary formation of the human intellect, we must suppose, that the Almighty God had created beings of the same species, totally different from one another. Beings, however, which are the same in *species*, must be the same in *nature*; and if so, they must be the same in those physical endowments, from whence alone can be denominated their real identity. But if those endowments from whence identity is denominated, be found totally different in the same species of beings, it leads us to this flat contradiction—that those beings are the same in nature, while they are totally different in those endowments from whence that identity of nature is denominated. It therefore

must follow, that the real or nominal difference we discover, cannot arise from the *physical* origin of things.

If the sensible difference we discover between men, depend upon the primary formation of human intellect, this difference must be for ever inseparable from human nature. For whatever is physically included in any nature, is necessary to the identity of that nature at all times; and the instant in which we can conceive it to be extracted, that instant the original identity of that nature can be no more.

Does not, then, the supposing this difference to arise from the physical causes of things, cast a reflection on the Great Creator? And in admitting this, must we not suppose, that to a superior intellect, God has communicated a superfluity of excellence; or, from one that is inferior, that he has withheld what is necessary to the perfection of its nature? And in either case, are we not led to accuse the Deity of *imperfections* or *imprudence*? But as neither can attach to God, we cannot conceive that the difference between men, can arise from the physical nature of things.

To continue through all eternity the human race, as a distinct link in the vast chain of Being, it is necessary that their identity be preserved; and so far as human discernment can penetrate, this can only be effected, by preserving the physical origin of their natures. But if the apparent incongruity we discover in men, exist in the physical essence of the human soul, it must remain unalterably the same for ever, and reproach, through all eternity, the Deity himself with the imperfections of his works. But is it consistent with those notions we form of that God—"in whose sight the stars are not pure," and whom Plato calls—*the ineffable Beauty*, to suppose that this can be the case? Can we conceive, that either intellectual *superfluity*, or intellectual *imperfection*, can find an abode in heaven? Or if each were admitted thither, can we conceive, that the harmony of heaven can arise from those chords of dissonance? Or is it possible, that such a thing can ever primarily exist, as *physical imperfection*? Certainly not. Does not each thing, whether animate or inanimate, possess every physical perfection necessary to its nature? And whether its endowments be exalted or debased, does it not possess every physical

perfection necessary to its station? And if every physical perfection be possessed by any individual of any given species, must not each individual of the same species be in the same circumstances an equal possessor? And without this, can those individuals be of the same species? But if each be an equal possessor, must there not be a physical equality through all individuals of the same species, both in material and immaterial nature? Certainly there must. And if so, the nominal difference which we discover, cannot arise from the primary physical essence of things. To admit any thing to be physically included in any nature, which is not essential to that nature, is a contradiction.* And to suppose any thing to be essential to any nature, which is not applicable to every individual of that nature, is a contradiction also: nor will the absurdity be lessened, in supposing an adventitious difference to result from the fixed essences of things;† and therefore, a *physical* difference in the nature of the human soul, cannot be that, which distinguishes man from man.

That these differences are purely *adventitious*, I readily admit. But while they are admitted to be adventitious, the physical nature of the soul must be totally discharged; and we must apply to another source, for that inequality which we discover in the intellectual powers of man.

To a mind capable of penetrating deeper than the mere surfaces of things, it must instantly occur, that since the introduction of moral evil, the state of man must have been considerably changed. The human body, lying open to the innovations of natural evil, is exposed to calamities in various forms. Diseases and misfortunes, inhumanities and distress, are but some of those evils that "life is heir to," and these are but the harbingers of death. An exposure to those calamities, under which the "whole creation groans," must have had a peculiar influence on the mechanism of the

* Or, vice versa.

† Whatever result is derived from the essence, in the case of one individual, must be the same in all the members of the species; all other circumstances being equal.

human body,—must have materially impeded the operation of physical causes, and considerably affected the organization of man.*

It is through the organs of sense alone, that we have any communication with external objects; and all impressions which we thus receive, must be *clear* or *indistinct*, in proportion to the evidence with which the impulse is communicated. Every defect in the organ must obstruct that evidence, and impede the impression, in proportion to its magnitude. Defects must be almost as various as the individuals who possess them; and this being admitted, leaves the apparent inequality of man, no longer an undecided point;—the physical essence of the soul, is no longer included in the question, the obstructions are purely adventitious, and the phenomena present us with totally another cause.

By what secret power the intellect lays hold on the objects of sensation, is to us totally unknown; it is a subject concealed too deep for philosophic researches, and the fact only serves to tell us, that we are strangers to ourselves. Be these

* His meaning is not, at first sight, very obvious when he says “must have materially impeded the operation of physical causes, and considerably affected the organization of man;” While shortly before he asserts that the real or nominal differences we discover, cannot arise from the physical origin of things. There can be no such result, as the impeding of physical causes either in relation to man’s advancement in the scale of improvement, or as regards his retrogression from a given state of improvement. Physical causes have nothing to do with the subject under consideration, unless we take into account those of climate; and even these have no connexion with the general question. Every diversity in the tastes, talents, and knowledge of the individual members of the species arises from the circumstances into which any one is, at first, placed. The religions and governments under which men live have a large influence in producing that diversity of character perceptible in individuals. Education and the modes of living are productive of peculiarities of character in the general inhabitants of one country, as distinguished from those of another; and even in the same country the general character of the population of large towns differs much in almost every particular from that of the agricultural population of the same country. While difference of religious distinction as to doctrine and discipline produce a marked diversity in the character of the population of the same town or locality.

things, however, as they may, observation will convince us, that while the body is exposed to those diseases and misfortunes that are incident to man, (and which in this depraved state of being are inseparable from us) the mind is subjected to error, enslaved to appetite, and under the direction of ungovernable passions. The empire of reason is invaded with hostile inclinations, and the observer is presented with an awful picture of intellectual ruins.

In this mutilated state of things,—is it possible that primary physical causes can perform their operations without obstructions? If they can so act, these impediments can be impediments no longer; if not, we discover a cause abstracted from all physical operations. Every defect, whether corporeal or mental, is a deviation from physical rectitude. And to imagine that any physical cause, can produce an effect, which is contrary to the nature of that power which produced it, is a contradiction in terms.

If a physical cause can produce those inequalities that are so visible in the human intellect, it must produce them invariably; unless this be admitted, it cannot be a physical cause. But to suppose an inequality to be produced invariably, is an absurdity too gross to be pursued,—an *invariable variation* is a contradiction in terms. It is, therefore, to the inroads of *moral evil*, operating through *the organization of the body*, upon the intellectual powers, that we must look for that variation which we daily discover in men.

A physical difference in nature, implies a real difference in species; and a real difference in species, destroys the only criterion from whence can be denominated the identity of man. But as both *species* and *identity* are preserved, it must undeniably follow, that the real and nominal essence on which both species and identity depend, must be preserved also; and the evident result is—that there neither is, nor can be, any primary physical difference between the individuals of the human race.

If this reasoning be admitted, and admitted as conclusive, it fully answers that question—"Wherein consists the difference between a wise man and a fool?" Not in the primary physical essence of their natures, but in the organization of the body, and the inroads of moral evil on the intellectual powers.

As the intellect is accessible or inaccessible to the evidence of external objects, we form accurate or inaccurate conceptions of them. And in an exact proportion to the internal perception being clear and shining, or confused and indistinct, we reason on this ground-work of human knowledge, and form complex ideas—crude and inconsistent, or incontrovertible and decisive. Obstructions in the organs, must always mutilate the images which pass through them, and from this cause, they must ever approach the intellect with distorted features, and make impressions suitable to their natures.

From this confused and indistinct mass of materials, it is—that the mind must begin its operations. And while these organical obstructions, and broken images of externals, impede its progress, it can never arrive to an adequate knowledge of the import and relation of things, which may be physically within its reach.

Unable to form a proper estimate, or to discover the mutual dependences, and influences, which subsist between things; it is impossible, in ten thousand instances, that any rational conceptions can be formed, or proper conclusions drawn. And while destitute of a clear perception of those materials, which are the foundations of human knowledge, it is impossible that any complex idea can be formed with accuracy or precision. And while external objects are distorted, by being viewed through discoloured media, it is under the influence of these distortions, that the mental powers perform their operations, and discover to the understanding, the phenomena which is so visible in the intellectual and natural world.

But while the organical passages, through which external objects present their images to the mind, appear so evidently in a disordered state, it is but rational to conclude, that even the immaterial substance itself, has undergone a considerable change in its *moral tendency*, but not in its *physical nature*. And the mental disorder too fatally guarantees the awful conjecture. The internal essence of its physical nature is too refined for human discernment, and of a nature too remote for our knowledge to be explored. It is from a discovery of its effects alone, that we may hazard conjectures

on its state; and those effects sufficiently warrant the supposition. And if so, the causes of deviation from rectitude, may be sufficiently ascertained from the influence of *moral evil*, without obliging us to have recourse to its *physical nature*. The physical nature of the soul may be invariably the same, although appearances may seem to indicate the very reverse. Mere appearance is no criterion of fact; and though the human powers may deviate from one another, it no more follows, that there is not an *immaterial substance* in man, than that there are no such species as those we denominate human, because we differ in *features* from one another.

SECT. VI.

Animal Vitality.—Instinct and Reason.

THAT there is diffused through all animated nature, a certain principle of vitality, is one of those truths which supersedes the necessity of all proof. It is a principle, every human being feels diffused through every part, and forms that insuperable line, which divides all animate from inanimate nature. Nor is this principle confined to man alone; every animated being is made an equal possessor of it, though with different degrees of acuteness, from the “unwieldy elephant,” down “to the green myriads of the peopled grass.” To separate this vital principle from any animated being, without destroying its present state of existence, is utterly impossible; but whether this principle of *vitality* belong to an *immaterial substance* or not, is a totally distinct question.*

Passing beyond that surface of things, where the mind

* The term existence is applied here to denote those things that are in the widest sense,—whether to God, or to animate or inanimate objects; and differs from the application of the term vitality, in this, that while existence may be predicated of every thing that is, vitality is only declared of those objects which we term living, as distinguished from those which are only so much dead matter. The one term is universal, the other is limited in its application; the one to those objects which are in a state of high activity, the other to that which is in a state of mere passiveness.

floats in a shoreless ocean of uncertainties, we enter a region which popular observation cannot explore. In this intellectual region, where apparent reason operates in all its gradations, there, however, must be some line of demarcation, that distinguishes the *animal* from the *man*: but where this line can be drawn, or where the boundaries can be fixed, is to me a point of almost inexplicable difficulty; and yet to fix on some discriminating criterion, is a point which must first be ascertained, before any conclusions can be deduced therefrom. Among those faculties that present themselves to the mind, there are none which I can discover, so appropriate as *instinct* and *reason*; but the shades which divide them from each other, are so minute, and so nearly allied, that they lose themselves in one another, by tints which are almost imperceptible; and we pass their boundaries, without discovering our situation, till we find ourselves on the confines of an opposite extreme.

It is foreign to my present design, to inquire into the various active operations, either of *instinct* or *reason*. I only wish to discriminate between them,—to mark their respective relations to their original causes, and their necessary connexions therewith: and in this view, I conceive the former to be founded upon *sensation*, and the latter upon *reflection*. To suppose the former to exist where there is no sensation, is a contradiction; and to suppose the latter to exist where there is no reflection, is an absurdity too gross to be admitted. If instinct can exist where there is no sensation, it can include neither energy nor action; and if instinct exist abstracted from all *energy* and *action*, it must exist without having any existence. And in supposing reason to operate without, or to exist abstracted from, all reflection, we must suppose it to act without either *volition* or *judgment*; and to decide upon the certainty of that, which is avowedly unknown, and without the knowledge of which, no rational decision can ever be obtained.—Instinct, therefore, must be founded upon sensation, and reason upon reflection.

But if sensation be necessary to the existence of instinct, and reflection to that of reason, neither instinct nor reason can have any positive existence, and therefore can only be

relative terms. If instinct have a real being, it must exist abstracted from all action ; for whatsoever exists positively, must have a being before it can possibly act ; and what has a positive existence, must be independent of all action. But if instinct exist abstracted from action, it can have no connexion with sensation, for sensation itself must be the result of action : and to suppose any thing to have a *necessary* connexion with sensation, from which it is possible to exclude the idea of *action*, is a contradiction.

If all instinct be limited in the nature of its existence, and confined wholly to those objects which are capable of exciting sensation, *corporeal existence* must form those lines, beyond the boundaries of which it cannot pass. To admit any thing to have a positive existence, which is not independent, is a contradiction in terms ; and to suppose the independence of that which cannot pass the boundaries of corporeal existence, while nothing physical obstructs such an action, is to suppose it to be independent, and not independent at the same time.

As a contradiction must ever be inadmissible, it follows,—that instinct, whatever it may be, can have but a relative existence ;—a relative existence must always be dependent on that object to which it is indebted for its being, and can no longer exist, than it is excited by foreign action. If instinct be in all animals the central point, where all the lines of organization meet, through which external objects are capable of communicating their impulses ; instinct can only be the medium through which the creature is directed to its intended end,* but of itself it can have no self-determining power.

* Or the application of the power or means with which it has been endowed. Thus the sepia, or cuttle fish, voids a black liquid, which prevents another fish from finding it or continuing its pursuit. The sword-fish is provided with a most powerful weapon and with great muscular strength to use it. He attacks the whale, which immediately, and by a special instinct, dives into so deep water, that the sword-fish being wholly unable to bear the pressure, is forced to quit his hold. This pressure produces no inconvenience to the whale, whose structure is formed to bear it with perfect ease. It is unnecessary to enumerate instances.

If instinct have a self-determining power, it can be no longer dependent on the impulses of sensation ; but to abstract the idea of sensation from that of instinct, and to suppose instinct to exist after this abstraction, is to attribute to it, a power which is precluded by the very nature of its existence. An idea of instinct, which does not include the idea of action, is a contradiction ; and therefore, wherever instinct be supposed to have an existence, the idea of action cannot be excluded ; which action must be either from itself, or excited by the impressions of foreign impulses. If it be from itself, it is at once raised into a state of independence, which, excluding all external impulses, annihilates its very nature. It must therefore follow—that as action is necessary to the idea of instinct, and as this action cannot be from itself, it must be impressed by that foreign power which communicates its impulses ; and instinct can only be the *medium* or *ensorium*, through which this foreign power acts, to produce those effects which we discover in animal life.

If this reasoning be admitted, it will follow also—that the instinctive properties which are perceived, must not only have a relative and dependent existence, but they can continue no longer than those causes conspire to operate ; which instinct is the medium of, and on which it must entirely depend. A relative idea can exist no longer than it is in contact with the influencing power ; and when that contact ceases, all relations must evaporate and expire. Animal action can only be excited by sensation ; and the action must ever be in proportion to the impulse. And whether the cause be physical or moral, there must be a contact previous to any operation ; and when the capacity becomes inaccessible to impulsion, the ideas of instinct and action must be precluded through necessity.

If instinct were supposed to have the power of election, where opposite sensations excite, and where no previous preponderation had given it a bias, it could be no longer excited by sensation. An elective power supposes in that Being which possesses it, a principle of judgment, with which instinct can have no kind of connexion. Instinct must, therefore, be dependent upon sensation, and where the

exciting powers are hostile to each other, it must necessarily follow the strongest impulse.

But while we behold a principle of animation diffused through all animal nature, distinguishing such portions of matter which are animated, from those that lie in a state of passiveness; and while we behold the inferior orders of animal creation, acting under those impulses which preclude the ideas of judgment, and election, we discern a superior principle in man. This superior principle, the Almighty has stamped upon us at our primary formation; and under its guidance and direction, has placed the whole economy of human actions. Whether we have acted conformably to the influences of this polar star, or deviated from its directions, is rather foreign to my present design. It is to the sacred writings we are indebted for this information; and in those sacred books it is, that we must find the *perfect* standard of right and wrong.

If this superior principle, to which we have uniformly given the name of *reason*, were nothing different from instinct, the *brutal* and *human* natures must have been physically the same. We might have differed from them, it is true, as one animal differs from another: but if there were nothing in either nature, which the other did not, and could not, possess, their physical identity must have been the same.

It may, however, not be difficult to ascertain, that *reason* is different from *instinct*, in its *source*, in its *nature*, in its *operations*, and in its *end*. And if it can be thus ascertained, it must produce conviction, in opposition to the indications of appearances.

Whatever affections reason may possess, or howsoever it may be diversified in the manner of its operations, it is certain that it can have no positive independent existence. For if reason have an independent existence, it can have no *necessary* connexion with any positive Being. But the instant we suppose *reason* to exist, while we exclude from it the idea of a reasonable *substance*, to support its existence; we admit reason to exist, without admitting the existence of any thing reasonable, which is a contradiction. If, therefore reason cannot have any independent existence, (which

must be admitted) it must rely on something capable of producing it, for its support. This must either be *matter* or *spirit*. In supposing it to be matter, we must either suppose matter to be reasonable in itself, or to be capable of producing what it has no power to produce. The former case is contradicted by its physical divisibility, and inertness; and the latter includes a contradiction. It therefore follows, that reason cannot subsist of itself, nor be produced by *matter*; and therefore, from the certainty of its Being, it must result from spirit, it being the only member of the alternative. Thus, reason must be different in its original source from that of instinct; and if different in its source, it must be different in its nature also.

It is the *nature* of reason, not to be guided by the impulse of sensation, but to follow the directions of judgment. Judgment must be founded upon *discrimination*, for where there can be no discrimination, there can be no *judgment*; and where there is no *judgment*, there can be no *reason*. If reason be the active result of judgment, the idea of judgment is necessary to its Being. And if the idea of judgment be necessary to its Being, a discrimination between two or more objects must necessarily enter into our abstract idea of judgment, without which it can have no existence. If, then, the perception of difference, between two or more objects, which present themselves to the mind, be necessary to the idea of judgment, and the idea of judgment be necessary to the idea of reason, it must follow—that *reason* and *instinct* must be totally distant in their *natures* from one another: the former striking its roots in an immaterial substance, and the latter in those sensations which are excited by animal impulses.

Nor does this difference terminate here. It is necessary to the nature of reason, not merely to follow the real or apparent good that is immediately presented to it; but to trace the object proposed, through all its labyrinths, previous to its adoption of it. To reflect on the past, to investigate the present, and to calculate upon the future, are all necessary to the nature of reason. For could we suppose, that reason could adopt without reflecting, investigating, or calculating, we should make reason to exist without reason,

which is a contradiction. And as neither of these ideas, can possibly be included in our idea of the abstract nature of instinct, we are here presented with a specific difference between the *animal* and the *rational* powers.

If, from this difference in nature, we turn to the operations of each, we shall find the same variations. It is the province of instinct to *gratify* appetite, but the province of reason to lay it under *restraint*. If instinct be capable of restraining appetite, it must thus act either from necessity or choice. If from *necessity*, it must act in opposition to itself, and this will end in a contradiction; if from *choice*, it can no longer be under the dominion of sensation. A contradiction is inadmissible, and an abstraction of instinct from sensation is refuted by fact.—Instinct, therefore, cannot restrain that appetite, which its nature is to gratify. If instinct be at once capable of *restraining* and *gratifying* appetite, instead of acting under the direction of sensitive impulses, it must have an elective power; and what has an elective power, must derive its actions from itself. And to that which derives all its actions from itself, the impulses of sensation must be arbitrary and adventitious; and what is arbitrary and adventitious to any subject, or idea, may be abstracted from either; but to suppose a case, where instinct may survive its contact with sensitive impulses, is to suppose it to exist and not to exist at the same time.

But while, from the nature of its existence, the restraint of appetite must be necessarily excluded from the idea of that which blindly gratifies it, we behold in reason an elective power.

To the existence of that faculty, which acts under the direction of an internal elective power, *volition* must be absolutely necessary; and where there is volition, there must be an object which is the subject of election. And it is equally certain, that where but one object is presented to the understanding, the only alternative is—either to adopt or to reject it. It is in this state, that nothing but an elective power can operate. And where but one object is presented to the mind, and this object (if congenial to it) be rejected, it is there we can discover an elective power, and be fully assured that reason there exists. It may, indeed,

be asked—"If reason reject the only object which is presented to the mind, and there be nothing in that object uncongenial to its nature, on what principle is that object rejected?" I answer, because I conceive reason to be founded upon reflection, and because it examines deeper than the surfaces of things. The present good is but a part of her province; she reviews the past, anticipates the future, and forms her decisions from the estimate of all.

It must, however, appear very certain, that this can only be effected by abstraction: and by looking forward beyond the influence of present motives, to a certainty of conclusion, in which nothing but abstraction can become its guide. If, then, reason in its operations can calculate upon consequences, remote from that object which first excited its attention, and with which that object has no apparent connexion; it is certain, that reason must, in this case, operate in a region, within the confines of which, instinct can never enter; and this leaves us in possession of a decisive difference between the *operations* of instinct and reason.

SECT. VII.

The Subject of Instinct and Reason continued.

THAT man is an *animal*, as well as a *rational being*, is a position which almost claims to be self-evident; but where the *animal* powers end, and where the *rational* begin, is a point which cannot be so easily ascertained.* There are, however, many instances in which these powers differ from one another, both in their nature, and their operations, beside those already mentioned.

It is the province of reason, to examine abstract propositions;—to ascertain the simple perceptions which are necessary to their existence;—to travel through their various modes and relations, and to identify them by definition.

* Nor is there any reason to expect that we shall ever, in the present limited state of our faculties, and while placed in a narrow and bounded state of existence, be able to penetrate the obscurity which surrounds the question upon every side.

But can any man suppose, that mere instinct can distinguish between *goodness* and *mercy*? Or that instinct can identify those simple perceptions, which are necessary to either of those abstract ideas? Can instinct distinguish between a simple and a complex idea? Or can it separate those ideas which have been uniformly associated together, though they have with each other no kind of physical relation? If instinct, by the locality of its existence, be unequal to that task which reason can accomplish, and which from mere instinct we could never learn; it is a decisive proof, that reason and instinct are as different in their operations, as they are distinct in their natures from one another.

Nor are there wanting, a variety of instances, in which reason and instinct are at variance with one another; in which there is an irreconcilable hostility subsisting between them; and which could have had no existence, if reason and instinct were the same, or originated in the same source.*

* On the future life of brutes, many things have been said, and much has been written; and both for and against the subject, many forcible arguments have been employed. An attempt to decide on such an important point in a few "straggling propositions," or a solitary note, would be both immodest and indiscreet. The thoughts which I have offered on this subject, are perfectly new to me; but whether they be admitted as conclusive or not, the decision can in no way affect the main purport of this essay. For although it could be proved, that brutes have an immaterial principle, and though the immortality of their natures could be deduced therefrom, it will neither destroy nor lessen the proof of an immaterial and immortal spirit in man.

The acute reasonings drawn from the *VIS INERTIA* of matter, by Mr. Baxter, together with the arguments advanced by Mr. Smith, are to me neither convincing nor conclusive. The heavy objections which may be advanced against the hypothesis of each, are to me more forcible than their arguments, however plausible they may appear.

How creatures, that are not subjected to any law here, can be made the subjects of rewards or punishments hereafter, I confess I do not perceive; neither can I discern how beings, that are incapable of intellectual enjoyments, can derive happiness from sources which they have no appetites to relish: but I would not urge either case as an argument against possibility. Yet I fear, that the admission of the belief of the immortality of brutes, will so far violate those distinctions which God has placed between the different orders of intelligent and animated beings, that we shall not be sufficiently guarded

There is not, perhaps, an instance, either of *moral* or *retributive* justice, where this is not the case. Reason and instinct are invariably at war with respect to distinctions in *property*; and those boundaries which are fixed by *reason*, may, and are considered by *instinct*, as an infringement upon natural right. The calls of instinct, aim at nothing but the gratification of appetite and desire, abstracted from all subserviency; while the voice of reason imposes a restraint, and compels it to be subservient to the principles of immutable justice. And therefore they must be different from each other.

It may, indeed, be asked—"Whether reason must not *necessarily* follow the impulse of motive?" This, I confess, I rather doubt. I rather conceive, that when a new motive is presented to the understanding, the attention of the soul is awakened by it from a dormant state. This impulse cannot be excited by previous choice, but presents itself, unsolicited, to our view; but it does not follow from hence, that the judgment must adopt its dictates. Motives only awaken the mind from a torpid state to examine their propriety; but the election of their dictates is the result of judgment, and in this stage of the mind's progress, *volition** can have no existence.

against the adoption of equivocal generation—a doctrine which has been justly exploded by Mr. Ray, in his book, entitled "The Wisdom of God in the Creation."

* It is not improbable but by advancing the observations suggested above, I may be thought, by many, to advance sentiments which include in them the ideas of fatality and destiny. Those among my acquaintances, whose sentiments are congenial with my own, may think I have given them an occasion of offence; and those who think differently, will perhaps be offended if I attempt to explain. I should, however, be very sorry to be the occasion of offence to either:—a subject on which the world has been so long divided, will have its votaries on either side; but as equivocation is with me a despicable trait of character, I feel no hesitation in avowing those sentiments which I have adopted.

It is a question which has long agitated the controversial world, "Whether man be a free or a necessary agent?" On both sides of this question many able pens have been employed, and many volumes have been produced; written, I am sorry to observe, with as

If reason *necessarily* follows the impulse of motive, motive must be the active *cause* of all its actions And as all causes

much acrimony and invective, as with an apparent aim to universal mental empire. With all deference to those names whose writings have kept alive the flame of controversial war, by endeavouring to extinguish it; I fear that they have shewn, not merely a wish to judge for themselves, but to think for, and dictate to, others.

If I have a right to think for myself, every other man has the same right; and an attempt to impose my creed upon the belief of another, merely because I think it right, is a piece of arrogance which too plainly characterizes the mind that adopts it. The mind of another may be silenced by the sorceries of argument, without being proselited to that sentiment by which it is refuted. It is in this case rather dragooned into a compliance, than proselited to belief. The weight of evidence is alone able to produce rational conviction; and this weight of evidence, will operate in proportion as it can have access unto the mind. It is on these principles, that I attempt to offer to the public my thoughts on this point, in the following note. Those whose minds enter into a train of thinking similar to my own, may feel weight in the following thoughts; and those who do not, will do me no injury, and give me no offence.

It has been frequently asked by the advocates of destiny, "If God foresee all future events, and those events cannot happen otherwise than God foresees them, how can human actions be contingent? If they be contingent, can God foresee them; if not, must not man be a necessary agent?" Arguments like these are the most plausible of any I have hitherto met with; and I am inclined to think, that all their energy is derived from associating together two distinct ideas, which in themselves have no relation—predestination and prescience. The difference in these two ideas will appear the instant we trace them to their sources.

Predestination is evidently founded upon the idea of infinite power, which necessarily calls those actions into being, that are supposed to depend on previous destiny for their existence; and to abstract the idea of power from those actions, which necessarily depend upon that power for their existence, is at once to annihilate their active original cause, and consequently to destroy their own existence. And were it possible to annihilate that connexion, which subsists between that infinite power, which influences into being all human actions; and were it possible that those actions could remain, after they were separated from infinite power; all human actions would be contingent, and consequently predestination could be no more. I therefore conceive predestination to include a necessary connexion, between human actions and infinite power; that human actions necessarily flow from infinite power, are inseparable from, and necessarily dependent on it; that if predestination be admitted, the present state of man is a state of mere passiveness, and that the idea of contingency can have no existence.

must exist previously to their own effects, we must attribute to *mere motive*, an abstract state of existence: while the

But while predestination is founded on the idea of infinite power, the knowledge of future events is founded upon the idea of infinite discernment, with which the idea of power has no necessary connexion. It would be absurd to suppose that God were infinite in his power, because he possessed infinite discernment, or that he were infinite in his discernment, because he possessed infinite power. Infinite power, and infinite discernment, must therefore be attributes which are co-essential in the Deity. If the knowledge of any action be founded upon the discernment of that action, the very discernment of it presupposes the previous existence of that action, of which this is the discernment. Existence, in the very nature of things, must necessarily precede, in order of being, all discernment of its modes and accidents; for nothing can be supposed to be known previous to the supposition of its own existence. And though we admit that infinite discernment is previous to the positive existence of the action itself; yet the action itself exists in idea, and is a future action actually existing in idea, as much as the discernment of this action is future knowledge, existing previous to that action, on which the existence of this discernment is founded. Here, then, the action itself must be supposed to be in being, and the discernment of this action founded upon that existence: but neither the necessity, nor contingency of this action, can be inferred from that discernment, which only presupposes the previous existence of the simple action, and with which its necessity or contingency can have no relation.

It will now be asked, "Could this action have been different from what it is? if it could, how could infinite discernment have decided upon its certainty; if not, what is become of the contingency of human actions?" However specious this question may appear in itself, it seems to me to be, upon the whole, a mere fallacy. It has been already proved, that the action itself must be supposed to be in existence, and the discernment of this action is founded upon that supposition; for it would be a contradiction in terms, to suppose any thing could be discerned, which had not even an ideal existence; so that the question is nothing more than if it were asked, Can an action, after it is past, be different from itself? To this question I would answer, No; and yet I cannot conceive that the contingency of that action can be affected thereby, because its contingency depended not on the discernment of its final issue, but on the adoption of these mutable motives, which, when adopted, led to this end, and which this action was the result of, without in the least affecting the action itself. The action which is thus discerned, is the effect of elective adoption, and the necessary termination of such motives as were adopted. To suppose that the action itself, under the direction of these elected motives, could be different from what it is, is to suppose that these motives could have produced an action contrary to their

mind is left to form this abstract idea, independent of those effects, which can alone denominate it to be an active cause.

own conclusions, which is a contradiction. That these mutable motives might have been differently elected, I admit; but then infinite discernment could have penetrated the result of that election,—have looked through the contingency, and have seen a different conclusion, with as much precision as it does the present; and whatever mutations these motives might have assumed, infinite discernment is still equal to the penetration, and capable of looking to the same certainty of conclusion. And although we suppose these motives to be subject to ten thousand mutations, to be subject to as many different elections, and capable of ending in as many conclusions,—yet, these conclusions cannot elude the penetration of infinite knowledge, which arises from the plenitude of infinite discernment; and which must ever be, while finite is placed within the reach of infinite---and while the Creator is capable of comprehending all created capacities. The power and discernment of God, must, therefore, be ever superior in their extensiveness, to the mutations which human contingencies are capable of undergoing; and we can thus conceive all human actions to be known to God, without having recourse to that destiny, which is supposed to influence them into being.

To ask, therefore --Whether an action which is foreseen, can be different from the foreknowledge of it, is no other than to ask,---Whether an action can be different from itself? To this question I would answer, no; because the question itself is founded upon the idea of the action's being known. And if the action be known, it must be supposed, at least, as much past, as that knowledge of it which is founded thereon. To conceive, therefore, that absolute foreknowledge and eternal decree, are similar in their effects, is, I conceive, an imposition upon the mind. If a superior Being could be supposed capable of possessing infinite discernment and knowledge, abstracted from all power, this Being would be as capable of looking through the contingency of human actions, as though he were possessed of infinite power. But we cannot conceive the idea of a decree, abstracted from the idea of infinite power; and therefore it follows, that prescience and destiny are totally different in their natures, as well as founded upon two distinct attributes of Deity---discernment and power; which, in the present consideration, can have no necessary connexion. The necessary effect of a decree, is the positive accomplishment of it; but the necessary effect of absolute foreknowledge, is what I have never yet been able to discover.

Every action must bear some relation to the knowledge of it, because the knowledge of an action is the communication of itself; without this relation, there can be no knowledge. And to say, that an action may be, or is known, while that action which is thus known, is in futurity, even in idea, while the knowledge of it is now actually existing, is to make the effect to exist prior to its own cause;

The great end of reason, is to regulate the impulses of *desire*, and to render appetite subservient to the principles

and is to suppose a relation between that which is, and that which is not; which is a glaring contradiction.

Whenever we form an idea of prescience, and speak of it as applying to the infinitely wise God, according to our weak perceptions of His attributes; we either behold him stepping into futurity, and there beholding actions in their dark recesses, or calling futurity to his bar, to develop its hidden mysteries; but in either case, the action itself, and the knowledge of that action, must be brought into contact with one another.

That the relative ideas of past and future, must be inapplicable to the eternal God, is too evident to require proof, or admit denial, there being but few abstract propositions more certain; and therefore, the idea of successive existence, must be precluded by the Omnipresency of his nature: and in the physical relation in which things stand to God, nothing can be said to be remote from him. If, then, we admit a future action to be known to, and present with God, we in futurity admit its actual existence; and while we admit this event which is future to us, to be present with, and therefore known to God, we admit, that nothing which is in futurity to us, can be remote from Him; but we behold this future action, actually existing now before God. Here, then, we behold the certainty of the action perfectly existing before God, and perfectly remote from the relative idea of futurity; and that action which is future with us, is in actual existence with Him.

Whatever event or action is said to be foreknown, can only be so in relation to us, but not to God. With him the event or action is but simply known. And as the simple discernment of an action, necessarily presupposes the pre-existence of that action; the action, itself is not subsequent upon, but antecedent to that discernment, which is founded upon it. If an action, which is future with us, be totally destitute of all existence, in the most absolute sense of the word, it never can be an object even of infinite discernment, because the supposition includes a contradiction; for he who discerns that which is destitute of all existence, discerns what is admitted even by the supposition itself to be undiscernible. The existence of an action, is therefore necessary to the discernment of it. If, then, an event which is future to us, be actually present with God; and if the actual existence of an event be necessary to his discernment of it, its mutable state is already past, and its destiny is as inevitable, as those events which are enrolled in the antediluvian annals. And as the knowledge of an event, must necessarily presuppose the previous existence of that event, the knowledge of it can never influence that event, or any of its preceding mutations, upon which this knowledge itself must depend for its own existence.

... itself, whether divine or human, necessarily implies

of immutable justice : while the great end of instinct, is to gratify the impulses of desire, independent of right and wrong. *Right* and *wrong*, are what instinct can form no conception of; but without right and wrong, reason can have no existence. Whether what instinct adopts, may issue in truth or error, is what can excite within it no solicitude; but the *final issue* of things, is the great point to which reason directs its steps. Reason and instinct must, therefore, be essentially different—in their *origin*, in their *natures*, in their *operations*, and in their *end*. Instinct denominates the *animal*, and reason the *man*.

an object; for it is a contradiction in terms, to suppose any being to discern an object which we conceive has no kind of existence. To suppose that the discernment of an object may exist, while we suppose the object itself to be a pure nonentity, is to suppose the object to be at once discernible and not discernible, to be an entity and a nonentity, at the same time.

However distant the modes of God's discernment are from those of our own, yet when we ask the question—"How can any thing be different from what God foresees it?" we have recourse to our own modes of apprehension, and incorporate in that question, the idea of successive duration, with his mode of apprehension; although in our abstract reasoning upon it, we exclude all kinds of succession from that idea.

In all our abstract reasoning upon the prescience of God, we exclude the idea of successive existence, and speak the language of philosophy and reason; but when we apply the prescience of God, to the contingency of human action, we lose sight of the only exclusive foundation on which the question can stand, and incorporate with it the relative ideas of past and future; and thus re-adopt that successive existence, which we had previously excluded from our abstract idea of the prescience of God. It is for want of this distinction, that we have such confusion in our ideas on the subject. Only let the idea of successive existence, be excluded from incorporating with that of prescience, and the difficulty will disappear, the question will assume an inoffensive form, and the prescience of God will be perfectly reconcilable with the contingency of human actions.

Finally, an action which is future with us, must be in itself either an entity or a nonentity, in the most perfect sense of the words; if an entity, it has all that existence which I contend for; if a nonentity, it cannot be an object either of infinite discernment or knowledge, for he that beholds or knows a perfect nonentity, must behold and know nothing. DREW.

SECT. VIII.

Memory and Reflection—The former visible in animal Powers, the latter depends on an immaterial Principle—Sensation—It may be annihilated, but the human Soul cannot.

THE abstract ideas of *memory* and *reflection*, however they may be allied, must be considerably different in themselves, from one another; the former we discover in the animal powers, but the latter only in an *immaterial principle*.*

* Here there is a considerable degree of logical inaccuracy; for we cannot suppose that Mr. Drew was intentionally desirous of inducing on the minds of his readers a false impression in relation to the powers of the mind. The language used has a tendency to produce an effect which could answer no conceivable end, as far as Mr. Drew's views of the human Soul are concerned, and of the contrary of which he had every day experience in the consciousness of his own mind. We are not aware, that the principles laid down and supported with so much ingenuity and success in the present Essay have been taken notice of by any advocate of materialism since their first publication; it is, however, evident that our author's language implies a distinction as regards memory and reflection between mere animal nature and man considered as an immortal being, which in the hands of an ingenious sophist might have been made to appear as militating against his own deductions; when taken in connexion with what has been advanced in the preceding sections.

The illogical mode of expression which Mr. D. adopts, when he says, "the former we discover in the animal powers" leaves his meaning in a very undefined state. Are we to understand him as acknowledging memory, as a faculty, to exist independent of an immaterial being? If it was intended that the passage should only apply to brutes, then, in that case, there is no discrepancy. But taken in connexion with the whole reasoning, Mr. D. entertained no such conception, but had in view solely the operations of the human mind. And when so viewed, we think, no sane mind will admit memory as separated, per se, from that in which the power of reflection inheres. The one is as much an attribute of mind as the other. We do not here speak of the period of development of these powers or faculties of the mind; but, that the power of reviving again in our minds those ideas, which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid aside out of sight, and which we have had by sensation, is as much inherent in that which we call mind, as that other fountain, (to use the language of Locke) from which experience fur-

Memory, no doubt, relates to sensation, but can have no relation to any thing but what is *past*; while reflection, commencing its operations independent either of *past* or *future*, forms its conclusions on the agreement or disagreement of those ideas which we associate together, which to memory and instinct must be for ever unknown. Instinct can never operate, abstracted from the impulses of sensation; but *reflection* begins its operations where sensation ends—where the impulses of sensation cannot excite, and moves in a region of which instinct can form no conception.

Sensation itself must necessarily be *diffused* through every department of animal being; and must of itself be as extensive in its *diffusion*, as the Being which possesses it. To be assured that it is a something which depends upon the modification of *body*, we need only to advert to the amputation of any bodily part. In proportion as these parts undergo a separation from each other, the capacity of sensation must be reduced in its extension, and the power of feeling must be confined within a narrower sphere. The acuteness, however, can have but little or no relation to its diffusion; for although the amputation of the parts of the body, may contract it in the extent of its operations, those parts which remain will preserve their acuteness uninjured and entire. And though we consider sensation as one great *whole*, yet the reduction of its diffusion, must necessarily be injurious to that *whole*, while the acuteness remaining plainly demonstrates, that sensation cannot arise from an independent principle.

nisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us: as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are, perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This is reflection. That they are both equally inherent in that immaterial principle, which is denominated mind, we think, no person will be bold enough to deny.-

A capacity which is thus capable of being reduced, must, through the progress of the means of that reduction, be finally *annihilated*; for it is a contradiction to suppose any thing, which is not infinite, to be capable of reduction, without arriving at last to a point when it shall cease to be. And from the effects of amputation, it undeniably follows, that the animal powers must depend for their existence on the modification of that body, of which they are powers, and on the continuance of which they stand or fall.

As no two parts of any animal, can both survive their separation from each other, there must be some immoveable seat of personality; but wherein this personality consists, or how far amputation may extend without approaching its recess, is a point which I confess myself unable to determine. It may be, and most probably is, very different in different species of animal beings; and what would terminate the existence of one, would permit another to survive its loss. But what is reduced by amputation, must be totally annihilated by the final separation of all its parts, beyond which nothing purely *animal* can survive.*

* How far an injury may be sustained without dissolving the union between soul and body, it is hard to say. The violence which in some cases can be survived, and the slight occasions which in others prove mortal, and dissolve this compact, imperiously force this truth upon the mind, that we know not with certainty in what this union consists, nor upon what secret ties it depends. The attenuated fibres, if such they are, which hold vitality and inertness together, are too minute for discovery, and lodged in those secret recesses which anatomical penetration can never reach. Certain it is, that the union must be indissoluble while life continues; and therefore, the soul cannot have an immediate connexion with those floating particles of flesh and blood, which are thrown off by effluvia and respiration, and supplied by nutrition. We are, therefore, naturally carried to some stamen of personality, which cannot be exposed, either to fluctuation or decay: in this seat of personality, it is more probable, that the identity of man consists. To this permanent principle, we may conceive the immaterial spirit to be united in our present state; and though separated from it by death, restored again to this union in the resurrection, which it will preserve to all eternity.

Admitting this permanent principle to exist, "in what the identity of the body consists," will remain no longer an undecided question, it must consist in the immoveable stamen of personality, which is equally removed from mutation and decay.

A final argument for the soul's immateriality may be thus stated :—Every action necessarily supposes the pre-existence of the actor. And if the soul of man be material, matter must have existed previous to that consciousness, which is dependent upon the modification of it ; and the conclusion is certain,—that consciousness cannot be an essential property of it. And no adventitious acquisition of quality, can communicate a power of which both acquisition and quality are naturally destitute ; nor incorporate with the identity of a substance, which is of itself inert, and therefore incongruous to its nature. And if so, there must be an IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE IN MAN.

The permanency of this principle of identity, will no doubt, preclude it from incorporating with other bodies, and losing its own identity in the identity of another. The floating particles of flesh and blood, which form the general mass, and which occasionally adhere to this principle, have, perhaps, but little or no connexion with the identity of man. Rendered indissoluble in itself by the power of the Almighty, it may continue incorruptible during its repose in the grave ; while the floating particles of the body, may be scattered with the winds of heaven. But when the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed, then this stamen of identity, which was sown in weakness, shall be raised in power ; and what was sown a natural, shall be raised, a spiritual body ; and, restored to an union with its immortal partner, it shall be for ever removed from separation or change. God, however, giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own body.—But the resurrection is not my present subject.

There are, perhaps, but few cases, in which this theory can derive more evidence from fact and incident, than in those of suspended animation ; for although in these cases, a torpor has overspread the general mass, yet this permanent principle must preserve its union with the spirit. The external obstructions, which occasion a suspension of animation, may oppress those springs of action, that are necessary to animate the remoter parts of the corporeal mass ; and, retarded in their operations, a general langour may prevail ; but the internal union between the two natures cannot be dissolved, while animation is within the reach of restoration ; and I conceive, that it is an internal separation between these two natures which can alone occasion certain death. DREW.

PART II.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMMORTALITY OF
THE HUMAN SOUL.

CHAP. I.

THE NATURE, MODES, AND POSSIBILITY OF
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL, CONSI-
DERED.

SECT. I.

Death—Definition of it.

IN the unbounded empire of human language, there is, perhaps, no term to which such strange and preposterous ideas have been annexed, as to that of Death.

The *Orientalists* have spiritualized it into an angel, the *Moralists* have degraded it into a *monster*, the *Rhetorician's art* has subjoined to it the idea of personification; while the *poet's imagination* has lent him "his meagre aspect, and his naked bones." All these ideas are, however, but the creatures of a prolific fancy, utterly devoid of any real existence in nature, and totally unfounded in fact.

To strike the passions, and animate the feelings, representations like these are undoubtedly judicious and appropriate; but it is the province of philosophical disquisition, to disrobe realities of the trappings of fancy; and to present them to the world, in the genuine features of their native forms. While the embellishments of fancy are thus added

to a mere abstraction of the mind, the inquirer is too apt to be misled in his investigations. Hence—

“DEATH, and his image rising in the brain,
Bear faint resemblance, never are alike;
Fear shakes the pencil, Fancy loves excess,
Dark Ignorance is lavish of her shades,
And these the formidable picture draw.”

But setting aside these things, as the creatures of a warm imagination, let us inquire what is Death?

It is certain, that death must either have a *positive* or a *privative* existence. If the former, death must exist whether any thing die or not; but this is absolutely impossible, for it supposes death, while it supposes nothing to die. If nothing were capable of dissolution or decay, it would be contradictory to admit any idea of death. It is the decay and dissolution of Beings, which give rise to the idea of death; and therefore death can have no positive existence. If, then, death can have no positive existence, it can only exist in relation to those Beings, which are capable of undergoing *dissolution*, *privation*, or *annihilation*; and therefore, in these *relations* it is that we must look for every conception we have of death.

The most simple notion (if notion it may be termed) which we can form of death, is,—that it is the reverse of life; and that it deprives of animation, that subject which falls beneath its power. When death is occasioned by *dissolution*, I understand it to be a separation of those parts or properties of any Being, which are necessarily united, in order to the existence and identity of that Being. By *privation*, I mean the subtracting something from any Being, without which, that Being cannot subsist. And by *annihilation*, I mean, not only the destruction of any and every modification which it might have assumed, but the utter destruction of *all Being*; and the reduction of any substance to an *absolute nonentity*. If, therefore, the soul, which is an immaterial substance, perish, it must be in one of these three ways.*

* “That as it is evident our present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body, in

SECT. II.

The Soul cannot perish by Dissolution, Privation, or Annihilation.

IF the soul perishes through *dissolution*, it must be by having those parts disunited, of which it is composed. But

the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.

“ Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and reason, we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now, it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For though, from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds, are in architecture; yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses, and without any at all, which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death.

It does not appear, then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is in any degree necessary to thinking, to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution, or alienation, of the former by death, will be the destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a continuation of both, with such and great alterations.

“ Now, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life, and of death, death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does; a state in which our capacities, and sphere of perception and of action,

this cannot possibly be ; because the soul is not an assemblage of distinct particles, but, as has been already proved, a simple, uncompounded, substance ; and therefore has no parts to be dissolved.—To suppose any substance capable of being dissolved , which has no parts, is a contradiction—it supposes a separation of parts, in a Being which has no parts to be separated.

A being, which has no parts included in the abstract idea of its existence, can never have any thing taken from it ; and where nothing can be taken away, that Being must necessarily be incapable of *dissolution*. An *exclusion* of all *parts*, is necessary to the existence of an immaterial substance ; and to suppose a Being to be dissolved, from the very nature of whose existence a capacity of dissolution is necessarily excluded, is a flat contradiction ;—it is supposing a Being to be capable, and yet incapable of dissolution, at the same time.

Whatever has parts, cannot be immaterial ; and what has no parts, can never lose them. To suppose an immaterial substance to have parts, destroys its immateriality ; for it is a contradiction to suppose *that* to be immaterial, which by its parts is demonstrated to be otherwise ; and if the soul be immaterial, which has been already proved, it necessarily follows, that it cannot perish by *dissolution*.

Neither can it be conceived, that the soul can perish by *privation*. For if privation imply the subtracting something from a substance, which is necessary to the existence of that substance, without annihilating the substance itself,

may be much greater than at present. For, as our relation to our external organs of sense renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation, so it may be the only natural hindrance of our existing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all shew us in what state death naturally leaves us. But were we sure that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers, yet the suspension of a power, and the destruction of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from the one to the other ; or conclude, even to the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.”—Butler’s Analogy ; “Of a future Life.”

(in which sense I here use it) it is certain, that whatever substance undergoes privation, must be a subject capable of it; and whatever is capable of privation, must be capable of surviving the loss of *that* which privation takes away. I therefore in this place consider *privation* as distinct from *annihilation*, the former implying the loss of something, which is necessary to the being of any substance, and the latter implying the total nonentity of the substance itself. If, therefore, the soul perish by privation, the soul itself must have something included within its nature which it can lose, without the total annihilation of its Being. For where the substance itself is reduced to a perfect nonentity, it cannot be said to be thus reduced by privation, but by annihilation, which is not the subject under immediate consideration.

To suppose a privation possible, which takes nothing away from that subject to which it applies, will certainly involve a contradiction; and to suppose a privation which leaves nothing behind, will conduct the mind to the same conclusion. For if a privation can exist, which leaves nothing behind, and which takes nothing away, the substance itself which is supposed to undergo this privation, must remain uninjured and entire; and from the permanent state of the substance, we shall be obliged to reduce that very privation to a nonentity, which we had previously admitted to exist and act. And a privation which cannot change the substance which is supposed to suffer by it, must be a privation, and not a privation, at the same time.

That a privation, when applied to compounded bodies may reduce to a nonentity that *cohesion* of parts, which it takes away, I readily admit; yet the substance itself from which the parts are taken, and between which cohesion is destroyed, must remain in existence and survive its loss. It is true, the modification of being in this substance, may, and must be considerably changed; but this alteration in the modes of being, cannot effect the identity of Being itself. A substance, and the modification of that substance, are two distinct things. The peculiar modification of Being may be destroyed, while the substance remains, but where the substance is destroyed, the modification which depended

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That a privation, when applied to compounded bodies may reduce to a nonentity that *cohesion* of parts, which it takes away, I readily admit; yet the substance itself from which the parts are taken, and between which cohesion is destroyed, must remain in existence and survive its loss. It is true, the modification of being in this substance, may, and must be considerably changed; but this alteration in the modes of being, cannot effect the identity of Being itself. A substance, and the modification of that substance, are two distinct things. The peculiar modification of Being may be destroyed, while the substance remains, but where the substance is destroyed, the modification which depended

upon the substance for its existence, must necessarily perish with it.

As privation must, therefore, imply a separation in the component parts of that Being which undergoes it, so it must also imply a change in the state of that Being which suffers by its influence, which change in the state of Being must arise from the separation of its component parts. For to admit a privation to take place, while we exclude all change from that Being which suffers, as it leaves the Being unchanged and entire, it is certain that nothing can possibly perish by it, and we must in this case allow privation to exist, while we are under the necessity of denying its existence. I therefore conclude, that wherever privation takes place ; it must necessarily imply a change.

If, then, privation imply subduction, without destroying the entity of that substance in which this subduction takes place ; and at the same time implies a change in the internal state of that Being which suffers ; it must certainly follow,—that *privation* can only apply to Beings which are capable of separation and change ; and therefore, from the pure simplicity of its nature, the soul can never perish by its influence.

If the soul perish by privation, and privation imply a partial subduction of Being, the soul must suffer loss without losing its entity, but this, on a more minute survey, will be found impossible.

That the soul is a simple immaterial substance, has been already proved, and from the simplicity of its nature, it can have nothing but its entity to lose ; and to imagine the soul to perish by privation, while privation implies a *partial* subduction, and while the soul has nothing but its entity which it can possibly lose, we must suppose the soul either to remain in existence after its entity is destroyed, or to perish by privation while its entity remains entire. But as both sides present us with palpable contradictions, it clearly follows that the privation can never destroy the soul.

The manifestation of thinking and volition, are but actions of the soul ; and to suppose that privation can destroy an action, is a quibbling absurdity. An action cannot be destroyed previous to its existence ; and the very instant it

exists, its end being answered, it expires. And as actions are only relative, perishing emanations of a simple substance, no privation can possibly pass upon either. The substance of the soul forms but one simple idea; and to make a partial subduction from a simple idea, and yet to suppose that the part which *remains*, may survive such subduction, is a contradiction—it is supposing the existence of that, which by the supposition itself, can have none:—It supposes an idea of that which is not an idea; which is an idea, and not an idea, at the same time.

As privation implies a change, there are other reasons which preclude its application to the soul. Whatever changes, must be capable of being changed; and what is capable of being changed, cannot be a simple uncompounded substance. To change the same numerical particles, for the same numerical particles, in material bodies, is not a change, but a nonentity. And to admit, that a change has passed upon an immaterial substance, when it remains the same after this supposed change, that it was before, is an evident contradiction. If the soul be changed, it must be changed from itself to itself, which includes this contradiction,—that it has changed, and not changed, at the same time. And if no change take place in the soul by privation, it must remain the same after this privation, that it was previous to it; and this will lead us to this conclusion—that the soul *has* suffered a privation, and yet *has not* suffered it, at the same time. A being, which has nothing but its entity to lose, cannot survive privation; and that which cannot survive privation, cannot be a subject of it.

It is a privation of animation, which all animal bodies undergo, in natural death. What remains is a lifeless mass; and the change which it undergoes, is from action to inaction. But this presents to the mind the idea of a Being capable of such a change:—Yet after this change has passed upon the human body, it is no longer a subject of death. It would be preposterous to speak of a dead man's dying, or to suppose that a dead man were capable of undergoing death, when he was known to be dead before. It would not be less contradictory, to imagine a dead man to be alive,—it is imagining the man to be dead, and not dead, at the same

THE IMMORTALITY OF

time.—It is no longer capable of death ; the only privation in which death consists, has already passed upon it, and it has nothing more to lose.

The only entity which can now remain, is that of its component parts. A separation of these may succeed to this privation, but this can only annihilate their mutual contact ; but in no case affect the entity of those component parts themselves. When the greatest possible separation has taken place through corruption, it is still the same in point of entity that it was before ; only it now engrosses different portions in the abyss of space. Every particle possesses all the essential properties which the whole did, prior to this total separation, only they are now differently modified. Matter can never be separated from itself ; it is a contradiction to suppose it ; it supposes the existence of it, after it supposes it destroyed. And if a material substance, after having been separated from an immaterial nature, with which it had no physical connexion, be incapable of undergoing any further loss ; by the same mode of reasoning, the immaterial principle, now separated from its grosser companion, has nothing more to lose. As it implies a contradiction, to suppose matter to be separated from itself ; so it implies the same contradiction, to suppose an immaterial substance to be capable of being separated, when it has nothing but itself to be separated from. To suppose an immaterial substance to be deprived of itself, is to suppose it to exist after it is destroyed.

A change can only take place in compounded bodies ; whatever is formed of one simple indivisible nature only, can be separated from nothing but those properties which are essential to that nature. And to suppose a separation in those properties, is to suppose that those properties are essential to the existence of the soul, and not essential, at the same time.*

It may, perhaps, be objected to this mode of reasoning—
“ that if the body be capable of undergoing a separation of

* If we deprive matter of magnitude and figure, and this privation causes a cessation of its being ; it, therefore, follows that being cannot be retained when its essential properties are destroyed.

all its parts, and thereby cease to be a body ; the immaterial substance may undergo a similar change, and thereby cease to be a soul." On this I would observe, that I conceive the objection is founded upon a gross mistake. It is founded not upon the *nature* of substances, but upon the *combination* of them. The comparison is not fairly stated. The body is a combination of atoms ; the soul is but a simple essence.

To state this case fairly, let us suppose (what, however, must be admitted to be an impossible case, because matter is capable of endless divisibility) a portion of matter to be divided, till it is impossible that it can be divided any more : I then ask,—Can either of these *particles* of matter undergo any further division, or not ? If it can, it is not yet divided, as in the case supposed ; if it cannot, we have here a case in point. The soul is this *immaterial atom*, (if I may so speak) which is incapable either of division or change ; because it is divested of all *diversity*, and lost in *unity* :—And if so, it can neither lose by privation, nor undergo a change. Or if we must still retain the idea of corporeity : let us suppose, that there are as many distinct independent substances in the soul, as there are atoms in the body, capable of divisibility ; in this case the comparison will hold good, and the conclusions will be fair ; each may be separated to infinity, and yet each preserve its entity uninterrupted, independent, and entire ; and therefore, the soul cannot perish through privation.*

* When the body seems to us to perish, we know that it does not truly perish ; that every thing which existed in the decaying frame, continues to exist entire as it existed before ; and that the only change which takes place, is a change of opposition or proximity. From the first moment at which the earth arose, there is not the slightest reason to think that a single atom has perished. All that was is. And if nothing has perished in the material universe : if even in that bodily dissolution, which alone gave occasion to the belief of our mortality as sentient beings, there is not the loss of the most inconsiderable particle of the dissolving frame, the argument of analogy, far from leading us to suppose the destruction of that spiritual being which animated the frame, would lead us to conclude that it too exists as it before existed ; and that it has only changed its relation to the particles of our material organs, as these particles still subsisting have changed the relations which they mutually bore. As the dust has only returned to the earth from whence it came, it is surely a reasonable inference from analogy, to suppose that the spirit may have returned to the God who gave it.

BROWN.

It now remains to be considered, whether the soul can perish by *annihilation*. If it can, all rational proof of its immortality must be given up; if not, its immortality will be ascertained.

It has been already proved, that the soul cannot perish by *dissolution*, because it has nothing to be dissolved. And it has also been proved, that it cannot perish by *privation*, because it has nothing to lose, and because it can undergo no change; and if it perish by *annihilation*, it must be either *through the tendency of its own nature*, or *the application of external force*. If an immaterial substance has no parts—has nothing to lose, and cannot change, it must follow, that such a substance cannot perish *through the tendency of its own nature*. To suppose a natural tendency, (in any simple Being) to that which is hostile to its own existence, is a contradiction.* A being which cannot change, can have no tendencies, but such as are peculiar to its nature; and that its natural tendency is to life, is demonstrated by its actual existence. If, then, a natural change in tendency, imply a change in that nature which produced it, and no such change in nature can possibly take place in the soul, because of the simplicity of its existence; it must follow, that the soul cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature.

A Being which has no parts cannot change; and that which cannot change, must be the same to-day, that it was yesterday; and that which is the same now, that it was then, can be no farther removed from annihilation to-day, than it will be to-morrow. And to suppose a Being, with a natural tendency to annihilation, which can make no approaches towards it; is to suppose it to have a tendency to annihilation, and yet to have no such tendency, at the same time. A Being which is no nearer to annihilation to-day, than it was yesterday, and which, for the same reason, must be as

* To suppose in the soul a tendency hostile to its own existence, is to assume that opposing tendencies inhere in a substance possessing only unity of being. A simple being, physically considered, which cannot change, cannot possess tendency inseparable from its own nature; and that the natural tendency of the soul is to life, is established by its actual existence.

far removed from it to-day, as it will be to-morrow, must always be at an equal distance from it ; and that which is always at an equal distance from any given point, can never arrive at it.

If the soul tend to annihilation, it must tend to its own *contrariety* ; and that which tends to its own contrariety, must act in opposition to itself, which is a contradiction. An action performed by any Being, supposes in that Being, a capacity for such an action. But if an action be performed by any Being, which its nature is *incapable* of performing, we must behold in such a Being, a capacity, and an incapacity, at the same time, for such an action.

It may, indeed, be said—"that this tendency of its nature, was impressed upon it at its primary creation ;—that it invariably accompanies the soul in all its progresses through existence ; and that its final annihilation is nothing but the necessary result of things." This, however, leaves the question in much the same state that it was before—clogged with absurdities, and embarrassed with contradictions.

If the Almighty God, in the primary formation of things, have created a simple, uncompounded substance, it can have but *one* simple tendency. The moment we admit a Being tending to its own annihilation, that very moment we admit the *diversity* of its component *parts*. If we admit the unity of any Being, it is a contradiction to suppose it to have a tendency in opposition to itself. That the soul has a tendency to life, is evident from its own existence. And if it have a tendency to its own annihilation, it must tend to life, and not tend to life, at the same instant ; or, it must have a tendency to annihilation, and yet have no such tendency, in the same moment. In either case, the contradiction is equal, and therefore no such tendency can possibly exist in the soul.*

* All our experience shews us no one instance of annihilation. Matter is perpetually changing—never destroyed ; the form and manner of its existence is endlessly and ceaselessly varying—its existence never terminates. The body decays, and is said to perish ; that is, it is resolved into its elements, and becomes the material of new combinations, animate and inanimate, but not a single particle

If a principle of life, have a tendency to its own extinction, it must, in the instant of its annihilation, exist, and yet not exist, in the same moment. That which is annihilated,

of it is annihilated; nothing of us or around us ever ceases to exist. If the mind perishes, or ceases to exist at death, it is the only example of annihilation which we know.

But, it may be said, why should it not, like the body, be changed, or dissipated, or resolved into its elements? The answer is plain: it differs from the body in this, that it has no parts; is absolutely one and simple; therefore it is incapable of resolution or dissolution. These words, and the operations or events they refer to, have no application to a simple and immaterial existence.

Indeed, our idea of annihilation is wholly derived from matter, and what we are wont to call destruction means only change of form and resolution into parts, or combination into new forms. But for the example of the changes undergone by matter, we should not even have any notion of destruction or annihilation. When we come to consider the thing itself, we cannot conceive it to be possible; we can well imagine a parcel of gunpowder or any other combustible substance ceasing to exist as such by burning or exploding; but that its whole elements should not continue to exist in a different state, and in new combinations, appears inconceivable. We cannot follow the process so far; we can form no conception of any one particle that once is, ceasing wholly to be. How then can we form any conception of the mind which we now know to exist ceasing to be? It is an idea altogether above our comprehension. True, we no longer, after the body is dissolved, perceive the mind, because we never knew it by the senses; we only were aware of its existence in others by its effects upon matter, and had no experience of it unconnected with the body. But it by no means follows that it should not exist, merely because we have ceased to perceive its effects upon any portion of matter. It had connexion with the matter which it used to act upon, and by which it used to be acted on; when its entire severance took place that matter underwent a great change, but a change arising from its being of a composite nature. The same separation cannot have affected the mind in the like manner, because its nature is simple and not composite. Our ceasing to perceive any effects produced by it on any portion of matter, the only means we can have of ascertaining its existence, is therefore no proof that it does not still exist; and even if we do admit that it no longer does produce any effect upon any portion of matter, still this will offer no proof that it has ceased to exist. Indeed, when we speak of its being annihilated we may be said to use a word to which no precise meaning can be attached by our imaginations. At any rate, it is much more difficult to suppose that this annihilation has taken place, and to conceive in what way it is effected, than to suppose that the mind continues in

cannot be in existence ; and that which is in existence, cannot be annihilated. Either the soul must exist in the moment of its annihilation, or it must not. If it exist, it cannot be annihilated while that existence continues ; if it do not exist, it can never perish through the tendency of its own nature. And if the substance on which this tendency depends, be not in existence at the time of its annihilation instead of annihilation being produced through the natural tendency of the soul, we are obliged to suppose the soul to be annihilated previous to its annihilation. Thus either case includes a naked contradiction, and the undeniable result is,—that an immaterial, uncompounded substance, cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature.

As the soul cannot perish through the tendency of its own nature, the next consideration is—Whether it can perish or not, from *the application of external force* ? All external force must be either natural, or supernatural ; and the means through which this external force must be applied, must be either *material*, or *immaterial*.

It has been already proved, that material bodies can never act but when they bring their surfaces into contact with one another. As an immaterial substance has no surface, it is a contradiction to suppose, that matter can ever be

some state of separate existence, disencumbered of the body, and to conceive in what manner this separate existence is maintained.

It may be further observed that the material world affords no example of creation, any more than of annihilation. Such as it was in point of quantity since its existence began, such it still is, not a single particle of matter having been either added to it or taken from it. Change—unnecessary change—in all its parts, at every instant of time, it is for ever undergoing ; but though the combinations or relations of these parts are unremittingly varying, there has not been a single one of them created, or a single one destroyed. Of mind, this cannot be said ; it is called into existence perpetually, before our eyes. In one respect this may weaken the argument for the continued existence of the soul, because it may lead to the conclusion, that as we see mind created, so may it be destroyed ; while matter, which suffers no addition, is liable to no loss. Yet the argument seems to gain in another direction more force than it loses in this ; for nothing can more strongly illustrate the diversity between mind and matter, or more strikingly shew that the one is independent of the other.

LORD BROUGHAM.

brought into contact with it: to suppose such a contact possible, is to suppose a surface in an immaterial Being, which, at the same time, is supposed to exist without it.

Whatever has an exterior, must have an interior; and what has both, must necessarily be extended; and what is extended, cannot be immaterial. An immaterial substance therefore, can have no surface; and what has no surface, can never be brought into contact with that which has. The very supposition includes this contradiction—that there is a contact, and no contact, at the same time. It therefore follows, that the soul must be inaccessible to all violence from matter, and that it can never perish through its instrumentality.

If matter can only act through the medium of matter, and an immaterial substance can be supposed to perish by it; matter must either act where it is not, or extend itself beyond its own being; but in admitting either, the mind is conducted to a contradiction. For when any portion of matter extends itself to an immaterial nature, it can no longer be removed from it; and that which is not removed from an immaterial nature, cannot be material.* And to suppose matter to be thus extended, is to suppose it to be matter, and not matter, at the same time. Nor can any accession of power overcome the contradiction. No acquisition of power can alter the identity of its nature, without destroying its identity; or communicate to it a force, of which its nature is incapable; the supposition includes not only a *moral*, but an *absolute* impossibility.

To make a *river fly*, to make a *rock walk*, or to make a *tree to speak*, are all impossibilities to us; but they are but *moral*. It is not impossible to conceive, that Omnipotence can add *wings* to the former, *motion* to the next, and *speech* to the latter; but to conceive, that Omnipotence itself, can

* That which possesses magnitude, figure, impenetrability, &c., cannot come in contact with, or impinge on, that which possesses no similar qualities: and as matter cannot act without being in contact with the object acted on, it necessarily follows, that unless it is put in possession of properties which, we know, it does not possess, it cannot destroy the soul. Besides, whatever is purely physical, as to its necessary identity, cannot be the subject of change.

make a river *fly*, and *not fly*, at the same time; that a rock should *move*, and *not move*; or that a tree should *speak*, and yet *not speak*, in the same instant, is utterly impossible.

In like manner we can conceive, that an accession of power, can make matter accomplish every thing which is placed within the reach of its nature; but to suppose matter to extend its influence beyond the limits of its own existence, or to act where it is not, is to suppose its presence and absence at the same time. And to suppose it to annihilate a nature with which it has no physical connexion, is to suppose it to act where it can have no influence; or that it can act, and not act, at the same time; which every one must see, is not only a moral, but an absolute impossibility. It therefore follows, that the soul cannot perish by the instrumentality of matter, whatever influence be attributed to the propelling power.

SECT III.

*We can have no simple Idea of what has no Existence—
We have an Idea of the Existence of God, and of his
Immortality—The Immortality of the Soul is inferred
from its Desire of Happiness.*

IF all our ideas arise from sensation and reflection, which is now no longer controverted;* it is certain, that the *materi-*

* If it be demanded, "when a man begins to have any ideas?" I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation.... I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation; which is such an impression or notion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call Perception, Remembering, Consideration, Reasoning, &c.

In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, and about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call "ideas of reflection." These impressions that are made on our senses by objects extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself (which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation,) are, as I have said, "the original of all knowledge."

LOCKE.

als upon which these ideas are founded, must have existed antecedent to the ideas themselves, which are evidently founded upon those materials. It therefore follows, that we can have no simple idea of what has no existence; because he that has an idea of that which has no existence, must have an idea of *nothing*, which is a contradiction. If, therefore, we have an idea of God, it plainly follows, that a God must be in existence. Nor can the imperfection of our simple idea of God, be admitted as an objection against the truth of the proposition. For the imperfection of our idea of God, does not arise from the *uncertainty* or *nonentity* of his Being; but from the inadequacy of our faculties to comprehend, what, from its own nature, must necessarily be incomprehensible.—And whatever notions we have of any thing which includes infinity, they must thus be necessarily imperfect, in an exact proportion to the relation which *finite* bears to *infinite*.

That our notion of God, and all his attributes, are but simple perceptions of the mind,* may thus be certified with

*This is a very unphilosophical mode of expression: no idea which we have of God can be termed simple, whether the demonstration of the being of a God is proceeded with a "priori," or a "posteriori." Of course we do not for one moment assume that Mr. Drew is an advocate for the doctrine of innate ideas, even upon this most awful and interesting subject. The mode in which the idea of the being of a God is derivable is nearly thus:—Every man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows that he exists, and that he is something. Every man knows by intuition, that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it follows as a consequence, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and whatever had a beginning must be the product of something which had a previous existence. The eternal source and origin of all being, must also be the source and origin of all power, as it is evident, that what had its beginning from another, must have derived all its powers from the same source, which leads to the conclusion, that that which conferred those powers on another must have all powers within itself. Every man finding in himself perception and knowledge infers that there has been also a knowing being from all eternity. It being, in the language of Locke, as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being: as it is impossible, that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it

precision. Whatever is but a simple perception of the mind, we can subtract nothing from, without annihilating the idea from whence we thus subtract. Such is the case with respect to God, and all his attributes. Whereas, in compounded bodies, by subtracting certain portions, we only alter their numerical parts, and change their specific quantity, while the identity of their *Being* remains entire.

Among the essential attributes of God, we must include his *immortality*; it being as impossible to conceive God to exist, abstracted from immortality, as it is to conceive him to exist, abstracted from *Omnipotency*, or *Holiness*. For that which is not *necessarily* immortal, cannot be God. Here, then, we have a clear and distinct idea of immortality, although we are totally unable to comprehend, or grasp it in its fullest extent.

Having thus, distinct notions of the certainty of immortality, and of the existence of the human soul; the next stage in the present argument, is, to trace out those intermediate ideas, which are necessary to connect these two simple conceptions together;—*the unquenchable desire which every man feels after happiness*, appears to me most likely to form this connexion.

Wherever moral evil has not transmuted *hope* into *despair*,* from a consciousness of future punishment, there is in every human mind, an insatiable desire after the greatest degree of *possible happiness*, which certainly includes the idea of immortality. And it may justify our inquiries, on principles superior to those of curiosity and idle speculation, to

should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge; as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones. Hence it follows, that from the consideration of ourselves, and the nature of our constitutions we are led to this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being, who is God.

* The same modes of reasoning which can deduce immortality from hope, can gather it from despair. The same physical principle is alike active at the bottom; and it is moral evil, by annihilating hope, that unlocks the avenues of despair.

know on what this desire is founded? And whether it be *natural*, or *unnatural*, to the mind of man?

It is very certain, that no man can desire any thing which he is conscious will produce him no felicity,—the supposition is refuted by the very term itself.* And therefore, as our desire of immortality, arises in proportion to the expansion of our faculties, and our love of *holiness* and *virtue*; it is certain, that these desires must be founded upon a conception of some real or fancied excellency, which we conceive to be included in the idea of immortality; and that if it were added to our natures, our felicity would be increased by the acquisition. This desire, therefore, must either be *rational*, or *irrational*,—must be *natural*, or *unnatural*, to the human mind.

A desire, which is unnatural, is a monster, and cannot uniformly conceal its deformity; and never can be consistent with holiness and virtue. But a desire of immortality, instead of being inconsistent with holiness and virtue, derives its chief energy from the influence which these principles have upon the mind which they inhabit. It therefore follows, that this desire cannot be unnatural to the human mind. A desire which is unnatural, must be irrational; and that desire which is at once unnatural and irrational, can never associate with holiness and virtue. For if we can suppose, that a desire, which is unnatural and irrational, can associate with holiness and virtue; holiness and virtue must be unnatural and irrational; or all distinctions between vice and virtue are at once done away. But as a distinction between vice and virtue must eternally exist;—as holiness and virtue can neither be unnatural nor irrational; and as the desire of immortality, derives its chief energy from the influence which holiness and virtue have upon us; it follows, that the desire of immortality can neither be irrational nor unnatural to the mind of man.

Have both reason and nature, then, conspired to cheat us

* Desire arises equally from the prospect of what is agreeable in itself—from the prospect of relief of what is disagreeable in itself—from the prospect of what is disagreeable in itself, and from the prospect of the loss of what is in itself agreeable. These constitute the foundation of all action, on the part of man.

with a lie? Is it possible that nature can suggest a desire which is unnatural? Or is it possible, that reason can beget within us, a desire, which she declares to be irrational! To suppose either, is to admit a palpable contradiction. If nature suggest to us the idea of our own immortality; if man be not immortal, she must suggest what is unnatural, and thus act in contradiction to herself; for we are reduced to this conclusion, to admit the desire of immortality to be *natural*, and *unnatural*, at the same time; the impossibility of which, requires no argument to disprove, and but little philosophy to discover. And if reason beget within us, a desire which is unreasonable, we must derive from reason, what from its own nature it is incapable of producing.—An unreasonable desire, resulting from reason, is a contradiction in terms; and therefore I conclude, that the certainty of immortality, arises from those desires which we feel for its possession.

SECT. IV.

The Annihilation of the Soul cannot be occasioned by a finite Being—The Possibility of Annihilation is doubtful—This may be illustrated by reflecting on the Creation.

IT is certain, that no created Being can be infinite; the supposition refutes itself. And if no created Being can be infinite, no created Being can perform an action, which nothing less than an infinite power can accomplish. The distance between *Being*, and *not Being*, is, and must be, infinite; and that distance which is infinite, no finite power can possibly grasp; and what no finite power can grasp, must (if it be grasped) be grasped by that which is infinite, for nothing less than an infinite power, can make an infinite exertion. And as nothing but an infinite exertion can change that which *is*, to that which *is not*; so that which cannot be changed from something to nothing, cannot be annihilated by any created Being; and that which cannot be annihilated, must thus far be immortal.

Nor can we conceive, that an infinite power can be communicated to any finite Being; for a finite Being who can

perform an infinite action, must be finite, and infinite, at the same time. And even to suppose a finite Being, to be delegated with power to perform an action, which no finite Being can accomplish; is to suppose it to be empowered to do what it cannot do—it is to raise a finite Being into infinity, and yet to suppose it to be but finite still.

A being thus empowered, must be either *finite* or *infinite*. If finite, it can do nothing beyond a finite nature; if infinite, it is no longer a finite Being; and from either case it follows, that the soul cannot be annihilated by any created Being, whether it be possessed of an intelligent, or an unintelligent nature.

Whether annihilation be *possible in the nature of things*, is with me a matter of considerable doubt. That is to me utterly inconceivable, I feel no hesitation in asserting; and while I can have no *conception* of the *possibility* of annihilation, I can have no *reason* to suppose it possible.*

* I think it not necessary in this place, to inform the reader, that while I assert annihilation to be impossible, I would by no means insinuate, that annihilation is not within the reach of Omnipotent power. The infinitely powerful and ever blessed God, must have an infinite variety of ways in which he can exert his power, that are to us totally unknown, and will probably remain so through all eternity. It is true, we cannot conceive how annihilation can be accomplished; but this is no argument against fact.

The same power which created the laws of nature, can undoubtedly destroy them; but when we admit the destruction of those laws, a scene presents itself to our astonished views, which human penetration cannot enter;—a scene in which we discover but little more, than “the war of elements, the wreck of matter, and the crash of worlds.”

By what antecedent laws, the laws of nature were created, we may venture to conjecture; but, with certainty, we, perhaps, shall never know. It appears probable, that the laws of nature arose from the unchangeable perfections of the Divine mind, and are but a transcript of the essential perfections of the nature of God. If this conjecture be right, the final destruction of things, as it cannot affect the immutability of God, cannot bring the soul nearer to annihilation, than if we suppose the laws of nature to continue for ever. But as this is only conjecture, it would be imprudent to pursue it within the limits of a solitary note.

All that I contend for, is---that according to the present laws of nature, and our means of knowing them, annihilation must be impossible. But when these laws are done away, an impenetrable cloud extends its shadow over us, and all beyond is partially unknown. DREW.

If annihilation be a total extinction of all Being, something must be reduced to *nothing*. But if the reduction of something to nothing, be necessary to the very admission of annihilation; (which must be admitted) we ascertain the existence of a point that denominates a *nonentity*. And to ascertain the certainty of what is admitted to have no kind of existence, supposes *nothing* itself to be *identified*, which is a contradiction.

If, on the other side, we suppose, that the certainty of annihilation cannot be ascertained, it is impossible to say whether the soul can ever be reduced to it or not; and if the soul be not thus reduced, it cannot be in a state of annihilation. Annihilation, is therefore, inconceivable.

If the soul cannot be reduced or resolved into *perfect nothing*, annihilation is not only inconceivable, but *utterly impossible*; because annihilation is an exchange of *entity* for *nonentity*. And if this point of *nonentity*, cannot be ascertained with as much precision as *entity* itself, it is impossible to say where the former begins, or where the latter ends. But in supposing this strange point to be ascertained, where *entity* ends, and where *nonentity* begins; (which must be admitted, if annihilation be supposed possible) we give a beginning to what we admit to have no kind of possible existence, which is a flat contradiction in terms.

To suppose a *nonentity* to have *no* beginning, is to suppose an *entity* to have no end; and what has no end, instead of being annihilated, must be immortal.

To give, therefore, a beginning to *nonentity*, is a contradiction in terms; and to deprive it of it, is to make the soul immortal. Annihilation is, therefore, impossible in the nature of things.

To reduce entity to nonentity, is to reduce that which *is*, to that which is *not*; it is to make *entity* and *nonentity* meet together, and entity and nonentity can then be extremes no longer. But if the physical distance which is between all natural extremes, be done away, entity and nonentity must be the same thing; for that which is separated by nothing, must necessarily be the same. And if that which *is*, can be the same with that which is *not*, we are brought to this naked contradiction—that the soul may be annihilated, and not annihilated at the same time.

Whatever is perfectly annihilated, can have no kind of existence; and what has no kind of existence, we can form no kind of conception of; and what we can form no kind of conception of, cannot possibly be known. To ascertain the soul's annihilation, is therefore utterly impossible.

To this it may, perhaps, be objected, "that although the soul's annihilation cannot be ascertained, it may, nevertheless, be possible, as the possibility of a fact by no means depends on our knowledge of that fact for its existence." To admit any supposed fact to be possible, while we can form no *possible* conception of such a *possibility*, is to lay the foundation of our reasoning in the sand; and to build on such a foundation, is to raise a fabric on what has no existence.

In every mental exertion, the mind must take its flight from some admitted point—there must be some *data* from whence we start. And if the mind can trace an association of ideas, between this given point, and the object it designs to compass, the demonstration will be complete. But if we have no *data*, from whence we commence our mental operations, it is impossible that ever the perception of the soul can arrive at its fancied object;—we can have no foundation on which to build in order to approach it. Such is the case before us. The annihilation of the soul is to be made out; to do this, proof must be adduced; this proof cannot be obtained. The objection, then, has recourse to probability; probability deserts it also:—The last refuge, then, is, "that the case is possible." And on this I presume to say, that if the annihilation of the soul be supposed to be possible, either this possibility must be self-evident, or supported by unquestionable authority; without this, we can have no *data* from whence we may presume.

As to authority, it cannot furnish the least pretence. And to admit the possibility of what we cannot conceive to be possible, is a contradiction in terms;—it is supposing a thing to be possible, and yet not supposing it possible, at the same time: it is taking for granted, the very point which remains to be proved;—and the mind, being thus deprived of its resting place, can never move onward in progressive reasonings, to identify that possibility which the objection

assumes as an admitted point. And to urge as a possibility what we can have no conception of the existence of; is to admit that as a possibility, which we cannot even conceive to be possible.

An idea of the possibility of annihilation, supposes that *possibility* conceivable: but to suppose it possible that the soul can be annihilated, while we can have no *possible* conception of such a *possibility*, is to admit, and yet to deny the existence of such a *possibility*, at the same instant.*

In admitting any fact to be possible, there must be some evidence to support the mind in that belief. But to admit a fact to be possible, while we have no kind of evidence to sustain our minds in what we admit; is not only to give ourselves up to the caprice of blind credulity, but to argue from no evidence, and to decide without any proof. And to found the soul's annihilation, on a mere abstract possibility, of which the mind can avowedly form no conception; is to admit as fact, what we do not know to be so; and to avow that we *know* annihilation to be possible, while we disclaim all *knowledge* of it at the same time.

But even admitting the *naked, abstract, possibility* of the fact, that the soul can be annihilated, yet the abstract possibility of what *may be*, must necessarily be to us inconceivable; for the instant we can have a conception of any *possibility*, it is a possibility in the *abstract* no longer. A possibility must be conceivable to us, or it must not. If it be conceivable, we must trace it by some relation, and then it cannot be in the abstract; but if it be not conceivable, the mere abstract possibility, is a possibility to us no more. For to conceive the existence of a possibility, which to us is inconceivable, is to conceive a possibility which we cannot conceive; and is a contradiction in terms.

To admit the future existence of what may be, is to admit the *present* existence of its *possibility*; and if the existence of this possibility be in the *abstract*, it must be detached from all evidence of its existence; without this, it cannot be in the *abstract*. But to admit the present existence of a

This paragraph is quite superfluous, adding nothing to the chain of reasoning and only exhibiting a play of words.

possibility, which has no evidence to support the mind in the perception of that *possible* existence; is to reason without all reason, which is an absurdity too gross either to be adopted or refuted.

Of that which we have no knowledge, we can have no idea; and what we have no idea of, we have no reason to believe; and, therefore, to admit that we have an idea of the existence of an *abstract possibility*, while we have neither knowledge nor idea of its existence, is to admit that we have an idea of a possibility, of which we have no idea. And if so, there can be *to us* no such thing in existence as the *abstract possibility of what may be*. All abstract possibilities must necessarily be to us unknown; and what is to us totally unknown, can neither be an object of our knowledge, reason, or belief.

That the abstract possibility of the Being of all created substances, both material and immaterial, must have existed previous to their actual existence; is a truth, which, I believe, no one will attempt to controvert or deny. Yet of this abstract possibility of things, no conception could possibly have been formed, prior to the actual existence of them. It is not my design to sound the force of this argument, upon the absurdity of supposing a created Being forming a conception previous to its own existence, though this assuredly must have been the case; but what I intend, is—that even admitting our own existence, no reasoning could ever have led us to form any conception of the abstract possibility of creation. It is from the actual existence of creation, that we know it must have been possible prior to its actual existence; but if no such creation had ever actually existed, the abstract possibility of it would have been totally unknown.

Supposing God had permitted such a Being as man to have existed previous to the actual creation of things, I would ask—Could man, in this state, have had any notion of the possibility of creation? * If not, the abstract possibility

* If the man possessed no knowledge of the power to which he owed his own origin, he could have formed no conception of the possibility of any mode by which other objects might be called into a state of active and sentient existence

is at once rendered totally inconceivable; but if he could, it must be either by *reason* or *intuition*. It could not have been by reason, because reason would have led to an opposite conclusion. Creation is the calling something into existence, which was not before. But how the Divine efficiency could be so acted upon by itself, as to produce something material, is what no human capacity can comprehend. To modify and combine certain properties which previously exist, may be conceived possible, from the previous existence of what is to be modified and combined; but to conceive that the Divine efficiency can be acted upon by itself, and *something* produced by that action;—that material substances can be produced without any materials; or that real Being can be made to arise out of what has no Being; instead of being a dictate of reason, is utterly incomprehensible and inconceivable.*

To suppose an intuitive knowledge of its possibility to have been communicated to man, is to call in the assistance of supernatural power; it is then no longer a conception,

* Our author appears in the preceding passage to exhibit a leaning towards the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing nothing can be produced, evidently giving countenance to the principle taught by some of the ancient philosophers, namely, that matter is the first principle of all things; shewing that on this important point of Natural Theology, he had not advanced as far as Thales is stated by Laertius to have done in one of his aphorisms, where he asserts, that God is the most ancient being, who has neither beginning nor end; that all things are full of God; and that the world is the beautiful work of God.

Although Mr. Drew has left no statement of his opinions on some of the leading principles of Natural Theology, it is obvious from the passage now under consideration that he has drawn his ideas of the existence of matter from the language of Plato as unfolded by Cicero: "Matter, from which all things are produced and formed, is a substance without form or quality, but capable of receiving all forms and undergoing every kind of change; in which, however, it never suffers annihilation, but merely a solution of its parts, which are in their nature infinitely divisible, and move in portions of space which are also infinitely divisible. When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and those forms are produced from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe."

arising from our natural faculties, but is rather a conviction produced by power, than the result of discernment. And, therefore, the abstract possibility of creation, must, in the case given, have been totally inconceivable to man.

When we lift our thoughts to God's *creative power*, we feel it difficult to exclude from its genuine nature, those local ideas of *generation* and *corruption*, with which, on all occasions, we are enveloped; but which must be equally injudicious and absurd. From the influence of these local prejudices, and this erroneous association of ideas, we feel it difficult to disentangle ourselves, to form any distinct conceptions of *formation* and *creation*; though, in themselves, the two ideas are quite distinct, and have but little or no relation to one another. The former undoubtedly implies, the previous existence of those materials, which are modified by formation; and it undeniably includes a contradiction, to suppose—that formation could ever take place, out of *pure and absolute nothing*. In this case, we must suppose *pure nothing* to be acted upon, as a pre-existent and material cause; and which must equally include a contradiction, whether the efficient power be supposed to reside in a finite, or an infinite Being. *Formation*, therefore, is not *creation*. For while *formation* presents us with an idea, which includes the pre-existence of these materials, out of which any Being or thing is formed; *creation* presents us with an exertion of infinite power, calling into existence, what, from the term itself, could not have existed before. And the supporters of that theory, (which makes formation and creation to be terms synonymous with one another,) would do well to consider, whether it do not include a denial of a creative power in God.

When we attribute to the Great God, a creative power, it is absurd in the highest degree, to admit the pre-existence of those materials, out of which matter itself was created;—it is admitting the existence of matter, prior to the existence of matter, which is a contradiction in terms. If the materials, out of which matter itself was created, existed previously to the existence of matter, the term creation must be totally inapplicable. In this case, it is rather re-production than creation; and to find a case, to which the term creation can

be applied, we must look deeper into the recesses of nature, than either of the cases under consideration can afford.

If, under these circumstances, we admit the pre-existence of those materials, out of which matter itself was created, and ask—of what peculiar nature were those materials? we shall feel ourselves rather at a loss to find an answer. To suppose them to be *material*, includes the contradiction stated above; and to suppose them to be *spiritual*, will lead us exactly to the same conclusion; we are, therefore, under the necessity of resolving all into the *efficiency* of the Divine power.

As the term *creation*, includes within it nothing more—than the causing that to be, which was not before, the action through which it is accomplished, can involve neither an absolute impossibility nor contradiction.

That the manner how this could be accomplished, surpasses all human comprehension, (if not the comprehension of all finite intelligence) is too evident to admit a moment's doubt; but this can never be admitted as an argument against infinite power.

On the contrary, the supposition which makes matter to originate in *absolute nothing*, not only supposes the non-existence of all materials, but it annihilates also the idea of an efficient power; for where an efficient power is admitted to exist, there it is certain, that absolute nothing cannot be. If, then, we admit that God created matter, both *from* and *by* his own efficiency, though it presents us with an idea which must necessarily be inexplicable, yet it involves neither contradiction nor absurdity. And for aught we know, the Divine *efficiency* may afford the only source, out of which both *matter* and *spirit* could possibly be created.*

* It is certain, that something must have existed from eternity, this is self-evident; that this something, which has existed from all eternity must be an Intelligent Being, no one will venture to deny. Whatever attribute belongs to his nature, it must be regarded as an essential perfection, and inseparable from his existence. Now, if it be conceded to the materialist, that matter by organization becomes capable of thought, it will not be affirmed, that it is necessarily intelligent. An infinitesimally small portion of that mass, with which we are acquainted, possesses organization; and a still smaller portion

Certain it is, that we can have no conception how any thing could be performed, unless it be by the laws of nature ; and it is equally certain, that by those laws, creation could not have taken place. For if we admit, that creation was accomplished by the laws of nature, we must, in order to avoid an opposite contradiction, admit the existence of those laws antecedent to all creation ; and in this case, those laws must be *uncreated, independent, and eternal* ; and therefore must be God. But as all laws suppose the previous existence of a lawgiver, antecedent to their own existence, it plainly follows, that those laws can be neither uncreated, independent, nor eternal.

I therefore conclude—that as the creation of nature, could not have been accomplished by the laws of nature ; and that as all human conceptions must be circumscribed by the boundaries which these laws prescribe,—the manner how creation was accomplished, must be to us necessarily incomprehensible ; and will, without involving any contradiction, in all probability, remain so through eternity.

is capable of thought. If intelligence is the result of mere organization, and if there is no immaterial principle of thinking, still it must be allowed, that as the organization is a property not inseparable from, or not inherent in, matter ; thought, the effect, must belong to it, not as an essential, but as a contingent property. If organized matter can think, by virtue of mere organization, its power of thinking must be derived from Deity, being itself essentially devoid of intelligence. Its organization is to be attributed to a Designing cause ; the effect, therefore, of that organization must be ascribed to the same cause. Now, the hypothesis of two eternal and self-evident beings, one essentially intelligent, the other senseless and impercipient, the one the sovereign agent, the other a passive instrument, is a supposition obviously irreconcilable with the notion of independence. If matter is indebted to Deity for its forms, its motions, and various modifications, we have reason to presume, that it depends on Him for its existence also. It amounts, we apprehend, to a contradiction to suppose a self-existent being to be in any respect dependent on another, or under his control. This argument alone is conclusive against the eternity of matter, and suffices to shew that there is no other self-existent Being, than the Eternal and Intelligent Architect of the universe.

SECT. V.

*Can the Soul be absorbed into the Divine Efficiency? Non-
entity, and Noncreation, are not the same—An abstract
Possibility is to us unknown—The Laws of Nature can-
not destroy the Soul—It has no tendency to Death, which
is the opposite of its positive Existence—Nor can the
Soul approach to the Absence of itself.*

WHEN from a contemplation of what is possible by the laws of nature, we turn our thoughts from the origin of things, and inquire, whether the same Almighty power, which produced us from the fecundity of his nature, cannot retrace his own actions, and absorb all finite intelligences again into his own efficiency; the question assumes a new and totally different aspect. It is no longer, in this case, a question about the entity or nonentity of Being, but about the modification of future existence.

To unhinge creation, and resolve every thing into its pristine state, is most undoubtedly within the reach of infinite power. This, no doubt, would destroy the individuality of man; but the absorption of individuality does not imply the annihilation of Being. What the modification of future Being may be, forms but little or no part of this essay. There is, with me, no doubt that the individuality of man, will be preserved through all eternity; but whether the individuality of man be continued or lost, is a question which belongs to another subject.

As absolute nonentity, was not that out of which God called forth creation, so neither will absolute nonentity take place, although God were to retrace all his actions, and reduce every thing to that state of *noncreation* in which things were, antecedent to their actual Being.* Those, therefore,

* We beg to refer the reader to the note relative to the Platonic theory. The passage before us places the opinion there expressed in a more forcible light. Mr. Drew, here, evidently draws a conclusion fixing a limitation to God's power, wholly inconsistent with the principles which ought to characterise a christian philosopher. He has not shown, nor can any man show, that it follows as a necessary consequence, that what has been once called into existence from nothing must be again reduced to the same state.

who out of veneration to the Divine Being, ascribe to him the power of producing annihilation, do in reality ascribe to him, an effect which seems contrary to his nature; and which, therefore, his nature seems incapable of producing.* That power which produces *annihilation*, must produce a *nonentity*; and that power which produces a nonentity, produces *nothing*.† I therefore conclude, that annihilation must be impossible, according to every mode of reasoning of which we are capable, and according to every view which we have of the nature of things.

If I were to be asked, whether it be possible for a *Zamiff* to exist or not? I should naturally reply, that I know not what a *Zamiff* is; and, therefore, can annex no idea to the expression; and having no conception of the thing, I cannot be guided in my decision, whether it be within the limits of possible existence or not. To decide whether a *Zamiff* be within the reach of possible existence, it is necessary to have some knowledge of its nature; but a knowledge of its nature, supposes the existence of that nature, (for to know what is *not*, is a contradiction) but if that nature be in existence, though but in idea, it is no longer a question of *abstract possibility*, but of choice in the Deity; and unless its nature be ascertained, it is impossible to say, whether a *Zamiff* be within the reach of *possible* existence or not,

* It would have been better, if Mr. Drew had pointed out the difference which has been expressed by the advocates of annihilation between matter as the subject of an animating principle, and that which is the cause of vitality in the same matter—the distinction between that which is the effect of the efficiency of God's power and that which is held to be an emanation from his own Divine Nature.

† This is a specimen of sophism, many of which are interspersed throughout the body of the work. The conclusion here drawn gives no determination to the enquiry, and does not strengthen the demonstration: and for this reason, that a power is assumed competent to the production of annihilation while it is predicated of the same power that it produces nothing. It must be obvious that that which has the power of producing annihilation has the power of calling into being whatever it might will. And the conclusion that is subsequently drawn is not warranted, namely, the impossibility of annihilation.

either of corporeal or incorporeal nature * In like manner, perfect annihilation is the total negation of all Being ; and to form any conception of what a total negation is, is utterly inconceivable, if not totally impossible.

If ever annihilation take place, annihilation must be *now* possible, or it must not. If not, that which is impossible now, must remain impossible for ever ; for no power can make that, which is an impossibility now, to be a possibility hereafter : but if we now *admit* annihilation to be possible, this very *admission* of the *possibility* of annihilation, supposes that *possibility* to be now *known* ; and this *knowledge* will then identify the *certainty* of that, which, when identified must be a *nonentity* ; and which, from that very circumstance, can have no kind of existence. Whatever can be identified, cannot be a *nonentity* ; and that which cannot be identified, cannot be known to be possible. The admission, therefore, of the *certainty* of the *mere possibility* of annihilation, must inevitably destroy the fact itself ; because the fact itself is a *nonentity*, and, therefore, can never be identified ; and what cannot be identified, as it can afford no kind of evidence of its certainty, can never be known to be possible. And, therefore, whichever side of the alternative be admitted, the human soul, in either case, from all our modes of reasoning, must necessarily be immortal.

To suppose that any created Being could be a creator, is a contradiction ; and therefore, from the nature of things, creation must have been the work of an uncreated power. And to conceive that any finite intelligence can be able to form, without any evidence, an idea of the *abstract possibility* of what infinite power alone is able to effect ; is to make a part to comprehend the whole, and to exist before it had a Being.

* To the term *Zamiff*, I annex no kind of idea. It is presumed to be a something which is totally distinct in nature, both from created and uncreated existence.

A term to which no idea can be annexed, and which expresses nothing, either of corporeal or incorporeal Being, can never be determined by any one to be within the reach of possible existence. And yet it must be in such a state, that all things are supposed, when we conceiv

As nothing but infinite power could create matter and spirit out of no materials, so nothing but infinite power can retrace its own exertions; and to suppose that either could be effected by the laws of nature, is a plain contradiction. If creation took place by the laws of nature, the laws of nature must have existed prior to their own existence: and if annihilation take place by those laws, the laws of nature must survive their own destruction, and exist after they are destroyed.* For if an immaterial substance can be de-

* Here we have strong traces of Mr. Drew having a knowledge of the work known by the title of the "*Systeme de la Nature*" by Baron d' Holbach. The language used in this part of our author's work is identical with that applied by the Baron.

If we assume for a moment that creation did take place by the laws of nature, Mr. Drew's conclusion does not necessarily follow. In such a case we can only reason by analogy: and if we take the case of a law framed and promulgated by a governor for the producing order and harmony in society, the application and operation of which produces the desired effect; and some time after the same law is suspended by the authority promulgating it, it is evident that, from the same elements possessing their original qualities, effects would ensue similar to those which had obtained, previous to the first application of the law. Further, it must be obvious that it was in the power of Deity to put forth such laws or principles, as to the Divine wisdom would seem fit, to call into existence millions of worlds; and that it was also in the power of the same all-wise Being to suspend the creating and directing influence of the same laws, when annihilation might follow, as a necessary and inevitable consequence of all that which had been at first called into being, without in the slightest degree affecting the existence of the laws. To pursue the analogy, the law in the first case although suspended would still exist, in the latter the laws would also exist; and thus possess both a priority to that which they had been instrumental in bringing into being as the Fiat of Almighty power and goodness, and also a subsequencey to that from which they were now withdrawn.

Besides, Mr. Drew's reasoning is here illogical: the application is made to both matter and spirit, while the deduction is drawn to effect an immaterial principle alone. It will not be denied that no laws are applicable to that which the syllogism is held as applicable—the immaterial principle being admitted by all christian philosophers as an emanation from the Divine Being himself.

The sophistical nature of the reasoning becomes more obvious from what immediately follows; as there must necessarily be a marked distinction between that which constitutes a law, and that which is the subject of the law. Further, Mr. Drew involves in the conclusion that which the premises did not assume, when he uses the expression in the close of the paragraph.

stroyed by the laws of nature, every thing in nature (including the laws of nature, which form a part) can be destroyed by the same laws. But if every thing in nature can be extinguished by the laws of nature, the laws of nature must survive their own annihilation, in order to their own destruction, which is a contradiction. And if we suppose the laws of nature to perish with the annihilation of any natural substance, then this substance must be annihilated by those laws, that, at the instant of its annihilation, can have no existence; which is also a contradiction.

There is, therefore, nothing to found the possibility of the soul's annihilation upon, but Omnipotent power, and this exerted in opposition to the laws of nature. And what can be accomplished only in opposition to the laws of nature, can never be conceived by any Being, which is only subject to its laws. Therefore, to suppose the annihilation of the soul possible, is to *suppose* without reason or evidence; it is to pretend to comprehend by the laws of nature, what to the laws of nature is, and must be, incomprehensible.

That life and death cannot both have a positive existence, is a self-evident proposition; the one being the pure negation of the other. Thus, if we suppose death to have any certain existence, life, which is its reverse, can be no more than the pure negation of its Being; or if life have a positive existence, then death, which is its reverse, can be no more than its mere absence. To suppose both life and death to have a positive existence, is to suppose that they may both exist at once; and if both may exist at once, both may meet in the same subject. But to suppose both *life* and *death* to meet in the same subject, involves it in this contradiction,—that a subject capable both of life and death, may *live*, and *not live* at the same time;—both, therefore, cannot positively exist. Nor is it possible that life and death can ever meet together in the same subject:—The supposition includes in it this contradiction—that life may *be*, and *not be*, in the same instant.

But while it is impossible that life and death can ever meet together, and unite in the same subject, it follows, with all the evidence of demonstration, that either life or death must positively exist. To suppose neither to exist posi-

tively, is to suppose both to be pure negations. But to suppose two negations to be the reverse of one another, is the grossest of contradictions. Whatever is a negation, must be the negation of something which positively exists, without this, it is the negation of *nothing*. And if neither life nor death positively exist, they must each be the negation of a mere nonentity.

The *negation* of a *nonentity*, will prove the *positive* existence of that supposed *negation*; for that which is the absence of *nothing*, must be *something*; and that which is something, cannot be a pure physical negation. But to suppose life and death to be pure negations, or the mere absence of each other, while neither is supposed to have any positive existence; is not only to make each, less than the "shadow of a shade," but it is to place in opposition to each other; two negations, neither of which, from the nature of the case supposed, can possibly exist. It therefore follows, that either life or death must positively exist; and the next inquiry must be, which of these exists positively, and which relatively?

If the pure negation of all Being had existed from eternity, positive Being could not now exist. That which was from eternity, must necessarily now exist; and that which thus exists, can be subject neither to decay nor change. Numerous casualties may affect a compounded nature, but life and death must ever be inaccessible to each other, and be placed beyond the influence of mutation, or natural change.

If *nothing* had existed from eternity, the immensity of space could have furnished nothing but the mere *absence* of *Being*. The mere absence of Being could never have acted; (for this would be to suppose an *action* without an *actor*, which is a contradiction) and that which could never have acted, could never have produced positive Being. But as every substance has a positive Being, it undeniably follows, that mere absence could not have existed from eternity. And if mere *inaction* could not have been from eternity, it follows also, that death can have no positive existence—that it is a mere negation, and a mere negation of that which *positively is*.

The soul is a principle of *pure essential life*, which positively exists as it stands opposed to death, which is its reverse; and under these limitations, therefore, it is, that I wish life to be considered in the present case. In the most general acceptance of life, it is but *relative*, and as such I have hitherto considered it in the former part of this Essay.

But even admitting that mere absence had been from all eternity, it would not from thence follow, that death had a positive existence; it would, indeed, sufficiently prove the nonentity of life, and the entire negation of all substances: but such an absence of all Being would not be death. It would entirely destroy the idea of the plentitude of all Being: but while the idea of plentitude was thus destroyed, mere absence could erect nothing positive in its stead.

The mere *absence*, from whence we derive our notion of death, is not the real absence of *all Being*, but the absence of something which is essentially necessary to that *particular modification* of Being, from whence something is taken, the loss of which that particular mode of Being cannot survive, and of which this absence is exactly the reverse. All nature will furnish us with instances of these reverses, that God has placed in those extremes, which must for ever remain inaccessible to one another. Thus, cold is the absence of heat—darkness the absence of light, and insensibility the absence of sensation. And the very instant we conceive either of these extremes, to make any approaches to its reverse, that instant, by deserting its station, its real and nominal existence can be no more. If, then, inaction be the absence of all action, and quiescence the absence of all motion, death, in the most common acceptance, can be no more than the absence of life.

But when we raise our thoughts to the nature of the human soul, and consider it as a principle of pure essential life, we discover nothing which it can possibly be deprived of but its own existence. And whether we denominate that which is its perfect extreme—*Death*,—*the perfect absence of itself*,—or *the reverse of Being*; certain it is, that they are extremes which are separated from one another, by those insuperable barriers which they cannot pass, and upon the preservation of which all our notions of natural extremes

depend for their existence. If, then, the soul be a principle of pure essential life, in which consciousness and activity inhere, and from whence must be subtracted every foreign appendage and superfluity, as has been already proved ; and if consciousness and perception can only exist in an unextended, immaterial, and uncompounded substance ; and if nothing can belong to the human soul, but what is physically necessary to its existence ; and if the subtraction of any one property of the soul, be to the soul the utter loss of Being ; whether we suppose the soul to approach toward the perfect nonentity of its own Being, or suppose this nonentity of Being to approach toward the soul, by annihilating the real and nominal existence of that to which either is supposed to approach, the soul must ever be inaccessible to its own *extreme*, and can never meet in contact with the *perfect absence* of itself.

Such is the nature of the human soul, the absence or reverse of which is death. And without the annihilation of this nature, it must remain in a state of corruptibility through all eternity.

Can, then, these extremes in nature ever meet together ? If they can, they are extremes no longer ;—if not, the soul must be inaccessible to death, and consequently immortal. If these extremes can meet together, either the soul must approach to the entire absence of itself, or that which has no positive existence, must act upon the soul. To suppose the soul to approach to the pure negation of itself, is a contradiction : it is to suppose the soul to be a principle of pure abstracted life, and yet at the same time, to suppose it to be no such thing.

Whatever the soul moves towards, is proved by that very movement, to be the perfect absence of itself no more. And while we suppose, that the soul approaches to the absence of itself, we are obliged to suppose, that the soul is abstracted from itself,—that it leaves itself behind, and yet moves with itself, to the entire absence of itself ;—that it has access to that which must necessarily be inaccessible ; and which, could the soul have access unto it, would entirely destroy that very absence which it pursued, and thereby annihilate that very death by which the soul is supposed to be ex-

tinguished. This mass of contradictions is too gross to be pursued. And the undeniable consequence is, that the soul itself cannot move towards, or ever approach the mere absence of itself.

SECT. VI.

The Soul cannot suffer Annihilation by the Action of the Absence of essential Life—Life and Death are Extremes which cannot meet in contact—Annihilation is a Nonentity which cannot be produced by any Power—There must be an infinite Distance between Nonentity and the Medium through which the supposed annihilating Power operates.

As the soul cannot approach to the absence of itself, nor perish through any tendency which it has to its own negation, for reasons which are already assigned; it remains to be considered, whether the mere absence of pure essential life, can ever approach unto it.

If the mere absence of pure essential life be capable of approaching the soul, we must admit *mere absence* to exist, because that which has no existence can never act, and consequently can never make any approaches toward the soul. And if this mere absence be capable of acting, and this action implies previous existence in that which acts, this mere absence can no longer be the pure negation of positive Being, and is therefore not the subject under present consideration.*

The mere absence of which I speak, can be no more than a pure negation; and what is but a pure negation of positive Being, must be devoid of that existence which is necessary

* It is not very obvious what the precise meaning is which Mr. Drew attaches to the expression "pure essential life." It appears to be rather a mere change of name, than any thing else, and intended only to try the reasoning in what he might suppose to be a new view. The use of words or terms about the import and signification of which men are not agreed has uniformly a tendency to confuse the understanding and to create a difference of opinion on the same subject. Such is the case in point. The introduction of a new term was not only uncalled for, but unnecessary; the reasoning was complete without a repetition of the evidence.

to that activity which we attribute to it. And if the soul be approached by the entire absence of itself, and this absence have no kind of positive existence, mere absence must act without a Being, and approach the soul without having any kind of positive existence. Either this absence must be *capable* or *incapable* of approaching the soul. If *capable*, it is no longer a pure negation; and if *incapable*, it can neither approach the soul, nor act upon it. If it be not a pure negation, it is not the subject of present inquiry; but if it be, the soul can never be accessible to, and therefore can never perish by it.

And as it implies a contradiction to suppose that the absence of Being, which is the reverse of the soul, to be any thing more than a pure negation; and as to suppose a mere negation to have a positive existence, is a contradiction also; so likewise that supposition which would lead us to admit, that what has no positive Being can perform an action, must be equally contradictory and absurd. And to suppose that that which positively exists, can perish by that which neither exists nor acts, is a contradiction too monstrous to be either refuted or pursued. As the soul, therefore, cannot approach to the negation of itself, nor this negation approach the soul, it necessarily follows, that the soul, being inaccessible to death, must be immortal.

But admitting that a mutual contact could take place between the soul, and that death, by which it is supposed to be destroyed, yet still they are extremes in nature, which must for ever render them inaccessible to one another. In these extremes of nature, which form the insuperable barrier of things, life and death are placed at *antipodes* to each other. It is from this natural distance which lies between them, that we form our conceptions of each; and no longer than this distance is preserved, can we attach any idea to either.

And although we admit, that a contact were to take place between these extremes, still their proximity to each other in point of space, can in no way overcome that distance which God has placed between life and death, and between that entity of Being which constitutes the soul, and this nonentity through which it is supposed to be destroyed. To

admit the idea of a proximity, through which a contact is supposed to take place between the soul and the entire absence of itself, is to lose sight of the idea of *absence*, which is the subject under present consideration; and is to raise mere absence into an efficient cause, and to attribute to it all that formal existence through which alone positive existence can be distinguished from the negation of Being. But as mere absence can never approach that which it is the absence of, nor destroy that positive Being upon which it depends for its own *negative nomination*; it is certain that no contact can be formed, and consequently no proximity, if it were admitted possible, can bring the soul nearer to annihilation, than if we admit the soul to be divided from the absence of itself by a distance which would exceed the extremes of the orbit of *Saturn*. And whether any power which possesses positive Being in itself, can destroy the soul, must be the subject of our next inquiry.

It is certain, that nothing can *communicate* what it does not possess; nor *produce* what it has not the *power of producing*. These propositions are self-evident, and the reverse of either is a contradiction. A Being which can communicate annihilation, must be one which is in existence; for that which *is not*, can communicate nothing; and for the same reason, can produce no effects. And that Being which is in existence, cannot, from the *certainty of its existence*, include the *absence of existence* within its nature; and consequently can never communicate to another, that *absence of existence or annihilation*, which it does not possess itself. *Annihilation*, therefore, can never be communicated, either by a Being which is *in existence*, or by one which *is not*.

As no Being can communicate to another, what it does not possess itself, so neither can it *produce*, what it has not the power of *producing*. If annihilation be the *effect* of power, which must be admitted by all who contend that power produces it; annihilation must be produced by an *energy* residing in that power, which is supposed capable of producing it. For unless an *ability* to produce annihilation, be included in the nature of power, power itself can never perform what it has not the *ability* to accomplish. But in admitting a *resident energy* in power, to produce an-

nihilation, we make this *resident energy* to produce a *nonentity*, (for annihilation is a nonentity) and that which produces a *nonentity*, produces *nothing*.* The supposition, therefore, of a power, whose *active energy* produces *nothing*, is a contradiction in terms; it attributes to the power, an *activity*, which, in the *only effect* which it is supposed to produce, we are obliged to deny the existence of; and, a power which is thus constituted, must be *active*, and *not active*, at the same time. If, therefore, neither the *absence*, nor *presence* of power, can produce annihilation, it necessarily follows—that the human soul must be immortal.

It may, perhaps, be said—that “annihilation is not, in the strictest propriety of speech, an *effect* of *power*, but is rather that point to which, through the effect of power, *positive Being* is reduced.” Admitting, for argument’s sake, the case which is here supposed, I would then ask—Can power ever pursue an object to a point which includes the absence of all Being, and consequently the absence of all power? If it can, we must suppose *power to be*, where we suppose *power not to be*, which every one must perceive is a contradiction:—If not, annihilation must be impossible. And whether we suppose power to be *present* or *absent*, at this given point, as the former includes a contradiction, and the latter precludes the possibility of annihilation; the decisive result is—that the human soul must necessarily be immortal.

Against this mode of reasoning, I can conceive no objection more forcible than this—“that though the annihilating power may be supposed to exist, yet it does not follow, that the substance which is supposed to be annihilated, must exist also.” To this I reply—that the point which admits the existence of the annihilating power, does not preclude the existence of that substance, which is supposed to be annihilated by it. For as neither power, nor an immaterial substance, can occupy space, the point which admits the existence of the former, cannot exclude the latter from Being. If power, which is supposed to annihilate, can exist, in this point of annihilation, Why should we sup-

* Here is a specimen of pure tautology exhibiting a repetition of the terms of the conclusion.

pose—that the same given point, should refuse existence to that substance, which is supposed to be annihilated by it? Natural causes can never annihilate one substance, and yet permit another, under the same circumstances, to exist. I therefore finally observe,—the power which is supposed to reduce the soul to a point of annihilation, must either exist in this given point, or it must not:—If it exist, we are not yet arrived to that point, which describes a nonentity; (and where nonentity is not, annihilation can never BE) and if it exist not in this given point, the soul can never be annihilated by its influence; and in either case—the soul must be immortal.

If the soul be annihilated, it must be either by something which is in existence, or something which is not. But that which is in existence, can never produce what is physically contrary to itself; and that which has no existence, can never act.

A Being, which is in a state of positive existence, can never be annihilated while that existence continues; and a Being which is devoid of all existence, can never be a subject of it. That which is in existence, must be at an infinite distance from non-existence; and that which is not in existence, is not the subject of our inquiry. Whatever is at an infinite distance from any given point, can never be brought nearer to that point, through the influence, either of time, circumstance, or power; and that which is removed from the influence of time, circumstance, and power, must necessarily be immortal.

Annihilation must either be the effect of power, or it must not. If of power, power must continue to operate upon a subject, until the subject itself, through the influence of that power, be reduced to a nonentity. But in admitting power to have an active operation, until it produces a nonentity, we admit a palpable contradiction. If it be not the effect of power, we must suppose annihilation to be produced, without admitting the existence of any cause sufficiently powerful to produce it, which is a contradiction also. If, therefore, annihilation cannot be produced, either with power, or without it, the soul can never be a subject of it; and what cannot be a subject of it, must be immortal. The admission of a

power, which is only known to exist, because it produces a nonentity, furnishes the mind with a chaos of contradictions—because that which produces a *nonentity*, is not power, but *nothing*.

SECT. VII

That the Absence of the Divine Power is impossib.e.

It may, perhaps, be said, that the annihilation of Being is not the effect of any power; but, that as all positive Being is supported in existence by infinite power, the mere cessation of that power is of itself, sufficient to produce annihilation; so that annihilation cannot be said to be the effect of any active cause, because the absence of the *cause of Being*, is alone sufficient to produce the nonentity of a finite Being.

The objection which is here started, appears to involve two distinct points. The first is, that the absence of the divine power is possible; and the second is, that the absence of this power is of itself sufficient to annihilation, without admitting the existence of any active cause to produce it. But whether the former be possible, or whether the latter be sufficient to the annihilation of Being, I must confess I have some considerable doubts; and as this objection seems plausible, I will endeavour in these sections to examine its force, and give to each part an attentive consideration.

If God be an *omnipotent* and an *omnipresent* Being, which I believe no one will deny, it is certain that no portion either of space or nature, of time or eternity, can exist where God is not. And it is equally certain, that the existence of the Divine Being cannot be *partial* any where, but must be *perfect* every where;—this proposition is necessarily included in our notion of his OMNIPRESENCE. And if God be an omnipresent Being, it is also certain that every attribute essential to his existence, must be inseparable from his Being and nature. That God, from the very notion we have of Omnipotency, must be possessed of infinite power, cannot, I believe, be denied by any who will admit of his existence; and as power is an essential attribute of Deity, it is certain, that its diffusiveness can be limited by nothing

but the existence of God : it therefore, can neither be arbitrary, nor adventitious, since both the nature, and attributes of God, must be denominated from their *necessary existence*. The present, therefore, is not an inquiry into the nature of the moral attributes of God, but into the nature of that power which is essential to his Being, and without which, all our notions of God are at once banished from the world. For could we admit it possible, that God could withdraw from any given point, either of *space* or *nature*, of *time* or *eternity*, that power which is an essential attribute of his nature, and which from his omnipotency must be admitted to be infinite ; we must behold in that given point, a certain *vacuum* where the divine power is not ; (because an immaterial substance is supposed to drop into annihilation through its total absence) : and consequently a point of duration, in which an *infinite power* is *not infinite* ; and we must admit the Being of a God, even while we subtract from his Being that infinite diffusion of his power, the presence of which is absolutely necessary to our notions of his existence. And consequently, we must admit the existence of an omnipotent God, while we admit a point in which his Omnipotency has no existence. To admit, therefore, the absence of the divine power to be possible, will oblige us either to admit the Being of a God, abstracted from that power which is essential to his nature ; or to admit an infinite power not to be infinite, both of which suppositions are plain and palpable contradictions.

If God could withdraw his power from any given portion, either of space or nature, of time or eternity, and yet remain infinite in his power, by the same modes of reasoning we must admit it possible, that God could withdraw his power from other portions of space and nature also. And what has no necessary existence in one part, can have no necessary existence in any part ; and what has no necessary existence in all and every part, can have no kind of necessary existence whatever ; and we may thus proceed until we totally deny the Being of a God.

If God withdraw his power from the support of any Being, and that Being fall into a nonentity through its absence, it is certain, that this power cannot be so diffusive

afterward as it was before, because that portion of energy which was necessary to support that Being in existence, which has perished through its absence, is now done away; and consequently we lessen the extent of that power which we admitted to be infinite, and which must, therefore, be without limits, which will conduct us to this contradiction—that infinite power is *limited* and *illimitable*, at the same time.*

The supposition of the absence of an omnipresent Being, is of itself a contradiction in terms:—And an omnipotent power, which is capable of being withdrawn, is an absurdity equally gross; in either case, it totally denies the nature of necessary existence; and, by adopting the supposition—that the absence of the divine power is possible, we make the most essential attributes of Deity to be only arbitrary and adventitious. And what is only arbitrary and adventitious to any Being, may be totally done away, without affecting the nature of that Being to which it is thus arbitrary and adventitious; and we may thus admit the existence of God, after we have supposed his power and presence to be necessary neither in space nor nature, in time nor eternity. And as these contradictions cannot possibly be allowed in point

We have here an example of the extent to which the loftiest mind, as regards the laws of reasoning, may be carried away by the very excess of its own acuteness. The contents of this passage have been already stated in a much clearer manner than is here done. Besides, the contents of the passage assume that which is not permissible by the previous reasoning; namely, the limitation of the diffusiveness of the power of God, after a manifestation of the withdrawal of that power from the object, which from its absence falls into a state of nonentity. Such a conclusion not only leads to the limitation of that efficiency of power in God, which all admit to be infinite; but also, to the still more absurd and irrational conclusion, that the withdrawal of the power of Deity from any created being, tending to the nothingness of that same being, would necessarily tend not to a limitation only of the power of God, but to the total destruction of that portion of the same power, which was the sustaining source of the being reduced to a state of nonentity. Which would lead to an assumption against that for which Mr. Drew has been contending throughout the previous part of the work, namely, the unity and indivisibility of every immaterial Being. The absurdity of the reasoning is sufficiently palpable.

of argument, nor rationally admitted in point of fact; it must evidently follow—that no portion, either of space or nature, of time or eternity, can be destitute of God; and, therefore, no Being which exists within the confines of either, can possibly perish through that absence of power which is impossible.

It may, perhaps, be further asked—“Whether that God can be infinite in his power, who has not power to withdraw his power? If he can withdraw it, must not annihilation be admitted? If not, can God be omnipotent?”—Questions like these are specious, but I conceive they are sophistical and unsound. If God have the power to withdraw his power, from supporting all nature in existence, which is presumed in the objections now before us, I would ask,—Is God present or absent in those *vacuities* from whence all finite existence is removed? If present, he must be there a God without his power; (because the absence of the divine power is supposed to constitute that vacuity on which I found the present question); and if he be absent, we at once give up his Omnipresence, and in either case destroy an essential attribute of God. In the former case, we make Omnipotence to exist without power; and in the latter, we admit the absence of an omnipresent Being.

If God can partially withdraw his own power from his own existence, (which must be admitted by all those who admit the objection, and who do not deny his Being), I would further ask—Cannot God, on the same principle on which he can partially withdraw his power, and separate it from his own existence, totally withdraw, and finally annihilate it? The same reasonings, which suppose a partial absence of power to be included in the operation of omnipotent power, will carry us to the total absence of it. For we may proceed onward with the same questions, until Deity itself is no more, and until we make Omnipotence to consist in the withdrawing of Omnipotence; and we must thus suppose omnipotent power to remain after it is removed, all of which are palpable contradictions.*

* The point previously under consideration was the withdrawal of God's power from that which he himself had created, and neither

As then, from the nature and attributes of God, all space and nature, all time and eternity, must be full of God ; and as the certainty of the Divine Being must be denominated from his necessary existence ; and as to suppose the reverse of either is a contradiction ; it must inevitably follow, that if the soul perish through the absence of the divine power, it must perish where the boundaries of space, of nature, of time, and of eternity can never reach, and consequently, where that power which we admit to be infinite, cannot possibly extend. And as space and nature, time and eternity, bound all our conceptions of possible existence ; and as these limits cannot possibly admit the absence of the divine power ; and as all possible existence must be confined within these limits (if such be) ; I conclude, that the absence of the divine power must be totally impossible, according to all those modes of reasoning and means of knowledge, which God has placed within the reach of human comprehension.

It will, perhaps, be said—"That if we admit the absence of the divine power to be impossible, it will not only militate against the creative power of God, but will tend to prove all things to be eternal."—Although such an objection may seem plausible, I conceive it is entirely founded upon an erroneous idea of creation. If the non-eternity of matter did imply the non-existence of the divine power, I would not only admit the plausibility of such an objection, but would admit it as unanswerable ; but this, however, I conceive is not the case. If the divine power had not existed from eternity, it is certain that creation could not have taken place through its efficacy. That the efficient cause of creation did exist from eternity, I not only admit, but think I can easily prove. But if the absence of all power be admitted possible, and the nonentity of Being be supposed to result from that absence, the efficient power must be removed. And if the efficient power be supposed to be entirely removed from any substance which is supposed to be reduced to a nonentity through its absence, I would ask—

does, nor can infer, a withdrawal of his power from his own existence. Such a mode of reasoning is as glaringly absurd as any thing to be found in the whole range of the works of the Sceptics.

Is the *re-creation* of that substance possible to the divine power, or not? If possible, the divine power must operate where it is not, because the absence of this power is that which is supposed to have produced annihilation; but in admitting any power to operate where it is not, we shall be obliged to admit its presence and absence at the same time. But if the re-creation of this substance is not within the reach of the divine power, it is certain that the nonentity of Being, can bear no relation to the state of things antecedent to creation.*

Our ideas of *sooner* and *later*, are all local and relative, and can have no kind of relation to God. Creation could not have taken place sooner than it did. God who created time, must have created it in eternity; and what took place prior to time, bids adieu to all our local ideas of *soon* and *late*, *before* and *after*; and leaves us enveloped with what has no beginning, no middle, no limits, no end.

And although creation has not been from all eternity, yet it does not follow, that there ever was in God the absence of a creative power. The creative power of God, is certainly only a particular modification of active energy, which, instead of implying the absence of *omnipotent* power, clearly demonstrates the certainty of its being, and proves omnipotent power to be inseparable from the divine nature. And even if this particular modification of active energy were withdrawn, the presence of which is necessary to support all finite Being, in this present state of existence, yet it would not prove the absence of an omnipresent Being; nor yet the total annihilation of any finite intelligence;—it might absorb the individuation of Being, but it would not prove the annihilation of Being itself. But to admit the total absence of the divine power, we must admit the total absence of the divine Being, and consequently destroy the existence of God, who can no more exist abstracted from his power, than he can exist abstracted from his own existence, of which the divine power is an essential attribute.

Whether the absence of that particular active energy, (the

* Mr. Drew has here assumed the very point which he ought to have established by a rigorous train of demonstration

presence of which was necessary to produce creation) be of itself sufficient to produce the nonentity of Being, is quite a distinct question. If the absence of this active energy, or any particular modification of the divine power, be sufficient to the production of annihilation, while the *omnipotency* and *omnipresency* of God remain entire, we must suppose annihilation to take place where we admit the Deity perfectly to exist, and how annihilation can possibly take place within the very bosom of Deity, without any action of divine power, we shall probably never know until we can reconcile contradictions.

If the absence of the divine power be sufficient to the annihilation of any finite Being, it is certain that this annihilation must take place where God is not; for wherever the divine Being is, it is certain that annihilation cannot be. For to suppose the existence of a point which describes the nonentity of Being, while we admit in this point the Deity to have a full and positive existence, is to admit this point to contain a nonentity, while we admit the existence of God within its confines.*—This point must then contain an entity and a nonentity at the same time. If the absence of the particular active energy of the divine nature produces annihilation, the soul must then retire out of *Being*, and drop into *God*, (who is the fountain and source of all existence) which is a plain contradiction, since the total absence of omnipotent power must certainly be impossible. And whether the absence of power, if it were admitted possible, be sufficient to the annihilation of Being, must be the subject of the next section.

SECT. VIII.

That the Absence of Power is insufficient to annihilate the Soul.

I now proceed to examine the remaining part of that objection, which was started in the preceding section, namely,

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—"that *the mere absence of power*, is alone sufficient to annihilate the soul."

That all finite Beings originate in, and are supported in existence by the power of God, I fully admit, and that the divine power is infinite and universal, I have endeavoured to prove in the preceding section: But that the *total absence* of the divine power is possible, I have contended against, and am fully persuaded, that if its total absence be admitted to be possible, it will amount to a total denial of some of the most essential attributes, and consequently of the existence and being of God. It may perhaps, be said—"that if the theory I have advanced be admitted,—if the absence of the divine power be impossible, it will make all things necessarily existent." But to this I reply, that the theory I have advanced, makes the annihilation of the soul (if it be possible) to depend upon the *power*, and not the absence of the power of God. The *positive, certain, and unalterable* existence of Omnipotent power, and the peculiar direction and modification of that power, I consider as two distinct ideas;* the former of which, is an essential attribute of the unchangeable nature of God, the absence of which cannot be admitted, without admitting a palpable contradiction; but the latter depending entirely upon the will of an infinitely free and powerful Being, may assume a variety of directions, without affecting the immutability of the nature of God.

That any particular mode of *active energy* may be withdrawn, I readily allow, but still contend that if that mode of active energy be withdrawn, nothing but power can withdraw it; and if this *active energy*† of the divine power be withdrawn by power, and the soul sink into *nonentity* through its absence, the power which withdraws this active

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energy, must be the cause of that annihilation which follows from the active operation of it; and the active energy which is withdrawn by the influence of the withdrawing power, can be nothing more than the mere instrument, through which this withdrawing power acts. *Mere absence*, therefore, cannot produce annihilation.

It is certain, that if the mere absence of power be admitted as sufficient to the annihilation of the soul, this *absence* must either *constitute* annihilation in itself, or be the *cause* which produces it; there being no other way through which the mere absence of power can be conceived as possible. For if the mere absence of power, neither *constitutes* nor *causes* the annihilation of the soul, it can bear no relation to that nonentity of Being, which is attributed to the removal of power, and consequently the soul can never perish by its absence.

It is certain, that if the mere absence of power *constitutes* the annihilation of the soul, the presence of power must constitute its Being. For if the presence of this power, do not constitute the identity of the soul, the absence of which *constitutes* annihilation, we must admit this power (previous to its removal) to be extraneous to the identity of the soul; and, consequently, that power, which is extraneous to the real and personal identity of the soul, can never, through its absence, constitute the annihilation of a substance, to the identity of which it is admitted to be extraneous. I therefore think the conclusion certain—that unless the presence of power *constitutes* the identity of the soul, the absence of power can never constitute its annihilation. But in admitting mere power to constitute the identity of any substance, we must totally deny the being of all substances, and reduce all our notions of matter and spirit to chimerical absurdities, and even bid adieu to our own existence.*

If matter and spirit do exist, mere power cannot consti-

* It does not necessarily follow: the argument has had reference only to the effects flowing from the absence of the power of God, and not the constitution of the human soul; and we feel ourselves called upon to meet the point "in limine," as another illustration of that which we have already pointed out as a begging of that, which neither is, nor can be, granted from the previous reasoning.

tute the identity of either ; and if they do not exist, they can neither be supported in existence by the presence, nor annihilated by the absence of power, and all our reasonings about both matter and spirit, can have no kind of foundation nor existence whatever. If, therefore, the absence of power *constitutes* the annihilation of the soul, the presence of power must constitute its identity ; but as to admit the identity of the soul to consist in mere power, will prove the entire negation of all substances, I think the final result perfectly conclusive—that the *mere absence* of power can never *constitute* the annihilation of the soul.

As the mere absence of power, for reasons already assigned, cannot constitute the annihilation of the soul, the remaining inquiry is—Whether the absence of power can *occasion*, or be the *cause* of, the soul's annihilation ?

That all finite Beings were created by God, and created by a particular display of active energy, which nothing but Omnipotence could exert, are truths that cannot rationally be opposed. But I consider this display of active energy, through which creation took place, as distinct from that Omnipotent Power, which called this creative active energy into action. And as creation was the work of God, when it was completed, there could have been no occasion for the perpetuity of this exertion. Substances were formed by a particular display of energy, and are supported in existence by that Omnipotent Power on which they rest, which *per-vades*, and *fills*, and *envelopes* all. The power of *self-subsistence* must have been incorporated in their natures to enable them to continue in existence, after the display of creative energy had subsided ; and nothing but a new display of active energy can retrace the paths of creative power. If the same display of energy, which called things into their primeval forms, were necessary to their continuance in existence, creation must have been imperfect, and the same display of active energy would have continued creating, without intermission, for ever. But as this is not the case, we have all the evidence moral certainty can give us, that those substances which God at first created, endued with the power of *self-subsistence*, require nothing more to support them in existence, than that power on which they rest :

which is immutable and eternal; the absence of which is impossible, in which state they must continue until a new display of active energy shall strike them from existence. And as finite existence could not have taken place by the laws of nature, the annihilation of Being, (if it be possible) must be equally removed from every mode of operation which these laws discover, and can never be accounted for by creatures that are only subject to their influence.

If the uniform continuance of that particular energy, which at first called creation into existence, be necessary to support created nature in existence, we shall never be able to distinguish between *creation* and *preservation*,—between the calling things originally into a state of positive existence, and the continuing the thing formed in its present state of Being; nor know with precision whether any created substance be complete or not. And to admit the self-same display of *active energy* to continue alike through the creation of substances, and the preservation of them, will lead us to attribute to this energy an uniformity of effect, which is at once contradicted by the supposition under consideration, as well as fact. The presence, therefore, of any continual exertion of energy to preserve created substances in existence, cannot be necessary to the perpetuity of what God has created, unless we admit creation to be imperfect; and to admit the *imperfection* of *creation*, is to admit creation, and deny it, at the same time.—The continuance of a creative energy that creates nothing, is a contradiction in terms. As, then, a *creative* energy can no longer exist than while it is creating, and as the power which supports creation is omnipotent, and therefore an essential attribute of God; as the former with *created* substances can have no *present* existence, and as the absence of the latter is impossible,—the mere absence of power can never *produce*, nor be the *cause* of the annihilation of the soul.

If the mere absence of power be the cause of the soul's annihilation, the soul's annihilation must be the effect of a nonentity; (for the absence of power must be a nonentity); and to make an effect to result from what must be a non-entity, and which therefore can have no power to produce it, is to attribute to the *absence of power*, an energy that

nothing but power can possess; which is supposing power to be present, while nothing but the absence of power is admitted to exist. And by admitting the mere absence of power to be the *cause* of annihilation, we must attribute an active energy to that nonentity of power, which we admit to be destitute of it, and is a contradiction.

That the absence of power must be destitute of all energy, will admit of no denial; and therefore the innate powers of consciousness and perception, which are essential properties of the soul, can never perish through an energy of which the absence of power must be totally destitute. And as nothing but *energy* can quench the natural powers of the soul, which energy the absence of power cannot possess, the powers of the soul can never through this cause be deprived of existence. I therefore conclude, that whether we suppose the mere *absence of power* to be *devoid* of energy, or *possessed* of it; as the former will prevent it from quenching the innate powers of the soul, and as the latter implies a contradiction, the mere absence of power can, in neither case, be the *cause* of the annihilation of the soul.

If power support the soul in existence, and the absence of this power produce its nonentity, this absence of power must be produced by power, or it must not. If this absence of power be produced by power, power must be the active cause of the nonentity of the soul, which activity will at once demonstrate the insufficiency of the absence of power to annihilate the soul; but if this absence of power be not occasioned by power, we must suppose the power that supports the soul in existence, to be removed by *no power*; and that which is removed by no power, must continue for ever. In supposing the *absence of power* to remove power, we must make it to contribute toward its own existence, and to act before it had a Being. And we must attribute to it an activity and energy, of which, from its very name and nature, it must necessarily be destitute, which is a palpable contradiction. In admitting the power that supports the soul in existence, to be removed by power, we call into existence an active cause, and discard the absence of power from being the cause of annihilation; and in admitting the power that supports the soul in existence, to be removed by *no power*.

the soul, which is supported thereby, must continue forever; and that which continues for ever, instead of being reduced to a nonentity, must be immortal. I therefore think this conclusion certain also—that the mere absence of power can neither *constitute*, nor be the *cause* of the soul's annihilation.

That all finite substances were created by power, will not, I believe, be denied by any; and if the mere *absence of power*, can counteract and annihilate what nothing but power could create: the absence of power must be equal in its efficacy to power itself. For if the mere absence of power can counteract the efficacy of power, we must attribute to the absence of power, an energy which nothing but power can possess; but in supposing the absence of power to be possessed of power, we must suppose power to be where, from the nature of the supposition, and from the import of the term itself, power cannot be, which is a contradiction, and therefore cannot be admitted.

However the soul may be supported in existence by any power, it is certain, from its actual existence, that it must have a distinct identity in itself, independent of that power which supports it in existence; and if so, all power must be extraneous to its real identity; and therefore, that power which supports the soul in existence, and is extraneous to the identity of the soul, can never, either through its presence or absence, change the nature of that substance, to the identity of which it is extraneous. For if we admit the distinct identity of the soul, and suppose it to be supported in existence, by a power which is distinct from that identity; it is among the grossest absurdities, to suppose that *the absence* of this power can affect the Being of the soul, to whose identity the presence of power was extraneous. If the *presence* of power was extraneous, the absence of power must be equally so; and therefore the soul can never perish through the absence of power, which must not only be remote from the identity of the soul, but totally destitute of all energy and action, and consequently devoid of all influence. If the mere absence of power be supposed to occasion the annihilation of the soul, I would ask—Does this *absence of power* possess power, or not? If it possesses power, we must

admit a contradiction ; and if it does not possess power, that substance which positively exists independent of it, can never perish by it ; and therefore the mere absence of power must be insufficient to produce annihilation.

That the power, occasioning the absence of that active energy which supports the soul in existence, must be different from that active energy itself, is, I think, demonstrable from this consideration,—that the active energy, which is supposed to support the soul in existence, must be necessary to its Being ; and the power which recalls this active energy, is that which deprives it of existence. Can the same modification of active energy, which supports the soul in existence, be the same that deprives it of Being ? If so, it must be the absence of itself,—it must be a power that supports the soul in existence, and a power that deprives it of Being, at the same time. If the same power that supports the soul in existence, can withdraw itself, and, through the absence of this power, the soul sinks into a nonentity, the nature of this power must first be changed, in order to produce these opposite effects ; and if the nature of a *supporting* power be changed, before it can absent itself from the soul ; it is not the same modification of power, but another ; which is not the subject under present consideration. In admitting a *supporting* power to withdraw itself from that substance, which is supposed to be supported by it, we must admit it (if it be the same modification of power) to be a supporting power, and not a supporting power, at the same time ;—for a supporting power that does not support, is a plain contradiction. In admitting a supporting power to withdraw itself, we must admit its previous nature to be done away ; and the power which was previously *supporting*, must now become *destructive*. But this affords us a distinct modification of power, and by admitting a distinct modification of power, we admit the necessity of an active cause to produce annihilation ; and therefore the soul can never perish, either by the presence, or absence, of that modification of power which *supports* the soul in existence. The modification of power which supports the soul in existence, must be a *supporting one*, and therefore cannot deprive the soul of Being, nor absent itself from the soul while it retains its nature.

The presence of this power must support the soul in existence ; its mere absence can do nothing, (if it were admitted possible); and that which deprives the soul of Being, must be a power, which is not *supporting*, but *destructive*.

Thus, then, from these arguments, I think the final result decisive,—that the total absence of the Divine Power is absolutely impossible,—and that this Omnipotent Power alone, can support the soul in existence : That if the absence of any particular modification of the Divine Power were possible, while that particular modification of power retained its name and nature, still the mere absence of any modification of power, must be alike insufficient, either to *constitute* annihilation, or to *produce* it. And if the mere absence of power, can neither *constitute* annihilation, nor be the occasion of it, an active cause must be admitted. And if the admission of an active cause, must imply *progression* in the activity of its operations ; and progression cannot apply to those actions through which an immaterial substance can alone be capable of perishing, because such substances must be destitute of all *dimensions*, and without interior or surface ; it must follow, that neither the absence nor presence of power, can possibly annihilate the soul, through any way, or mode, or manner, which God has placed within the circle of human comprehension. And that which cannot be annihilated, either by the presence or absence of power, must, according to our views, necessarily be immortal.

SECT. IX.

Spiritual Mediums are as remote as material ones from Nonentity—The Distance maintained has no Relation to Space.

WHEN we take a survey of that influence, which all causes display in the production of their own effects, we cannot avoid concluding, that some agreement in nature must inevitably subsist between them. Whenever an action takes place, it is certain that there must be something which produces it :—For to suppose an *action* without an *actor*, is a

plain contradiction. And it is equally certain, that all causes, in order to produce effects, must either act through the instrumentality of mediums, or produce effects purely from themselves. And whatever these mediums are, through which any given cause is supposed to operate, to the production of its own effect; still these mediums through which it operates, must act as links in the chain of causes and effects, to bring the cause and effect into contact with one another.

As the exchange of *Being* for *not Being*, is of itself a positive action, an actor to produce it, must necessarily be admitted. And whether the cause which produces it, act through a medium or without it, the cause and the effect, must be brought into contact with one another.

Whatever these mediums are, through which the cause is supposed to operate, in order to produce annihilation, it is certain, that they must have a *Being*; for no cause can make that to be a medium of action, which has no kind of existence. But if these mediums have a *Being*, it is then certain, that they must (in point of real existence) be equally removed from annihilation with that cause which is supposed to operate upon them, or to act through their instrumentality. For as both cause and medium, from the actions which we attribute to them, must be admitted to exist; and as annihilation is a perfect nonentity, an infinite distance must for ever subsist between them. And what is at an infinite distance from annihilation, can never be brought into contact with it.

However much, distinct parcels of matter may be separated from one another, by the peculiar quantities or qualities of which they are composed, still absolute *nonentity* must be at an equal distance, both from an *atom* and a *world*. An atom can be no nearer to a *nonentity*, in point of real *Being*, than the whole mass of universal nature; and therefore, neither an atom nor a world, can ever be made instrumental to the production of that, which is at an infinite distance from both.

If, from mediums which are material, we turn to those that are spiritual and incorporeal, the same modes of reasoning will hold equally good. A spiritual nature, whatever

its essence may be, if it be acted upon, must necessarily have a Being; (for one which has no Being can never be made the vehicle of action) and therefore, must be at an equal distance from a nonentity, with that Being, which is supposed to act upon, or through it. I grant, a spiritual substance (which is the *medium* under consideration) may be supposed to be perfectly passive; but passiveness implies existence, as much as activity. For the difference between material and spiritual Beings,—between an active cause, and the mediums through which it acts, lies in the *nature* and *manner* of existence, but not in the *certainly* of existence itself.

Whatever has any existence, must be at an infinite distance from that which has not, and therefore, can never be brought into contact with it. And where no contact can be formed between cause and effect, either through the instrumentality of any medium, or abstracted from it, there no effect can be produced. If, then, annihilation be produced, it must be produced by something; and that which produces, must be brought into contact with it. But as the distance between *Being*, and *not Being*, is, and must be infinite; and as nothing but that which has a Being, can either act, or be acted upon, it necessarily follows,—that no such contact can be formed, and consequently no such effect produced. Annihilation, therefore, cannot be the effect of any Being; and that which cannot be effected by any Being, must remain unaccomplished for ever. And the evident result of all, therefore, is—that the human soul must necessarily be immortal.

Whatever annihilates the soul, must operate upon it; and what operates upon, must be brought into contact with it; and what is brought into contact with the soul, can no longer preserve its physical distance from it. These propositions are self-evident, and it is a contradiction to suppose the reverse of either. If, then, that which annihilates the soul, must be brought into contact with it; if the soul be pure, abstracted life; and if life and death belong to those extremes by which God has divided things; the soul cannot be accessible to its own extreme, and consequently must be immortal.

Either the distance which divides life from death, must continue for ever, or it must be removed :—If it be removed, the very idea of death is annihilated by that removal ; if it continue, the soul can never perish ; and in either case it must be immortal.

Let it not be imagined, that the distance of which I here speak, has any relation to space ; the idea of space is foreign to the question. In relation to space, death is a mere non-entity ; it can neither have a positive nor relative existence here ; and can only relate to the physical distance which lies in the nature of things. If this distance lay in any relation it bore to space, it would be hard to say, how far it might be dispensed with. The progress of time may be productive of events that may baffle calculation, and overcome distances, which to us are inconceivable ; but where the distance is placed in the physical nature of *extremes*, as in the case before us ; and where the removal of it implies the grossest of contradictions ; the human understanding recoils at the idea of annihilation, and the immortality of the soul presses itself upon us with an evidence that is irresistible. The mind, while floating in an ocean of uncertainties, may languish under the doubts of scepticism and error ; and we may hazard conjectures, which will terminate in a doubtful issue ; but to abstract ourselves from corporeal Being, to examine subjects which it is our highest interest to know, is to ensure to ourselves certainty, as the recompense of exertion.

Whatever has any relation to space, must occupy it ; and what occupies it, must be extended ; and what is extended, must be formed of parts ; and what is formed of parts ; must be capable of dissolution ; and what is capable of dissolution, cannot (in that state) be physically immortal. There is, therefore, no other alternative left,—either the soul must have a relation to space, and be material ; or it must be immaterial, and have no such relation.

It has been already proved, that matter, under every form it is capable of assuming, is unable to think ; and that the supposition implies a palpable contradiction. And if we suppose, that a thinking quality can be added to any material substance, this substance, to which this thinking

quality is added, must have had a previous existence, with which, from that previous existence notwithstanding its addition, this thinking quality can have no physical relation.

It will, perhaps, be asked, How can any thing exist in space, without having some relation to it? Or, how can any thing, having no such relation, exist in it? I might also ask, If an *action* be performed within the limits of pure distance,—can that action thus exist, without having some relation to that *distance*, within the limits of which it is performed? If it can, the solution will apply to the former case; if not, we must admit a relation, without being able to trace it, and without having any knowledge of such relation, or we must totally deny the existence of all *action*. The former is a plain contradiction, because it supposes the *knowledge* of a relation, without any such *knowledge*; and the latter contradicts common sense.

As all actions must be performed within the limits of pure distance, without having any relation to it; so volition, and that substance which is similar thereto in nature, and from whence it proceeds, must exist in space also. while the ideas themselves can have no kind of relation to one another. To ask, Whether virtue or vice be *square* or *long*? Whether the abstract idea of *red*, be more ponderous than that of *blue*? Or, whether the *primary* or *sensible qualities* of substances, be more *obtuse* than those conceptions which we have of them?—are questions which demonstrate their own absurdity. And it is certain to all who examine with minuteness and attention, that the soul itself, although existing in space, can have no more relation to it, than those questions can have with the decisions expected from them. To decide whether a conception of the mind, includes within it more *substantiality*, than is included in an *inference* from that conception, is at once frivolous and absurd. The mind can easily have a perception of difference between these two ideas; while to that of substantiality, it can annex no association of either.

How any thing can exist in space, without having any relation to it, is a question which, perhaps, we shall never know. To solve this question, it is necessary that we have some determinate idea of space; but this is absolutely im-

possible ; for if space be an *infinite* and immoveable expansion, which must be admitted, it must necessarily be placed beyond the limits of finite comprehension. An expansion, which can be grasped by any finite intelligence, cannot be infinite ; and an expansion which is infinite, can be grasped only by an infinite comprehension. And therefore, from the finitude of our natures, we can form but very partial and inadequate notions of its nature.

If space be infinite in expansion, whatever has any existence, either *possible* or *real*—either *positive* or *relative*, must exist within it ; but it does not from thence follow, that every real or relative existence must have a relation to space. The mind can form ten thousand abstractions, which can have no more relation to space than they can to duration ; yet it is certain, that every abstraction of the mind must be made within the confines of both ; while it is equally certain, that they can have no relation to either. If man were able to comprehend infinite expansion, he would be no longer man ;—and therefore, while the identity of man is preserved in the vast chain of Being, whatever is infinite, must necessarily elude our comprehension, by the finitude of our natures. An expansion which is, and must be, infinite, must necessarily include within its confines, all real and possible Being ; were not this the case, we must suppose an existence without space, or a portion of space where space is not ; either of which suppositions is a contradiction.

It is not because space is necessary to our formation of the idea of *Being*, but from its infinite diffusion, that we are certain, that all *existence* must be included in it ; for all Being must exist, either in real or mental *vacuum*. The idea of Being, does not include within it the idea of space, as necessary to the formation of that idea ; but when the idea of any possible Being is formed, the necessity of space arises, from the utter impossibility of any thing existing in a state of perfect abstraction from it.

Every conception of the mind, as well as the mind itself, must exist in space ; not that space is necessary to the conception or Being of either, but because infinite expansion encircles and envelops all : and therefore, to conceive—that to *exist in*, and to *occupy space*, are terms of the same

import, is, I humbly conceive, a gross mistake. Use may have rendered an association of the two ideas so familiar, that we may have blended and incorporated them together; but if their natures are found to be distinct, no locality of thought can in the least affect the identity of either.

Whatever occupies space, must undoubtedly exist in it; but it does not follow, that whatever exists in space, must therefore *occupy* it. To the former case belong all material natures; and to the latter, all immaterial substances, and those mental abstractions which result from the peculiar directions of their natures. No two portions of matter, can occupy the same identity of space in the same instant; it is a contradiction to suppose it; but volition can never, by *pre-occupying*, preclude the entrance of matter from any given portion of space whatever. The mind can wander, with equal facility, through a perfect *vacuum*, or a rock of adamant, and feel no obstruction from either. It must, therefore, be evident, that there is a peculiar difference, between the *existing in*, and the *occupying* of space.

If the soul of man be a substance distinct from, and independent of, all material Being, it must necessarily be *immaterial*; and may, on that account, exist in space, without occupying it. The component parts of body must still remain under every form which matter may assume; but simple modification can never affect identity. If matter, as matter, be capable of thinking, it must be capable in all its forms; if not, *form* can never communicate to it, a quality which is foreign to its nature. Form, is but a configuration of parts; and it is a contradiction to suppose, that mere arrangement can communicate to that which it is an arrangement of, a quality which is possessed by neither.

CHAP. II.

THAT NOTHING BUT ANNIHILATION CAN DESTROY THE SOUL;—AND THAT ANNIHILATION CANNOT APPLY TO ANY SIMPLE SUBSTANCE.

SECT. I.

Thinking is not connate with Matter—The Soul is indivisible, and incapable of Corruption, there being no Stamen of Corruption in its Nature.

WHETHER the Great God can communicate to matter, a quality of thinking, is a distinct question. But the very idea of such a communication, necessarily implies the previous existence of matter; and demonstrates that thinking can never be *connate* with that substance, which must have existed previous to, and which stands in need of, such a communicable quality. The very supposition that God can, in the infinitude of his *power and wisdom*, communicate to matter a quality of thinking, is a decisive proof that matter, as such, does not; and in its own nature, cannot think. If then, matter be incapable of thinking, under every modification, and man be capable of abstraction and reflection, in all their forms; it must follow,—that there is in man, a certain substance distinct from, and independent of, all material nature; and that which is distinct from, and independent of, matter, must necessarily be immaterial.

If, then, there be in man such an immaterial substance, it must be indivisible in its nature, and destitute of parts; for if it be not indivisible, it is not an individual substance, but an assemblage of distinct individuals of the same species. An immaterial substance can be but one; the admission of others annihilates the very idea, and obliges the mind to have recourse to a series of subtractions, till it arrives at a simple unit.

If an union of these substances be necessary to form a cogitative Being, then it is evident, that neither of these

individuals, in this union, is of itself capable of cogitation; and if neither be capable, then either may be taken away. But if either be taken away, then cogitation, which depended upon an union of the whole, must be destroyed. And to make cogitation to depend for its existence, upon an union of individual substances of the same species, neither of which, in itself, possesses cogitation; when the removal of one, which is *uncogitative*, annihilates the nature of *cogitation*,—is to make an union of these substances necessary to cogitation, and not necessary at the same time. It therefore must follow, that cogitation can only result from one identical, individual, uncompounded, immaterial substance; which must include the ideas of divisibility and separation.*

If a Being, thus constituted, be capable of corruptibility, this corruptibility must proceed, either from itself, or something exterior. From itself it cannot possibly be, because it is a contradiction in terms, to suppose that any simple substance, which actually exists, can possess the power of altering the permanency of its nature. If that infinite power, which denominates the soul's certainty of existence, be capable of corrupting it, that power must act in opposition to itself.—It must tend to corruption, and yet remain incorruptible at the same time; and therefore, a simple essence which thus exists, must necessarily, from the nature of its existence, include within it the idea of incorruptibility. A simple essence, which tends to its own corruption, implies within that essence an hostility of power, which is utterly inconsistent with the simplicity of its nature; for it has been already proved, that the soul is a *simple* essence; and, therefore, this hostility of power must necessarily be excluded; and from this exclusion it follows, that corruption cannot be from itself. A Being which is simple and uncompounded in its nature, must necessarily retain that nature which denominates its identity: unless this be admitted, it is not the

* This passage is defective in logical accuracy; for it is evident, that although by the removal of any one of the substances constituting the cogitative principle the power of cogitation is thereby destroyed, it is only proved that their union was necessary to cogitation; the reverse of that conclusion is neither, nor can it be shown to be, deducible from the premises.

same Being, but another ; and what retains through its simplicity, the denomination of its own identity, must necessarily exclude, through that *simplicity* of nature, every internal propensity and tendency, to corruption or decay.

To imagine a Being to exist, (which is simple and uncompounded in its own nature), with an internal propensity to decay, includes the grossest of contradictions. Its very existence demonstrates that it is in *Being* ; and the simplicity of that existence, excludes from it the possibility of such a tendency, in opposition to the supposition in the case given.

A simple Being, therefore, which is in existence, (which is supposed to have an internal tendency to decay) includes in it this contradiction ;—it supposes the Being to be simple and uncompounded in its nature, while that very tendency which it is supposed to possess, places itself in direct opposition to that simplicity ;—a Being thus constituted must be *simple*, and yet *not simple*, at the same time.

A substance which has any tendency to corruption, supposes in that substance something capable of corruption ; but this gives to us an idea of parts, which destroys the idea of unity, and which is incompatible with the uncompounded nature of the soul. But if the idea of parts,* be included in the capability of corruption, and the soul be a simple essence, and therefore without parts ; it necessarily follows—that it must be destitute of all tendency, to that corruption which is hostile to its identity, and which must therefore be, incompatible with its nature. And that which excludes through the simplicity of its nature, all tendency to corruption, must necessarily be immortal.

As corruption cannot proceed either from the internal nature, or from the tendency of the soul, so neither can it be occasioned by any thing exterior to it. It has been already proved, in a former section, that the human soul is one of those extremes, which is fixed by the God of nature, in that remote situation, which must for ever secure it from what is opposite to its nature. But waving the energy of

* The conception of parts is necessary to the capability of corruption.

this argument, I will now suppose it possible, that the soul can be approached by what is the reverse of its nature, and that it may wait the arrival of its own *antipodes*. In this case, whatever can corrupt the soul, must commence the attack ; and this must either be by violence, or by communicating a contaminating quality. What the abstract nature of corruption is, it is, perhaps, not easy to ascertain ; but be it what it may, it is certain, that it must include one of these two ideas—either the disjunction of cohesive particles by violence, or the subdual of the soul by mere contamination.

A substance, like the soul, can have no parts ; and what has no parts, must ever be impervious, in its own nature, to all violence, and invulnerable against all assaults. Whatever has no parts, can never lose them ; and what has nothing which it can possibly lose, must remain unchangeably the same ; and what remains the same, must necessarily be immortal. And if the soul have nothing which it can possibly lose of itself, because it has no parts, and therefore, is physically incapable of separation, it must follow also, that not one of those radical powers and faculties which the soul possesses can expire, because they derive their existence from the stability of their primary principle. And as there is no *part* to which violence can possibly have access, there is no property which is capable of subduction ; and therefore, the soul, with all the appendages of its powers and faculties, must be for ever inaccessible to violence or decay.

Neither can the soul perish through contamination. Contamination, abstracted from all substance, is but a relative term ; and mere relation can never affect the identity of positive existence ; the soul, therefore, cannot be corrupted by any thing which is but a *mere relation*. But if contamination be considered as the effect of external application, the former arguments will still apply ; and notwithstanding its approaches to the soul, the soul must ever be inaccessible to its influence ; because nothing which is foreign to its nature can ever incorporate with its essence ; and that which cannot incorporate with its essence, can never corrupt it by contamination ; and in either case, the immortality of the soul necessarily results from the incorruptibility of its nature.

In admitting corruption to take place on a Being which

is simple in its own nature, we suppose both the presence and absence of that very Being which is corrupted.* Corruption is the reverse of incorruption; and the identity of a simple Being which is not in a state of corruption, must be changed before it can be made what it is not; for it is a contradiction to suppose, that an incorruptible substance can be corrupted, without losing its *nature* and *essence*. The very essence of its nature, places it beyond the possibility of becoming what it is not; and the immutable lines which divide *identity* from *diversity*, must be for ever secured by the uncontrollable laws of nature. And therefore, to suppose any simple Being to *be*, what it is not supposed to *be*, is a contradiction in terms; and is one of those self-evident errors which carry with them their own refutation.

If any given substance be supposed capable of corruption, the actual existence of that substance, is necessary to the idea of its corruption; for it is a contradiction in terms, to suppose any Being to be corrupted, which has no existence. But if the actual existence of that substance, be necessary to the idea of its corruption; and this substance be uncompounded, and destitute of parts; the very existence of this substance (without which corruption is impossible) precludes the very possibility of that corruption, by which it is supposed to perish. A simple essence must have an existence, or it must not; if it have, corruption must be excluded by the simplicity of that existence; if not, corruption is totally impossible.† Whatever has a simple Being, must retain that being while it exists, and, therefore, cannot be corrupted during that period; and when it ceases to exist, it is no longer a subject of corruption.

* The impossibility of corruption affecting the soul has been forcibly shown; but that, by the admission of the possibility of corruption affecting a substance simple in its nature, proves the supposition of the presence and absence of the same being, at the same time, is to my mind perfectly incomprehensible.

† In other words; A simple essence must have an existence, and if it has, corruption is excluded from the simplicity of its existence; if it has no existence, corruption is necessarily impossible. In the one case, the syllogism is defective; in the other, a mere truism is presented to the mind.

Corruption can never operate upon a simple Being which has no existence; and the very nature of corruption must be excluded by admitting a Being to exist which is simple and un compounded.

Corruption is, and ever must be, the reverse of incorruption; and whether stability, or instability, be the distinguishing characteristic of an immaterial substance, that which is *not*, must necessarily be excluded by that which *is*. If stability be its characteristic, instability and mutation must be excluded, or we must suppose the same Being to be possessed of stability, and not possessed of it at the same time. The same reasoning will hold equally good if the case be exactly reversed; and in either case, it will equally end in a contradiction.

To suppose any simple substance to be what it is not, and what, from its nature and essence it is even supposed not to be, is a position which will admit of no defence; and yet this contradiction must be maintained, by admitting even the possibility of the corruption, of an immaterial substance.

Nor will it be of any avail to suppose, "that the seeds of corruption were sown in the soul at its primary formation; that they have 'grown with its growth, and strengthened with its strength;' and, that its final extinction is nothing but the necessary result of things."

If there be within the soul, such a stamen of corruption as the objection supposes, it is certain, that this stamen must have been coeval with the soul's existence; for without admitting this, the soul must have existed previous to this corrupting stamen; and if we admit its previous existence, the reasonings advanced above, must for ever preclude it from being acquired. But if we admit this stamen of corruption to have been coeval with the soul, we immediately contradict the simplicity of its nature, and take into our conception the idea of a compounded Being. It has been already proved, that a conscious substance must be simple in its nature, and that it can only exist in *unity*; and if so, it is a contradiction to its simplicity, to admit a stamen of corruption to be implanted within it, and to ripen to maturity through the gradations of nature. The very suppo-

sition takes into the conception two distinct ideas ;—first, *that* of a simple, uncompounded essence ; and secondly, *that* of a stamen of corruption moving onward in a graduated state.

If this stamen of corruption, as well as the essential properties of the soul, be included in the nature of the soul, How can the soul be simple and uncompounded ? If this stamen of corruption be included within the soul, I would again ask—Is this stamen necessary to the soul's existence or not ? If it be, it must be inseparable from the soul, and therefore can never destroy it ; if not, it must still be foreign to its nature, and therefore can have no occasion. To suppose any thing which is necessary to any given simple substance, and which is included in the idea of that substance, to be capable of destroying it, is in effect to say, that it is necessary to the existence of that substance, and not necessary at the same time. And to suppose any thing to be included within the nature of any *simple* substance, which is not necessary to the existence of that substance, is a contradiction in terms. And view the idea in what form soever we may, a stamen of corruption must be inadmissible in a simple substance ; and, therefore, no such stamen can possibly exist in the human soul.

SECT. II.

Admitting a Principle of Corruption, it cannot ultimately destroy the Soul—The Soul cannot perish from any Cause, either in itself or exterior to it—The Soul is invariably independent, and inaccessible to all Violence ; it is necessarily immortal.

IF, from this priority of Being, in which I have been considering the objection, we turn our thoughts to its consequences and issue, and from the admission of the principle, trace it to its remote conclusion, the same or similar absurdities will arise. In tracing this objection to its final issue, let us suppose the soul to be wholly annihilated ; and when this is the case, either this stamen of corruption must survive the soul, or perish with it. If it survive, we must

admit physical corruption, while we deny the existence of that which is corrupted ; if it perish with the soul, then it is impossible that it should be the occasion of the soul's extinction. The effect and its cause can never be coeval with one another. Dissolution, or annihilation, can never be coeval with that which occasioned it. And yet to suppose *that*, which occasions the soul's destruction, and the soul itself, to expire together, is to blend together both cause and effect, and to destroy that priority of existence in the cause, which alone can distinguish it from its own effects ; and thus blended together, a stamen of corruption is supposed to be the cause of the soul's final ruin, and yet not the cause, at the same time. On the whole, it is evident from the nature and essence of the soul, that it can have no such stamen of corruption ; and if it had, it must have included a contradiction.

To admit the corruption of a simple substance which has no existence, is a contradiction ; and to suppose corruption in one which perfectly exists, and in the idea of which, corruption is not included, is to suppose that substance to be, and not to be, at the same time. And the final result of all, is,—that the soul must be incorruptible, and that which is incorruptible, must necessarily be immortal.

If the soul perish, it must be from some cause ; and this cause must either be from itself, or something else ;—if from itself, it must arise either from choice or necessity. It cannot be from choice, because this implies a physical contrariety between the action which is produced, and that cause which produced it. Where there is a physical contrariety, there can be no relation ; and what has no relation, can neither be an effect nor cause. The idea of choice, therefore, involves in it this contradiction, that there is a relation between the cause and its effects, and no such relation at the same time.* Neither can it be from neces-

* In such a supposition it would be necessary to exclude from our conception the immateriality and simplicity of the soul's essence, in order to qualify for destruction by that stamen of corruption under supposition.

† In all cases where there is the power of choice, existence is ob-

sity, because physical necessity must be for ever incompatible with physical freedom. And to suppose a conscious Being to act upon itself, from the impulse of physical necessity, supposes an *annihilation* of those powers, which are essential to the existence of that very consciousness, which is thus influenced by this physical impulse. For neither understanding, nor volition, are necessary to the existence of physical impulse; and if not necessary, they may be dispensed with; and we are left to form an idea of an immaterial substance, after we admit its essential properties to be destroyed.

If the soul perish through a necessity which is implanted within itself, either those *properties* of the soul which are necessary to its Being, must be in existence when it is thus impelled, or they must not. If they be in existence, we must admit their existence after their uses are supplanted by necessity. For as neither *understanding*, nor *will*, can be necessary to the existence of the soul, while it is impelled by physical impulse; if they exist, we must admit the *judgment* to exist while its decisions are rendered nugatory, *consciousness* to exist while its comprehension can afford no ground for action; and we must admit the existence of the *will*, which, while it is overruled by the impulses of necessity, must be blind to the relations of those things which it is presumed to choose of. And to admit a *judgment*, the decisions of which are rendered nugatory; *consciousness*, whose comprehension can afford no ground for action; and a *will*, which is blind to those objects it is presumed to choose; is to admit a judgment which cannot decide, consciousness which cannot comprehend, and a will which is destitute of choice. And to admit a judgment without decision, consciousness without comprehension, and a will without choice, will conduct us to a region which involves the mind in shadows; but whether of contradictions or absurdities, it is hard to say. But if these properties that are essential to the existence of the soul, be not in existence

viously implied; and as every act of the will must be the effect of that very power of choosing, we cannot conceive a desire of annihilation to arise on the part of that existence, which would necessarily imply the reverse of its own being in the choice thus made.

When the soul is thus impelled to destruction by necessity, we shall be obliged to suppose a previous annihilation of these properties, in order that an action may follow which is alone capable of producing annihilation, the absurdity of which every intelligent reader must discover. In admitting the existence of these properties of the soul when it is thus impelled, we must suppose their *natures* to be annihilated while the *properties* themselves remain: and in supposing these properties not to exist, we must suppose the soul to exist after those properties are destroyed, which are essentially necessary to the soul's existence. The soul, therefore, cannot perish from itself, either through choice or necessity.

Can the soul, then, perish through any external cause? All external causes must be either material, or immaterial, in their own natures; and if the soul perish through a material cause, it must perish through a cause which has no relation to it. Howsoever annihilation may be produced, the cause from whence it proceeds must communicate its influence, and that influence must be brought into contact with the object to be destroyed;—for where a cause can extend no influence, it can produce no effect. But to suppose a material cause, extending itself to an immaterial nature, is to suppose an extension of which it is necessarily incapable; which is a palpable contradiction. For to suppose any given substance to retain its own nature, and yet to extend beyond the physical boundaries of that nature; is to suppose it to retain its own nature, and not retain it, at the same time. The soul, therefore, cannot perish through a material cause.

It now remains to be considered, whether its annihilation can proceed from an immaterial cause. Whatever this immaterial cause may be, it is certain, that it must possess intelligence, because an immaterial power, which is abstracted from all intelligence, is a *nonentity*, of which we can form no conception. If, then, the soul perish through an immaterial, intelligent power, or agent, this agent must operate in its effects, quite contrary to its own nature; and this necessarily ends in the same contradiction, that the supposition does, of the soul annihilating itself through choice. For to suppose any intelligent agent to possess a power,

which produces an effect which is contrary to itself, and while it retains a nature which is contrary to the effect produced by it, is to suppose it capable of producing such an effect, and incapable of producing it at the same time.

If, therefore, the soul cannot perish from itself, either through choice or necessity, nor from any external cause; not material, because it is contrary to its nature; not immaterial, because it is similar to its nature; and because such considerations end in a palpable contradiction, it necessarily follows, that the soul must be immortal.

If nature, "which lives through all life," can produce annihilation, she must *act* in opposition to herself; for the annihilation of any substance, whether it be material or immaterial, cannot be produced by a mere cessation of support, but it must be a positive action. A mere cessation of assistance will terminate *support*; but the *negation* of support, does not imply the annihilation of that substance which was supported. The suspension of support, is the negation of an action; and to suppose a mere negation, to be able to perform a positive action, is a contradiction in terms.* It therefore follows, that the soul cannot perish by nature's withdrawing her support

Natural power is not the *cause*, but the *effect* of nature. The powers of nature could not have existed antecedent to nature, it is a contradiction to suppose it:—Nature must then have existed antecedent to its own existence. If natural power can only result from *matter* and *spirit*, (and without this it cannot be natural power) matter and spirit must both have existed antecedent to those powers which they produce; and, therefore, *natural power* cannot be even coeval in its *action*, with those substances on which it depends for its existence. And if natural power could not exist previous to, nor be coeval with, those substances on which it depends, and which it is the power of, it necessarily follows, that no natural power can destroy the soul; and

The suspension or withdrawal of support would have a tendency to derange previously existing relations; it would, however, be simply a negation tending to the production of no positive result; and annihilation could not ensue by that which ended in no positive result.

therefore, the soul must be inaccessible to annihilation. A power which is capable of acting, must certainly exist, otherwise it could not act; but to suppose a power to exist, which is capable of destroying that cause on which it depends for its own existence, is a contradiction in terms.*

It may, perhaps, be said, that "though no power can destroy its own cause, yet, as these powers result from distinct substances, one may annihilate another." This, however, will be found fallacious; for how, then, can the last substance be destroyed. This, on the principle of the objection itself, is absolutely impossible; and what is impossible to one, must be equally impossible to each individual of the same physical nature.

Whatever has a perfectly physical existence, must necessarily retain it; and what retains it, cannot be annihilated; and what is not annihilated, must necessarily be immortal.

As independence is necessary to the existence of a Being thus constituted, this independence must be inseparable from, and uniformly attached to it. For to suppose a Being to have a positive existence, which is only *partially* independent, is not only to make *that* independent which in reality is not so, but is to destroy the identity of its Being. It must, therefore, follow, that a Being which *thus* exists, must not only be independent, but must be invariably so. If, then, the soul be *invariably independent*, it must be inaccessible to all violence. If a Being, or substance, which is invariably independent, can be subjected to annihilation, the idea of its independence must be annihilated, previous to the annihilation of its Being. But to suppose an independent Being, which can lose its independence without being deprived of its existence, is a plain contradiction; and, therefore, the human soul must necessarily be immortal.

* If such was admitted, it would be to suppose an effect to exist after the cause had ceased from which it was necessarily derivable. Such a result would be opposed to the whole doctrine of causation.

SECT III.

Whether God can create an Immaterial Substance, and cause that Substance to exist, abstracted from all Life and Consciousness, or not?

WHETHER it be possible, or not, for the Great God to create an immaterial substance, abstracted from all life and consciousness, or to deprive an immaterial substance of life and consciousness, without annihilating the substance itself, is a point of speculation which I tremble even to approach.

It has been hinted by a celebrated writer, to whose name, since I have been acquainted with it, I have ever annexed the profoundest veneration, "that it is not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he please, superadd to our idea of matter, a faculty of thinking, than, that he should superadd to it *another substance* with the faculty of thinking." And to this sentiment it has been replied, "that if this be admitted, all *natural* proof of the soul's immortality must be done away."*

* I cannot but think, says Dr. Brown, that the too great caution of Mr. Locke, by giving the sanction of his eminent name to the possibility, at least, of the superaddition of thought as a mere quality, to a system of particles, which, as a number of particles, have no thought, and yet have, as a whole, has tended in a great degree to shelter the manifest inconsistency of the doctrine of the materialist. He was unwilling to limit the divine power; and from the obscurity of our notion of the connexion of the feelings of the mind, in any manner, with the changes induced in the bodily frame, he conceived that the annexation of thought to the system of particles itself, would be but a slight addition to difficulties that must at any rate be admitted. He forgot, however, that a system of particles, is but a name for the separate particles which alone have any real existence in nature; that the affirmation of what is contradictory, like plurality and unity, simplicity and complexity, is very different from the mere admission of ignorance; and that, though we may not know any reason for which the Deity has been pleased, at least during our mortal state, to render sensations of our mind dependent on affections of our nervous system, there is no more absurdity in the affirmation of such a dependence, than in the assertion of any other physical connexion of events,--of material phenomena with material phenomena, or of mental phenomena with other phenomena of the mind. If the

I would not have presumed to tread that hallowed ground, which is rendered almost sacred by the venerable footsteps of these great men, were not the subject of such a nature, as unavoidably to fall within my way. It is a question which suspends the mind between the demonstration of *what is*,—and the possibility of *what may be*;—and the question purely is—"Whether God can create an immaterial substance, and cause that substance to exist, abstracted from all life and consciousness, or not?" For in this the dispute finally resolves itself.

It is agreed by these great men, that matter, considered as such, does not include within it the ideas of life and consciousness; but whether an immaterial substance can exist, abstracted from life and consciousness, is quite another question, which seems to admit of some considerable doubt.

It is very evident, that consciousness must be either an essential property of an immaterial substance, or it must be an adventitious acquisition. If it be an essential property, it is a self-evident contradiction, to suppose an immaterial substance to exist after consciousness is abstracted from it, and in this case no *such* substance can exist where con-

presence of the moon, at the immense distance of its orbit, can affect the tendencies of the particles of water in our ocean, it may be supposed with equal readiness to produce a change in the state of any other existing substance, whether divisible into parts, that is to say, material,---or indivisible, that is to say, mind. But when thought is affirmed to be a quality of a system of particles, or to be one result of many coexisting states of particles, which separately are not thought, something more is affirmed than that of which we are merely ignorant of the reason. A whole is said to be different from all the separate and independent parts of a whole; this is one absurdity; and that which is felt by us in its very nature simple and indivisible, is affirmed to be only a form of that which is, by its very nature, infinitely divisible. It is no daring limitation of the divine power to suppose, that even the omnipotent himself cannot confound the mathematical properties of squares and hexagons; and it would be no act of irreverence to his power, though it were capable of doing every thing which is not contradictory, to suppose that he cannot give to a system of organs a quality wholly distinct from the qualities of all the separate parts; since the organ itself is only a name which we give those parts, that are all which truly exist as the organ, and have all an existence and qualities that are at every moment independent of the existence and qualities of every other atom, near or remote.

sciousness is not. But if consciousness be purely adventitious, it may be separated from this immaterial substance, without annihilating the substance itself: but in admitting this, we shall necessarily break down the only barrier, which divides a *material* from an *immaterial* nature; and *matter* and *spirit* must then have the same denominating *negations*. If, in all immaterial substances, consciousness be the only criterion by which that which *is*, can be distinguished from that which is *not*; and this consciousness be taken away, entity and nonentity must be the same thing;—but as this is totally impossible, it seems certain, that consciousness must be essential to the very nature of an immaterial substance.* And if we take off this only idea, which can certify to us the *actual* existence of such a substance, (in which this idea *must* be included) and yet admit the *possible* existence of this substance after this idea of consciousness is annihilated, we must admit the *possible* existence of that substance, while we admit that we have *no grounds whatever* for that possibility. And this leads us immediately to this contradiction—that *we know* it to be possible, and yet *do not know* it at the same time.

If an *immaterial* substance be created, destitute of all *life* and *consciousness*, or, deprived of these properties, its real substance remaining; I would ask—Is this substance (thus deprived of life and consciousness) *matter* or *spirit*? It is certain, that it cannot be matter, because it is *immaterial*; and it is equally certain, that it cannot be spirit, because it is destitute of that life and consciousness from whence alone spirit can be denominated: and, therefore, I conclude, that *life* and *consciousness* cannot be abstracted from an immaterial substance, that substance still remaining in existence. And as matter and spirit pervade all created nature; and as every essence, and species of essence, must necessarily be included therein; and as an immaterial substance, which has neither life nor consciousness, seems to

* In supposing an immaterial substance to exist, after the removal of that which distinguishes it from a mere nonentity, we are necessarily compelled to the admission of what we previously rejected; and therefore consciousness is essential to the very nature of an immaterial substance.

be necessarily excluded from both, it follows, with all the evidence (I conceive) that certainty can give it, that no *such* substance can be in existence; and consequently, that *life* and *consciousness* must be essential to its nature. To suppose an immaterial substance to exist, which has neither life nor consciousness, is to suppose it to be *spirit* and *not spirit*, to be *matter* and *not matter*, in the same instant.

That the Great God can create a Being, which partakes neither of matter nor spirit, is undoubtedly within the reach of Omnipotence: but such a Being, which must be at an equally physical distance from both, can have no kind of relation to either. And to suppose such a Being to exist within the confines of *matter* and *spirit*, which is at an infinite distance from each, and yet partakers of both, is a plain contradiction.

When, therefore, it is asked, "If God were to create an immaterial substance, endued with consciousness, could he not deprive that substance of its consciousness, without annihilating its nature?"* I confess I feel some hesitation in assenting to the proposition. With all deference to so great a man, I humbly conceive, that—to resolve all into God's Omnipotency, is not giving the question a fair statement.

The question rather is—"Can an immaterial substance, endued with life and consciousness, survive a privation of them, without undergoing such an alteration as must affect its identity?" If it cannot, the case is decided; but if it can, it must have suffered a privation, and yet remain entire—or, in other words, it must have undergone a change, and yet not have sustained any alteration in the identity of its nature at the same time: and how such a change can take place in a substance which is devoid of all parts, I confess I have not acuteness enough to discover. If any substance, under any modification whatsoever, be identified, not only the permanent primary qualities of it must be ascertained, but its secondary qualities also; for whatsoever that be, which denominates *identity* in any given substance, the same denominations are essentially necessary to its *re-*

* Locke.

cognition. It is this stability of the denominating qualities, which can alone divide identity from diversity, and ascertain to us that it is the same, and not another. If, then, the physical identity of substances be denominating from their real existence, not only the primary qualities, but the secondary also, must remain; because the secondary, resulting from the primary qualities, must depend upon their stability for their own existence; and where the secondary qualities of any substance are not the same, it is an undeniable proof, that the primary qualities of that *substance* are changed also, and consequently that its identity is totally destroyed. And, therefore, whether we consider consciousness to belong to the primary or secondary qualities of an immaterial substance, in either case, a privation of it must affect the identity of the substance itself; and that real or nominal essence which ascertained its identity, eluding all recognition, demonstrates that the primary identity of the substance is annihilated by the change.

These observations will, I conceive, apply to *all substances* in general; but when we particularly apply them to one that is immaterial, they acquire a more vigorous energy.

An immaterial substance can have no parts,—it is a contradiction to suppose it; and what has no parts, can, in its *nature*, undergo no modification; and what can undergo no modification, can never lose its identity. If, then, consciousness be an essential property of this substance, it can never be lost; if it be only adventitious, it can never be connate with, nor exist in it, by inhesion. If consciousness be a primary quality of an immaterial substance, it is impossible that it can be separated from it, unless the identity of that substance be annihilated. If it be a secondary quality, it must depend upon the stability of the primary ones for its existence; and while these primary qualities remain, consciousness must continue. And if, to destroy a primary quality of any substance, be to annihilate the identity of that substance, it certainly must follow, that consciousness cannot be separated from an immaterial substance, but that if the substance remain, consciousness must continue for ever.

If all consciousness be purely *adventitious*, an immaterial substance may exist without it, and there can, then, be no such thing as a *real* conscious Being in nature; consciousness, then, cannot be *necessary* to the existence of spirit; and an *animated, conscious Being*, may exist without *animation or consciousness*.

If consciousness be only adventitious, and not an essential property of an immaterial substance, I would ask—If God were to take away this consciousness, by what can the actual existence of the substance be ascertained? And will not all distinction between entity and nonentity be done away? And if so, must not entity and nonentity be the same thing? And is not the supposition of entity and nonentity being the same, a positive contradiction? And must not this contradiction be the necessary result, of admitting consciousness to be annihilated, while the substance remains? And if so, must not Mr. *Locke's* conclusions be wrong?

If God were to create an immaterial substance, abstracted from all life and consciousness, must not that substance be imperfect? And is not an *imperfect substance* the *negation* of a substance? If it be imperfect, can it, as a *substance*, possibly exist? If such a substance be not imperfect, must not life and consciousness be superfluous to its physical nature? And if superfluous, must not the inhesion of a conscious quality destroy its physical identity? And if its perfection be destroyed, can its physical nature remain? But if its physical identity be not destroyed nor altered, either by the *inhesion* or *abstraction* of life and consciousness, must not life and consciousness be a *nonentity*?

Can any quality incorporate with a simple substance, which is not essential to the nature of that substance, (and which of itself can have no abstract existence) without altering the nature or identity of that substance? * If it can,

* Mr. Drew here puts a case which was not necessary for placing the previous chain of reasoning in a clearer light. It is obvious that every simple and indivisible substance is in itself impervious to the incorporation of any thing hostile to its own nature; and that that which is supposed could not obtain. But, admitting for the sake of argument, that it could be as asked, it would not follow, as our author has concluded, that the substance is different from what it was before,

this contradiction must then follow,—that the substance is different from what it was before, and not different at the same time ; if it cannot, this conscious quality must have a positive existence, independent of that substance in which it is supposed to inhere ; and the idea of any other immaterial substance is a mere creature of the imagination. On the whole, if a substance, which undergoes no change, can be conscious at one time, and unconscious at another, the supposition includes within it this gross contradiction—that it is altered, and yet not altered at the same time ;—I therefore conclude, that consciousness must be essential to its nature.

If God were to create an immaterial substance, devoid of all consciousness, it is certain, that consciousness can be no way essential to its nature. And if this consciousness itself, cannot exist, abstracted from this immaterial substance ; and this substance be naturally destitute of it, How can an union between this *substance* and *quality*, call into existence, an energy of which both are totally destitute ? If it can, then both quality and substance must confer an energy which is possessed by neither, which is a contradiction ;*—if not, consciousness must be essential to its existence. An immaterial substance, which has neither life nor consciousness, can have no known property, either of *matter* or *spirit* ; and to place it under the denomination of either, is an equal contradiction, with the supposition of its being removed from both.

and not different at the same time. Such a deduction is unwarranted by the premises.

* This passage contains an assumption which no Immaterialist ever yet argued for. Mr. Drew's object is evidently to destroy what he conceived to be the doctrine asserted by Locke. The passage quoted from his Essay does not contain such an assertion ; all that Locke did was merely to throw out a suggestion as to the Omnipotency of Deity, which had reference only to the possibility of that power.

SECT. IV.

The Soul is a simple Essence, and cannot perish; neither can its essential Properties—An Objection answered—The Properties of Perception and Consciousness are physically united with the Substance of the Soul—Even the physical Nature of Matter remains incorruptible and entire.

THAT the human soul is a simple essence, has been already proved; and if so, it must follow, that it cannot perish. A simple essence can be but one, and nothing but this can be a conscious Being. If an essence, which is in existence, be perishable in its own nature, it must be because it is defective; and an essence which is simple, and is supposed to be defective in its own nature, seems to include this contradiction, that it is an essence, and not an essence at the same time. An essence, which is *simple* in its own nature, can include within it nothing but what is necessary to its own existence; for to admit any thing to be included in a simple essence, which is not necessary to the existence of that essence, is to annihilate its *simplicity*, in order to establish its nature; and does, in fact, destroy that very essence which is supposed to exist, abstracted from all extraneous properties. And if nothing can be included within this *essence*, but what is necessary to the existence of it; to suppose this essence, or any property of it, to be perishable in its nature, is to suppose that *what* is thus perishable, is *necessary*, and yet *not necessary* to the existence of the soul at the same time, which is a plain contradiction.

As an exclusion of all foreign acquirements is necessary to our idea of the soul's *simplicity*, nothing that is either hostile or foreign to its nature, can ever have access unto it; and what possesses in itself no perishable quality, and through the *pure simplicity* of its nature excludes all diversity, must necessarily be immortal.

As no physical essence can be defective, and as one that is not defective, must necessarily exclude all diversity; as nothing but a simple substance like this can be capable of

thinking, it is certain, that as man is a conscious Being, he must possess this *physically pure and simple substance*, which, in its own nature must be distinct from, and independent of, all corporeal Being; and with which, extension and figure can have no affinity or relation.

We have now before us, an essence which is physically simple, and which can include within it, nothing but what is necessary to its own existence; and the great question is—Can such an essence be perishable in its nature?

It is a self-evident proposition, that what is *simple* in its own nature, can have no parts; and what has no parts, can never lose them; and what has nothing which it can lose, can admit nothing to incorporate with its essence, while its simple nature remains; and what has nothing which it can either acquire or lose, can never be affected by modification. And to suppose an *essence*, which has nothing that it can either acquire or lose, to be capable of perishing, we must first suppose an annihilation of its *simplicity*, previous to the annihilation of its *Being*, which includes this contradiction, that it *is in existence*, and *is not in existence* at the same time. And as a contradiction cannot be admitted, the soul must be imperishable in its nature.

A Being, which continues simple, must be the same to-day that it was yesterday; and must be exactly the same to-morrow, for the same reason; and while this *physical simplicity* remains, it must continue the same for ever. And to imagine the annihilation of its *simplicity*, as preparatory to the annihilation of its *Being*, is to imagine the annihilation of its identity, and not the annihilation of it, at the same time.

As the continuance of every property of a simple substance, is necessary to the duration of its Being, it is certain that none of these properties can be lost. The properties which such a simple nature possesses, are, and must be, necessary to its existence; and the separation of them from one another, is the annihilation of its Being; but if the separation of these properties be impossible, it is certain, that this substance must remain perpetually the same.

The common principle in which these properties inhere must be a something distinct in idea, and in reality, from

either of these properties, considered in themselves ; which, taken in the aggregate, are essential to the existence of this substance. And though the idea which we form of this substance, be distinct from those which we form of the properties of this substance, yet the latter being necessarily included in the former, demonstratively precludes the possibility of their separation, and proves that union without which, the idea of substance itself can have no kind of existence. If, then, the soul can perish, every property which is essential to its existence, must expire ; and if each individual property expire, each individual property must be capable of perishing. But as it is a contradiction to suppose, that any essential property of any substance can perish, while that substance remains, so it is impossible that this substance can perish, unless its essential properties expire, to the existence of which these properties are necessary.

If the properties of the soul be imperishable in their own natures, because inseparable from one another, how can they acquire a perishing nature by inhering in one common principle ? Can the whole of that substance perish, of which no property can expire ? Or if the *inherence* of these properties be necessary to their own existence, *can* mere *inherence* destroy, what *without inherence* can have no existence ? If *inherence* be necessary to the existence of these properties, can it be made the vehicle of their annihilation ? If it can, *inherence* must be necessary, and yet not necessary to the existence of these properties ; if not, the whole must necessarily be immortal.

It is a self-evident proposition, that no property which is essential to the existence of any substance, can perish while that substance remains : and it is equally self-evident, that this substance, to the existence of which these properties are essential, cannot perish unless these properties expire. If, then, this substance, and the properties of this substance, be alike necessary to the existence of each other ; if these properties cannot expire while the substance remains ; and if the substance must remain until its essential properties perish,—it follows, that the human soul *must* be immortal.

I am well aware, that to the energy of this argument it will be objected, “that this is arguing in a circle,—that it

is making two ideas mutually to depend for support on one another, while neither of them can communicate that assistance to each other, which they mutually want." I have no doubt, that in all compounded bodies, this objection would be of force; but it must be remembered, that this is not a question about the *identity and diversity of body*, but about the *entity and nonentity of Being*. It has been abundantly proved, that the soul is a physically pure and uncompounded substance; and what is physically simple, can be (as to its essence) neither the subject of accidents nor modes:—And what is not the subject of either, precludes, through the very nature of its Being, that adventitious support, from which, if we separate compounded bodies, they can have no existence.

The two faculties of *will* and *consciousness*,* are necessary to our conception of that substance in which they inhere; though the abstract idea of that substance is distinct in point of *existence* but not of *nature*, from either. The support which these properties *derive* from their substance; and the support which the substance itself derives from those properties that are necessary to its existence, are neither *adventitious* nor *arbitrary*, but they are *physical*, and *absolutely necessary* to each other's Being. And where the simple properties, which are necessary to the formation of our ideas of immaterial substances, are founded in those substances; they afford to each other a certainty of support, not by any mutual dependence, but through an inseparable and necessary co-existence. And, therefore, as the soul is

* I think it necessary to inform the reader, that wherever the term "Consciousness" has occurred from page 181 to this place, I have used it to express that faculty which we possess, and which I have been endeavouring to prove to be an essential property of the soul: under this particular consideration, the activity of that faculty is quite remote from the point in hand. Whether this faculty be continually active, or whether its activity be occasionally suspended, is quite a distinct question, which I have considered in a former part of this Essay. All that I here contend for, is,---that an immaterial substance, with a faculty of thinking or consciousness, cannot lose this faculty, and yet retain its identity and nature; but, that the instant we suppose this faculty to be annihilated, that very instant it must cease to be an immaterial substance. DREW.

physically pure and simple essence, and as no simple essence can perish, its immortality arises, not only from the co-essentiality of its properties and substance, but from the apparent impossibility of its being otherwise than what it is.

And even matter itself, notwithstanding the various forms which it is capable of assuming, must be permanent in its primary nature; and although new forms are for ever attendant on the internal combinations of particles, and the external disposition of surfaces; and though these forms rise and perish in fleeting succession to one another, while the mere superficial observer is presented with nothing but portions of matter, which present their forms, and then disappear; the discerning eye penetrates deeper into the recesses of nature, and explores in those recesses, an essence, which can neither expire nor change. For although all particles of matter, by arrangement, configuration, and variable combinations, be subject to every modification of which their nature is capable, yet it is certain, that those particles which are thus arranged, figured, and combined, must be, in themselves, of a more permanent nature.—The existence of all matter must be confined within the limits of its nature, beyond the boundaries of which it cannot pass. If then, we suppose any given particle to be so reduced by divisibility on the one hand, that it is no longer capable of separation, and so bounded on the other, by the limits of its nature, that it cannot pass from what it is, to what it is not; we at once behold it in a state of permanency, which is imposed upon it through the necessity of things; and we behold it at once incapable of mutation or decay.*

In this state of physical permanency, it is very certain, that no single atom which is once in Being, can be lost. It may be diversified in a thousand forms; it may assume a variety of attitudes, and form new combinations with other particles, with which it had no previous association; but this can only affect its modification. It is still the same under every form; and modes and accidents will leave it perfect matter still. And if modes and accidents can only affect the configuration of its parts; and if the certainty of

* See note on page 126.

its nature exists, independent of all these mutations, even matter itself must be imperishable in its nature.

If, then, the physical nature of matter remain entire and incorruptible, upon what principle can we suppose an immaterial substance to expire? The same incorruptibility which is attached to the former, must necessarily be attached to the latter. And although an union may subsist between that which is *material*, and that which is *immaterial*, yet this union can no more affect the identity of the one, than it can affect the identity of the other; which, with each other, can have no *physical* connexion.

SECT. V.

The Soul is naturally independent, and cannot be approached by created Power—It cannot be separated, because of its Unity—The inherence of its Properties is not a Medium of Annihilation—It cannot lose its essential Properties, nor expire with them in one Act of Annihilation.

WHATEVER is a *simple* essence, can be dependent for its existence on no created power; and what is dependent on no created power, must be *naturally* independent. We know of nothing which can claim this privilege but *matter* and *spirit*: and whatsoever is thus naturally independent, must be incapable of receiving obstructions or violations, from any intrinsic cause; and to admit the interference of any external influence, is utterly inconsistent with the ideas of its unity and independence. If its unity and independence be admitted, (which necessarily must) all external influence must be prevented from approaching it, by a necessary exclusion.

If, therefore, the soul be incapable of being approached, because of its independence; and incapable of undergoing a separation, if approached, because of its *unity*, it must necessarily be immortal.

If the properties of the soul can have no existence, abstracted from their *inherence* in an immaterial substance; (and that they cannot, has been already proved) *inherence*

must be necessary to their existence ; and if *inherence* be necessary to their existence, it is a contradiction in terms, to suppose that *inherence* can ever be made the *medium* of their annihilation ; for if *inherence* can be made the medium of their annihilation, *inherence* must be necessary to their existence, and not necessary at the same time.—To suppose these properties to perish, abstracted from their *inherence* in a substance, is utterly impossible ; and to suppose them to perish through its *instrumentality*, or its being a medium of it, is a plain contradiction ; and, therefore, the human soul must necessarily partake of immortality

If the soul lose not its essential properties, it is utterly impossible that it should expire ; and if it lose them, it is necessary (in order to our knowledge of the fact) that we ascertain its loss ; but to ascertain its loss, is not only to ascertain a point which we admit to have no existence, but is to identify an absolute nonentity. If the soul lose its essential properties, it must be in one of these three ways ;—either *before* its *annihilation*, in the *act of annihilation*, or, *subsequent upon that annihilation* ; there is no other way within the reach of possibility

To admit the first case, is to suppose that the soul can, and does, survive the expiration of those properties which are essentially necessary to its existence ; and then we must admit these properties to be necessary, and not necessary at the same time.

To admit the second case, is to suppose that those properties may be *separated* from the soul, which are *inseparable* from it :—and that every property which is essential to the existence of the soul, must be possessed by it in that *moment* of duration in which they are separated from it, and in which they expire. For if the soul be not possessed of these properties in the *moment* of its annihilation, it can never lose them, nor be the subject of annihilation ; and if it be possessed of them, it cannot perish. If the mere *extinction* of all these properties, be the *identical act* of the soul's annihilation, the soul must perish without being separated from any thing which is essential to its nature ; or *sustaining the loss* of any thing which is necessary to its existence ; which of itself is a contradiction. A simple

Being, which is in the possession of all its essential properties, is not extinct; and one that is not in such possession, has no existence. If consciousness be an essential property of any Being, that Being cannot expire while this consciousness remains; and if that Being expire, which this consciousness is an essential property of, consciousness itself must expire, previous to the annihilation of that Being. Unless this be admitted, the Being itself must be imperishable in its nature; it being a contradiction to suppose any Being to expire, without being detached from those properties which denominate and certify its existence. But if consciousness be an essential property, the idea of its being detached from that substance which it is necessary to the existence of, includes this contradiction, that it is essential, and not essential at the same time.

To admit the third case, is to suppose that an essential property can survive the annihilation of that substance, to the existence of which, this property is necessary, and with which it must be co-essential. To conceive, therefore, that the soul, which is a simple essence, can be *separated from itself*,* is utterly impossible; and to suppose it to perish without such separation, is a contradiction: and, therefore, no simple essence can perish.

If, then, for the soul to lose its essential properties, be absolutely impossible; and if to expire without losing them be a contradiction; there remains nothing to be considered, but whether the soul, together with all its essential properties, can expire together, *in one act of annihilation*.†

It is very certain, that nothing can act before it has a Being; and if so, the soul cannot possibly perish through annihilation as its cause. Annihilation can certainly have no Being while the soul is in existence; and, therefore, the non-existence of the soul, is necessary to the existence of

* From those properties essential to its existence.

† Whether the supposition of annihilation, as assumed by our author, is within the range of possibility, as far as our conceptions of Deity is concerned, is what in this state of being we shall never be able to determine: but taken in connexion with Mr. Drew's chain of argument such conclusion is wholly inadmissible.

our idea or notion of its annihilation. And if annihilation can have no Being until the soul be reduced to an entire nonentity, it is absolutely certain, that the soul can never be thus reduced by that annihilation, which cannot exist, even in idea, until the soul be perfectly destroyed.

If annihilation could destroy the soul, it must act before it had any kind of existence, which is a flat contradiction. The non-existence of the soul, is necessary to our idea of its annihilation; and, therefore, the soul must be destroyed before it can be said to be annihilated. And if the soul be thus destroyed before we can have any conception of annihilation, annihilation can never be the cause of its destruction.

If the soul perish through annihilation, and the total *nonentity* of the soul be necessary to the idea of annihilation, the effect must have an existence prior to that cause which called it into Being: and the effect of this cause must be completed, before the cause which completed it, can have any kind of existence; the absurdity of which is too manifest to be refuted.

If the destruction of the soul be that which gives annihilation birth, annihilation must come too late to effect that purpose for which it is supposed to BE; for if the total *absence of Being* in the soul, be necessary to our conception of *annihilation*, the soul can never perish through that annihilation, of which we can form no conception until the soul be destroyed. But if the predestruction of the soul be necessary to the notion of its annihilation,—and if, without this previous destruction, it be impossible to form any idea of its annihilation; we behold, on both sides of the question, the most palpable contradictions.

For if, on the one hand, the soul be destroyed previous to the completion of its annihilation,—and if this utter loss of Being be necessary to our idea of annihilation,—the soul must be annihilated previous to its annihilation, and must be reduced to a nonentity, in order to the birth of that annihilation which is supposed to produce it,—the absurdity of which every reader must discover. If, on the other hand, we view the opposite member of the alternative, and conceive that no such predestruction of the soul is necessary to the idea or its annihilation; and that annihilation may take

place upon it, without first conceiving, and annexing to it the utter loss of Being; we must behold annihilation, while nothing is annihilated; and we must conceive the utter loss of that very Being, which we behold in existence; the absurdity of which needs no further pursuit. And as the contradiction is equal on each side, it must follow, as an immovable consequence—that the soul cannot perish through annihilation.

SECT. VI.

No act of Annihilation can destroy the Soul—Objection that the utter Privation of Being is the annihilating Act. considered.

THE certain and actual *existence** of an action must necessarily precede all effects which can result from that action;

* I here use the word “existence,” in preference to the word “completion,” as being more expressive of that idea which I wish to convey. In an action (if such there be) which does not include progression, the word “completion” might convey an erroneous idea; and yet so much are we accustomed to those actions which apply to compounded bodies, that we feel it difficult to find words that are exactly adequate to those ideas which we wish to express. In compliance, therefore, with our customary modes of speaking, I have, in the following pages, occasionally introduced the word “completion,” not from any conviction of its strict propriety, but from a difficulty in making the word “existence” to be understood to include completion, when it applies to an action through which an immaterial substance is supposed to perish. That the word completion, implies progression and previous incompleteness, I readily admit, and for that reason I consider the word inapplicable to the case in hand. For since an immaterial substance can have no parts, the action which destroys it, can have no progression. There can be no room for a progressive action, in that substance which has neither interior nor surface;—progression can never apply to that, to which it is inapplicable. I have said, in page 179, that “that which destroys the soul, must be a positive action;” but how an action can possibly exist, which excludes progression, I believe it is impossible to conceive. That the idea of an action which excludes progression, includes a contradiction, is not difficult to prove; which will afford us another evidence that no such action can possibly exist;—and consequently, that the human soul must be immortal. DREW.

and if so, the soul can never be destroyed by that action through which it is supposed to be annihilated. For if the actual annihilation of the soul, be necessary to the existence of the *annihilating act*, the annihilating act can never be the *occasion* of the soul's annihilation. The annihilation of the soul being necessary to the existence of this supposed action, the action itself can never produce that annihilation, upon which this action itself depends for its own existence; and, therefore, no act of annihilation can ever destroy the soul.

Whether the idea of an action be *real*, or *relative*, it is only the actual existence of that action, which can give to the mind any idea of its Being,—it is a contradiction to suppose otherwise. But if the actual existence of an action, be necessary to the existence of any thing which can result from that action, the soul can never perish by an annihilating act. For if we suppose the soul to perish by an *annihilating act*; and admit that nothing can result from an action, until that action certainly exists; we must suppose the soul to be annihilated, previous to the existence of that *annihilating act*, by which it is supposed to be destroyed.

As no cause whatever can produce any effect, until that cause is in actual existence, the act of annihilation, through which the soul is supposed to perish, must have a certainty of existence, previous to that annihilation which it is supposed to produce,—it is a contradiction in terms to suppose otherwise. But if the certainty of the existence of that action, be necessary to the annihilation of the soul, we must suppose the existence of this action antecedent to the soul's annihilation, which is a contradiction also; and, therefore, since no such thing as an annihilating act can possibly exist, the human soul must necessarily be immortal.

To admit the soul to be annihilated previous to its annihilation, is a self-evident contradiction. To suppose it to be annihilated by an action, which of itself cannot exist until the soul be actually deprived of Being, is to make an action to produce effects previous to its own existence. And to suppose the soul to perish subsequent upon its own annihilation, is an absurdity too gross to be refuted. And if the soul can neither perish previous to the act of annihila-

tion, nor by the act of annihilation, nor subsequent upon it, the self-evident result is—that it must necessarily be *immortal*.

It may, perhaps, be said, “that the utter privation of Being, is the annihilating act.” But that such an act of privation can possibly exist, I must confess I have considerable doubts. For if nothing can be said to be annihilated, but what has suffered the utter loss of Being, instead of admitting the *act of privation* to be that which destroys the soul, the *total privation of Being*, must be necessary to our idea of that *act of privation* through which the soul is supposed to be destroyed. And, therefore, the *perfect completion* of the action, is not only necessary to our idea of that action, but to that effect also, which the objection attributes to the action while in a progressive state, and which the action is supposed to produce, before it can be said perfectly to exist itself. *Total privation* cannot be said to exist, until the soul is perfectly destroyed; and that act can never destroy the soul, which cannot be said to be in Being, until the soul is no more; for it is the total extinction of the soul, which can alone give *complete existence* to that act, by which the objection supposes it to be destroyed. For if the privation of Being, be that very act which terminates in *complete annihilation*, the soul can never perish through that act of privation, which can have no complete existence, neither in idea, nor in reality, until the soul is perfectly destroyed.

If the existence of an action be necessary to the existence of itself, which no man can deny, the action, which is supposed to accomplish any event, must necessarily exist in the order of nature, before that event can be accomplished by it. But in admitting this conclusion, we shall be obliged to admit the existence of an annihilating act, while we admit nothing to be annihilated by it; and the soul will then be admitted by us, to be annihilated, and not annihilated at the same time. If, on the other hand, we reject this conclusion, and adopt the opposite member of the alternative, we shall then be driven to this conclusion—that an action may exist before it has any existence—and, that the soul itself may be annihilated by an action, which cannot

have any kind of existence itself, until the soul is perfectly reduced to nothing by it.

To suppose the privation of Being, to be that act* through which the soul is reduced to nothing, while the perfect *nonentity* of the soul is necessary to the existence of the act of privation, and is that, from whence both privation and annihilation are denominated; is to make the idea of the act of annihilation, to exist antecedent to that perfect nonentity of Being, from whence alone annihilation can be denominated; which is an evident contradiction. And to suppose the soul to be annihilated by an action which is *not* an annihilating one, is to attribute to that action, an effect which is precluded by its very name and nature;—the soul to be annihilated by an *action*, which is not an annihilating one, is a plain contradiction in terms. Can any effect result from an action, before that action has a Being? If there can, an effect must be produced by that which has no existence; if there cannot, no act of annihilation can destroy the soul; and that which cannot be destroyed by an act of annihilation, must necessarily be immortal.

If, then, the soul cannot be annihilated, either by what is supposed to be an annihilating act, or by an act which is not an annihilating one, nor abstracted from either, the plain consequence is—that no such thing as annihilation (according to those modes of reasoning which God has placed within the reach of human intelligence) can possibly take place; and, therefore, the soul can never perish by it. And that which is not placed within the reach of annihilation, must necessarily be immortal.

I am well aware, that to this mode of reasoning, it will be objected—"that if the mode of reasoning which I have adopted in the preceding pages, be admitted, it will amount to a total denial of all possible action." This, however, I conceive, upon a more minute survey, will be found to be an erroneous conclusion. Confined as we are within the circle of compounded bodies, a strange association of ideas, has led us to apply the modes of dividing compounded bod-

* The effect of that act?

ies, to the annihilation of simple substances, though the actions, which are peculiar to each, can have but little or no relation to one another.

That all human actions include *progression* in their very nature, is a truth, which I believe, no one will attempt to deny; and the admission of this principle, will prove to us a decisive difference between those actions which apply to the division of compounded bodies, and those which will apply to the annihilation of an immaterial substance.

Let us suppose, for instance, the action of my hand, with which I am now writing,—it is an action which includes *progression*; but the action through which I am now writing, though it may be said to exist, yet it cannot be said to be a *complete book-writing action*, until the book is completed; for it is the completion of the book, which can alone *denominate* it to be a *complete book-writing action*. But if, in the midst of my writing, the action of my hand be suspended, the action is only *complete* in an exact proportion to the quantity which I have written; and it is from this partial completion of the book alone, that the action can then be denominated. But where the *subject* under consideration is so *simple* in its nature, that the idea of *progression* must necessarily be excluded from the action,—where these actions will not apply,—there no medium can possibly exist, between *perfect* annihilation and *perfect* existence.

If we again suppose the existence of an action, through which an *apple* is divided into two equal parts, the action can only be *complete* in proportion to the quantity divided; but it is the total separation of its parts, which can alone denominate the action, to be a *complete apple-dividing action*. But whether we admit the progress which this action has made, to be partial or complete, it is the progress of the division alone, which can determine the specific quantity of the action which exists. In an action which applies to the division of compounded bodies, the action may be said to *exist* before it is *complete*; but in an action which is supposed to annihilate an immaterial substance, there can be no medium whatever between *existence* and *completion*. And as, in the order of nature, the action must *exist* before

the soul can be annihilated by it ; and as the annihilation of the soul can alone denominate it to be an annihilating act certain it is, that if the soul perish, it must perish by an action which is not an annihilating one. But in admitting the soul to be annihilated by an action, which is not an annihilating one, we admit a palpable contradiction ; and attribute to the action, an effect, which must be *excluded* from it, both by its name and nature.

An Apple may be partially divided ; this Book may be partially written ; and in either case the action may be suspended in this partial state ; but when we apply any action to the annihilation of the soul, no such medium of suspension can possibly be admitted.—Between *completion*, and *nonexistence*, there can be no medium, because there is nothing which can be divided ; and where there is nothing which can be divided, there the action which applies, can know no distinction between *beginning*, *progression*, and *end*. Simple *existence* must comprehend and encircle all.

If the action, through which an immaterial substance is supposed to be annihilated, be of the same nature with those actions through which compounded bodies are divided, it is certain, that such an action must include *progression* ; unless this be admitted, the actions cannot be alike. But if an annihilating act be admitted to include *progression*, I would ask,—If in the progressive state of this annihilating act, God were to suspend this action, would the soul be annihilated or not ? It is very certain, in this case, that it could be neither. It is certain, that the soul cannot be in existence, because an action has so far passed upon it, as to be denominated an *annihilating* one ; and it is equally certain, that the soul cannot be reduced to a nonentity, because that action has been suspended, through which its perfect annihilation could be alone accomplished ; and how a simple Being, which has no parts, can be partially annihilated, and partially in existence, I must leave for those to decide who can reconcile contradictions.

It may, perhaps, be said—“ that in compounded bodies, there can be no medium between *division*, and no division,—that an *apple* must be either sound or injured.” The truth of these positions I readily admit ; but I still contend, that

the action which produces an injury, must include *progression*. Unable as we are, through the want of acuter organs to penetrate the minuter parts of compounded bodies, we must content ourselves with that evidence which analogy supplies.

If the division of *two* particles, in any given portion of matter, can be accomplished by an action which has no progression, *four* may be divided in the same manner, and for the same reason; and we may extend the same principle, even to the division of the *Globe*. In the division of larger bodies, progression becomes visible, because it is more suited to our perception; but the *progression* of all actions which divide compounded bodies, must be in an exact proportion to the quantity of matter which is divided. As an action which divides a world, includes progression, progression must be included in that action also which divides an apple; and progression must continue, so long as *parts* are included in the thing divided. But where there are no *parts*, there can be no *progression*; and where there is no progression, there can be no *action*; and where there is no action, nothing can suffer by it. An action, therefore, which includes progression, cannot apply to an immaterial substance; and an action which does not include progression, is a contradiction in terms. I therefore conclude;—that since all those actions with which we are surrounded, must include progression, because they apply to compounded bodies; and since an action, which includes progression, cannot apply to an immaterial substance, because it is uncompounded; the soul can never perish by any such action as those with which we are acquainted; and must, therefore, be immortal

SECT. VII.

The loss of Existence is necessary to the Idea of the Privation of Being—The extinguishing Act cannot be Privation. It is absurd to suppose the Pre-existence of the Actor that destroys the Being of the Soul—There can be no Evidence of the Fact of Annihilation—From the Mass of Evidence, the Author is fully satisfied that the Human Soul must necessarily be IMMORTAL.

NOR will it be of any avail, to exclude the term “annihilation.” The same reasonings which preclude the term, will equally apply to any action, which includes within it the loss of Being. Nothing that is in existence, can be said to be deprived of existence, while that existence remains—it is a contradiction to suppose it. And if nothing can be *deprived* of Being, while it is in existence, the loss of existence must be necessary to the idea of that *privation*. And if the idea of privation can have no existence, until the utter loss of Being denominates privation of Being to *exist*; that *extinction of Being*, which is supposed to be effected by privation, must necessarily *precede* the existence of the idea of privation. And if *this* idea (of privation of Being) be necessarily preceded by *that* of the *extinction* of Being, from whence this privation is denominated; the idea of privation must necessarily be excluded from entering into the production of *that nonentity*, from the completion of which alone, the certainty of privation can be called into existence.

If the perfect *nonentity* of Being be not necessary to the certainty of privation, privation may exist, although the Being remain entire; and then the conclusion will be,—that privation is not necessary to its own existence. But if the perfect *nonentity* of Being, be necessary to the certainty of the *privation of Being*, the extinguishing act cannot be this privation.

To suppose *privation of Being* to be the identical act of annihilation, the completion of which is necessary to the existence of the very idea of privation, is to make *privation* to exist *antecedently* to its own existence. For as the com-

pletion of the act, is necessary to the idea of *the act of privation of Being*, the thing itself can never contribute towards its own existence.

An action necessarily supposes the pre-existence of the actor. The supposition, therefore, that the soul can perish, either through "annihilation,"—"the privation* of Being,"—"the utter loss of existence," or any term of synonymous import; conceives either or each of these ideas,—to have an *action* in that very *ruin* of the soul, upon *which* each idea necessarily depends for its existence. And to suppose either of these ideas thus to act, is to make them contribute to their own Being, and to act before either could possibly have any kind of existence.

And even if any substance be annihilated to be *certified* of the fact, its annihilation must be *ascertained*. And to ascertain its annihilation, something must survive the annihilated substance, which bears some relation to it; and if any such *relation* survive, the existence of this relation, which is supposed to ascertain the annihilation of that substance which it is the relation of, will sufficiently demonstrate that no such annihilation has taken place. And if nothing can ascertain the fact it can never be known, although annihilation were possible.

The mere *absence of Being*, can never be a proof of the annihilation of Being, while the infinitude of space is too great for finite comprehension: and *mere absence*, is all that can possibly survive the annihilation of any substance.

If any Being be admitted to be annihilated, there must be some evidence to support the mind in the belief of the certainty of that nonentity of Being which it adopts; and the only possible evidence which it can have, must be the *total absence of all Being*; which evidence can never be obtained by created Beings, till a finite mind can pervade an infinite expansion, which is impossible, because it is a contradiction. And if annihilation can never be known, unless the knowledge of it be supported by evidence; if the only possible evidence, be the mere absence of all Being;

* It may not be unnecessary to say,---that from page 199, to the conclusion of the work, I have used the word "privation," as being synonymous with "annihilation." DREW.

if the total absence of all Being can never be ascertained until a finite mind can grasp what is infinite ; and if to grasp infinity be a contradiction ; it necessarily follows, that the *possibility* of annihilation can never be known, even admitting that it were a fact.

Annihilation can never be admitted, where there is no evidence to support the mind in that belief ; and the admission of evidence must necessarily contradict that fact which it is designed to prove and establish.

And, therefore, from this mass of evidence, drawn purely from the fountain-head of nature, uncorrupted by literary prejudices, and unshackled by any bias of education, fully satisfied I am, that the human soul must necessarily be IMMORTAL.

